Delineating policies: governing spaces with no coextensive institutions:metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities in the United States by Favre-Bulle, Thomas Charles Marie Pierre
POUR L'OBTENTION DU GRADE DE DOCTEUR ÈS SCIENCES
acceptée sur proposition du jury:
Prof. M. Fröhlich, président du jury
Prof. D. Dietz, directeur de thèse
Prof. C. Maumi, rapporteuse
Prof. D. Kübler, rapporteur
Prof. J. Lévy, rapporteur
Delineating policies.
Governing spaces with no coextensive institutions: 
metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities 
in the United States.
THÈSE NO 7776 (2017)
ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE
PRÉSENTÉE LE 14 JUILLET 2017
 À LA FACULTÉ DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT NATUREL, ARCHITECTURAL ET CONSTRUIT
ATELIER DE LA CONCEPTION DE L'ESPACE
PROGRAMME DOCTORAL EN ARCHITECTURE ET SCIENCES DE LA VILLE
Suisse
2017
PAR
Thomas Charles Marie Pierre FAVRE-BULLE

Abstract
Many policies are spatially targeted: they attempt to foster or 
incent policy actions in areas meeting specific criteria. The identi-
fication and delineation of the spatial reality of interest is a major 
challenge to spatially targeted policies. In many cases, this spatial 
reality has an ambiguous meaning and no coterminous governing 
institution, leading to the need for institutional collaboration around 
policies.
This project investigates the discrepancy occurring when the 
functional space relevant for polices and the institutional space of 
government produced by historical processes do not share the same 
extent. The research examines two spatial realities of importance 
for public policies in the United States: metropolitan areas and 
disadvantaged communities. Because they are the main social unit 
of urban life, metropolitan areas—such as the San Francisco Bay 
Area—are the target of housing or economic development policies. 
Disadvantaged communities are targeted by programs intending to 
mitigate inequalities between communities. In both cases, specialists 
and laymen alike have a sense of what these spatial realities are, but 
charting a robust, actionable definition is problematic. 
The three articles of this doctoral project form a coherent path 
to scrutinize and resolve the spatial reality / institutional space 
disjunction. The first, Delineating the space of urban life, investigates 
spatial practices of individuals and how, collectively, they cast a 
unit of urban life, the metropolitan area. The second paper, On point: 
designing robust spatial targeting for public policies, analyzes how these 
practices can be integrated in a robust policy targeting, taking the 
example of disadvantaged communities in California. The third pa-
per, The place and scale of consent takes a bottom-up approach to show 
how individuals perceive and express preferences for resolving that 
discrepancy.
I show that neither of the currently used definitions for metropol-
itan areas and disadvantaged communities is robust because they 
use a strict threshold on a continuous metric that is not exhibiting 
clear breakpoints. Furthermore, definitions are not geographically 
consistent. A single definition does not capture the same reality of a 
metropolitan area in a coastal region or in the rural west, or of a dis-
advantaged community in a large urban region or in a rural county. 
Therefore, these definitions fail to provide a dependable policy tar-
get. Moreover, I show that local preferences for policy collaboration 
to resolve the discrepancy vary geographically, further undermining 
the relevance of a one-size-fits-all definition.
I recommend that definitions of spatial targets for policies use a 
continuous scale instead of a discrete, binary one. These definitions 
should also be adapted to the geographical context they are applied 
in. Randomized vignette experiments can be used to understand 
residents’ preferences.
Keywords
metropolitan areas; disadvantaged communities; survey experi-
ments; United States; public policy

Résumé
De nombreuses politiques publiques ont un objectif spatial: elles 
tentent d’influer sur un territoire dont les contours sont définis par 
des critères spécifiques. L’identification et la délinéation des réalités 
spatiales visées est un enjeu majeur des politiques spatiales. Dans de 
nombreux cas, cette réalité spatiale a un sens ambigu et ne dispose 
pas d’institution en partageant les contours exacts, ce qui conduit à 
la nécessité d’une collaboration entre institutions existantes autour 
de la politique à conduire.
Ce projet de recherche examine l’écart produit lorsque l’espace 
des pratiques sociales, producteur de réalités spatiales, et l’espace 
institutionnel de gouvernance ne partage pas la même étendue. 
J’examine deux réalités spatiales d’importance pour les politiques 
publiques aux États-Unis: les aires métropolitaines et les commu-
nautés désavantagées. Parce qu’elle sont l’unité principale de la vie 
urbaine, les aires métropolitaines font l’objet de politiques publiques 
visant le logement ou le développement économique. Les commu-
nautés désavantagées sont ciblées par des programmes visant à 
corriger les inégalités. Dans les deux cas, spécialistes et profanes ont 
un sens de ce qu’elles recouvrent, mais leur définition précise pose 
problème.
Les trois articles de ce projet doctoral forment un parcours 
cohérent pour examiner et résoudre l’écart entre réalités spatiale et 
institutionnelle. Le premier, Identifying the space of urban life, exam-
ine la définition officielle des aires métropolitaines à la lumière des 
mouvements de pendularité. Le second, On point: designing robust 
spatial targeting for public policies, évalue la définition des commu-
nautés désavantagées en Californie et comment les pratiques socia-
les peuvent former la base d’un objectif robuste de politique spa-
tiale. Le troisième, The place and scale of consent, part des individus 
pour montrer comment ils perçoivent et expriment leur préférences 
pour la collaboration inter-gouvernementale dans les aires métro-
politaines pour résoudre cet écart.
Je montre qu’aucune des définitions officielles, aires métropol-
itaines ou communautés désavantagées, n’est robuste. Ces défi-
nitions utilisent un seuil strict appliqué à une métrique continue 
sans point de rupture clair. Par ailleurs, ces définitions ne sont pas 
géographiquement stables. Une définition unique ne capture pas la 
même réalité métropolitaine à l’est ou à l’ouest des États-Unis, ou le 
même désavantage économique dans une région urbaine ou rurale. 
Ces définitions échouent à fournir un objectif de politique publique 
cohérent. Par ailleurs, je montre que les préférences locales pour la 
collaboration inter-gouvernementale varient géographiquement.
Je recommande que la définition des objectifs géographiques 
des politiques publiques utilisent une métrique continue plutôt que 
binaire, et s’adaptent au contexte géographique local. Par ailleurs, 
la méthode des enquêtes expérimentales peut permettre de mieux 
comprendre les préférences locales.
Mots-clé
aires métropolitaines; communautés désavantagées; enquêtes ex-
périmentales; États-Unis
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Numerous public policies feature explicit spatial dimensions.
Many others bear spatial effects. Understanding and delineating
this space is particular challenge for policy makers and scholars
alike. This challenge is compounded by a discrepancy between
spaces of social life and spaces of institutions tasked with policy
definition and implementation.
Spatial realities, forged and enlivened by societies, are complex,
fluid, multi-dimensional, sometimes rapidly evolving and seldom
obvious to the observer. Space has taken an important role in the
understanding of social phenomena, driven by a conceptual re-
newal of the role of space in social sciences and humanities1 and 1 Warf and Arias 2008.
a novel permeation of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) in
these scientific fields, permitted by an increasingly shared reliance
on computation.2 In spite of this renewed armamentarium, socio- 2 Goodchild and Janelle 2004.
spatial realities, although powerful tools to understand societies,
remain elusive to who intends to delineate them precisely. Em-
bedding spatial dimensions in public policies, however, require
methods to tell them apart effectively. How to provide resources
to residents of disadvantaged communities if we do not know
what a disadvantaged community is? How to alleviate mishaps
in the housing market if the spatial structures and extent of housing
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markets are impenetrable? Beyond direct spatial targeting, policy
interventions often generate externalities—positive and negative—
and spillovers who can only be comprehended through their spatial
dimensions.
Spatial dimensions of political institutions appear equally com-
plicated, calling comparisons with layer or marble cake, “character-
ized by an inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients,
the colors appearing in vertical and diagonal strands and unex-
pected whirls”.3 But however complex institutional architecture 3 Grodzins 1960.
reveals itself, social space as a whole offers more dimensions and
changes more rapidly.
In this research I investigate the discrepancy between spaces of
social practice and spaces of institutions. Taking the example of
two spacial realities targeted by public policies, metropolitan areas
and disadvantaged communities, I evaluate the current official
definition and propose alternatives to improve policy efficacy. I
go beyond the policy-maker point of view to understand what
type of inter-governmental collaboration, and within which spaces,
do people support. The three papers composing this dissertation
form a coherent path to investigate the chasm between social and
institutional spaces.
The first paper, Identifying the Space of Urban Life: Delineating
American Metropolitan Areas evaluates the definition of metropolitan
areas as the functional units of urban America, traced from com-
muting patterns between places.
The second paper, On Point: Designing Robust Spatial Targeting for
Public Policies, The Example of Disadvantaged Communities in California
focuses on a smaller spatial reality, disadvantaged communities in
California, targets of social and spatial justice policies intending to
compensate for these communities relative lack of resources. By
looking at these communities and how the State of California looks
to profile and outline them, I reveal specifically geographic pitfalls
stemming from spatial biases. Using space and spatial statistics
as policy instruments opens a range of relevant policy pathways
but exposes policy-makers to the vagaries of spatial aggregation,
overlapping effects, scale, neighborhood effects and spatial autocor-
relation. . . all effects that should be addressed when space if used as
a policy instrument.
Lastly, the third paper, The Place and Scale of Consent: Individual
Support for Local Government Collaboration in California Metropoli-
tan Areas takes a bottom-up approach to understand the features
swaying people’s support for inter-governmental collaboration. So-
cial spaces are complex and institutional spaces are slow to adapt.
Moreover, institutions cannot capture in one delineation the intrica-
cies of social spaces. Therefore, public policies are often designed
and implemented by networks of collaborating institutions. Re-
search has been focusing on actions of policy-makers and evalua-
tion of the intrinsic merits of governance forms. Few, however, have
examined perceptions and motives of the people themselves. We
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might recognize that a given area is the right space to conduct land-
use policy, but what do people living in the area actually think?
What do they perceive as the legitimate space of action, to do what,
and how? I answer these questions with a survey experiment ex-
ploring land-use policy collaboration in California.
In this introductory chapter, I provide a higher level background
to understand the stakes of each of these three investigations. In
section 1 I portray attempts to resolve the discrepancy between
social and institutional space. Then, in section 2 I explain why
metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities are appropriate
case studies to approach spatial mismatches between spatial real-
ities and policy endeavors. In section 3 I describe how the United
States are a valid field of research to explore this question, in a fed-
eral system with a high degree of local autonomy, and important
institutional and social spatial fragmentation. Lastly, in section 4 I
lay out the general hypotheses for the research. These general hy-
potheses will be informed by the three papers looking at specific
configurations.
1 Crossing the chasm
Applied and theoretical scholars alike have recognized the discrep-
ancy between social and institutional space for a long time. They
have proposed ways to bridge the gap, either by directly reform-
ing institutions or by changing the way they act and interact with
each other. However, as I describe in the following, these endeavors
have largely focused on endogenous characteristics of institutions
and their personnel, rather than on their interactions with society
and its manifold spatial dimensions. At first, research has focused
on the architecture of governance, trying to define the right insti-
tutional form (1.1). In spatial terms, this focus on architecture has
materialized as a quest for the right scale of governance. In the
past decades, however, collaborative governance has occupied the
forefront. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, collaborative
governance offers a fresh focus on how existing institutions and
civil society actors create new ways of governance based on their
interactions. With collaborative governance has come a new focus
on the behaviors of policy-makers and stakeholders (1.2). These
two approaches, and the multiple nuances thereof, can be described
as respectively focusing on the right institutions and on the right
methods. Central to institutional reform and collaborative gover-
nance alike is the idea that policies can and should be evaluated,
regarding their efficacy or their legitimacy. However, there is little
consensus on the way to assess and measure them (1.3).
1.1 Institutional form
introduction 14
The right architecture. Political institutions have been the fo-
cus of policy studies for a long time, following the core tenet that
better institutions lead to better policies. Before widespread urban-
ization grew the spatial gap between institutions and social prac-
tices, Alexis de Tocqueville described America’s political virtues by
its institutions.4 Tocqueville focused at once on both the architec- 4 De Tocqueville 1835.
ture of institutions and its harmony with American society. This
double dimension, intrinsic virtue and adequacy to social function-
ing, will continue to be the yardstick of institutional evaluation.
For much of their history, political sciences have taken a theoretical
and normative approach, embracing an empirical turn World War
II onwards.5 Emphasizing in turn collective decision making or 5 Dahl 1961.
competition to satisfy individual preferences, political scholars have
often approached these questions through an institutional prism.
What are the right institutional forms to achieve these goals?
The right scale. In spatial terms, the focus on institutional forms
translates into a pursuit of the right scale and the right extent. The
affiliation of an institutional form with an univocal space dates
from antiquity, where the question of the right form of government
was tied to that of the right size of the polity.6 How many men 6 Ostrom 1972.
can govern themselves and what is the geographic extent that this
government can reach? Expectedly, more contemporary schools of
institutional form comport a comparable spatial dimension. Insti-
tutional reform schools calling for government consolidation insist
that governments should grow in extent to follow the growth of
urban settlements.7 Public choice theorists posit that only small 7 Jones 1942; Briffault 1996.
governments can satisfy the aggregated preferences of their popu-
lations.8 Moreover, they contend that multiple small governments 8 Tiebout 1956.
offer people a choice to move to one that is in line with their pref-
erences. Debates over the right scale have not withered and con-
temporary debates about institutional form in urban environment
grapples with questions of delineation.
1.2 Collaborative governance
Collaborative governance has brought an alternative to the focus on
institutional by investigating practices of government and policy
rather than their architecture. At the core of collaborative gover-
nance is the idea that institutions, and individuals therein, have an
autonomy of action going well beyond what is captured by insti-
tutional architecture. Consequently, the architecture of institutions
is less important than the context they are placed in, the path they
have taken, and the individuals they are composed of. In a network
of distributed agency, institutional reform carries limited clout. By
focusing on relations between agents through fieldwork and em-
pirical analysis, scholars have built an understanding of political9 9 Fenno 1978.
and administrative personnel.10 Starting from an understanding of 10 Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007.
the practices and relationships between formal institutions of gov-
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ernments,11 collaborative governance has progressively broadened 11 Ostrom 1972; Poteete, Janssen, and
Ostrom 2010.its purview to include organized civil society actors and a variety
of other agents and stakeholders. The term is now largely used to
described collaboration between state and non-state agents.12 Col- 12 Ansell and Gash 2007.
laborative governance is as much descriptive as it is prescriptive.
Proponents of collaboration argue that this form of governance, by
increasing information and deliberation, produce higher quality
outcomes, as well as appear more legitimate.
1.3 Efficacy and legitimacy
Both institutional form and collaborative governance measure the
relative merits of institutional arrangements in terms of efficacy,
legitimacy, or both.
Efficacy measures the ability of an institution to deliver the policy
it is supposed to be delivering. Beyond efficacy, efficiency measures
the institution’s capacity to do so optimally, without wasting time
and resources. Both efficacy and efficiency are measures of a pol-
icy’s output. Efficacy arguments run into measurement problems
however, as it is often difficult to assess of effective and efficient a
specific policy is.13 Direct cost can be measured to some extent, but 13 Ostrom 1973; Andrews, Boyne, and
Walker 2006.only captures part of a multi-faceted and complex set of benefits
and policy externalities. The direct cost of policing, for instance,
can be relatively straightforward to assess, but its benefits are not.
Policies have effects in different time-frames, so that a complete
cost-benefit analysis, if at all possible, might only be reachable long
after the policy has been conducted. An important question for
this research is the possibility of optimizing for efficacy and effi-
ciency and the extent to which these arguments bear any weight in
people’s preferences for a policy.
Legitimacy measures the degree to which how a policy is de-
signed and implemented adheres to standards of political legiti-
macy, often defined by democratic and social justice values, mainly
looking at a policy’s input and throughput. Several hurdles lie
on the way of evaluating a policy instrument’s legitimacy. The
first obstacle is that individual preferences are seldom transitive.14 14 Tversky 1969.
Overall, a person’s set of preferences towards policy might present
paradoxes or be downright incompatible the ones with the others.
A second obstacle is that preferences do not aggregate easily, es-
pecially with voting methods generally in use.15 Aggregation, in 15 Arrow 1950; Farrell 2011; Nurmi
2012.turn, is a source of more intransitivity. A third obstacle is that in-
dividual preferences are not fixed. People might prefer one policy
over another at one time, but change their mind and switch pref-
erences a while later.16 This can be due, in part, to neighborhood 16 Jennings and Niemi 1975.
and social reinforcement effects whereby individual start to align
their preferences with ones of their neighbors, friends and acquain-
tances. Then, people’s preferences are not context-less. Preferences
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declared in surveys, for instance, have limited predictive power
for actual decisions. The context in which people make decisions
matters considerably.17 Even for matters as important as retirement 17 Kahneman and Tversky 1979.
savings, for instance, changing the context and the way the decision
is presented has sizable effects on decisions. For all these reasons,
empirically measuring legitimacy by comparing policy instruments
and outcomes to people’s preferences presents critical caveats.
In addition to empirical efforts to measure legitimacy, norma-
tive approaches of political theory attempts to measure legitimacy
of a process by comparing it to a prototypic ideal of justice and
democracy.18 The major quandary of this approach is one of exter- 18 Manin 1987.
nal validation of the theory of legitimacy that we should compare
actual policy instruments to. Again, an important question for this
research is the question of people’s preferences for forms of legiti-
macy, and tis influence on supporting one institutional or another.
Can we find external validation for theories of legitimacy?
2 Two spatial realities without institutions
I approach the discrepancy between social and institutional spaces
by focusing on two spatial realities of different scales: metropolitan
areas and disadvantaged communities. These two spatial reali-
ties offer a good comparative and contrasted point of view on the
challenges of delineating policies with spatial dimensions. They
share four important characteristics. First, there is a wide consensus
about their existence with a general lay understanding of what they
are. Second, they do not have a coextensive local government or in-
stitution. Third, they are ambiguous to be challenging to define for
policy purposes. If we agree they exist, depicting them in precise
terms defies legislative and regulation attempts. In both cases there
is a simple but unidimensional and binary definition. Lastly, these
two spatial realities are the target of public policy programs with
critical consequences for their occupants, residents and neighbors.
I begin by describing metropolitan areas (2.1) and disadvantaged
communities (2.2) before developing their shared characteristics
(2.3).
2.1 Metropolitan areas
Metropolitan areas capture the urban regions forged by decades
of suburbanization and extension of urban settlement beyond the
limits of compact cities. They are functional units of urban life,
units of urban settlement where people live and travel for most of
their routine business. This routine mobility shapes regional job
and housing markets. Residents of a metropolitan area are highly
interdependent. residents of a metropolitan area are more linked
to each other, regarding their everyday occupations, than they are
to the rest of the country. They share common resources and com-
mon problems. Interdependency does not suppose homogeneity. A
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metropolitan area can be highly segregated, by income, by race, by
household status, often by multiple dimensions at the same time.19 19 Fischer et al. 2004.
Even living close but apart, however, metropolitan residents affect
each other through strong externalities. Whether they come from a
poor or a wealthy neighborhood, cars contribute to congestion all
the same, for instance. For this reason, many economic develop-
ment and housing policies, transit and transportation infrastructure
programs, are directed towards metropolitan areas.
Metropolitan areas are the focus of policies for functional rea-
sons. Because metropolitan areas are the best units of urban life,
urban problems pertaining to these functions are best understood
by looking at metropolitan areas. Strong interdependency begets
strong externalities. If this fact is little contested, the way to address
externalities is contested between proponents of consolidation,
competitions, or collaboration.
2.2 Disadvantaged communities
Disadvantaged communities are communities lacking resources
compared to the rest of the population. Poor neighborhoods have
been documented since science has been looking at cities. They
have been, under the lens of epidemiology20 or the study of poverty,21 20 Snow 1855.
21 Embree 1900.the first focal points of nascent urban sciences. To educated ob-
servers of cities, poor neighborhoods were sources of legitimate
questions if not problems, long before the city as a whole or wealth-
ier communities became so. Suburbanization and, later on, metropoli-
tanization, have created the conditions for an amplification and
transformation of segregation. Indeed, increase choice of commut-
ing driven by rail transit followed by individual cars and freeways
has given wealthier household options to surround themselves with
their own kind. If racial segregation has somewhat receded since
the Civil Rights movements in the 1960s, income segregation has
risen.22 22 Fischer et al. 2004.
In the United States very few policies have aimed at desegre-
gating neighborhoods by promoting social diversity.23 On the one 23 de Souza Briggs, Popkin, and Goer-
ing 2010.hand, social homogeneity provides better chances for local support
networks. On the other hand, diverse neighborhood provide more
opportunities, especially for children,24 while local social ties al- 24 Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016.
leviate trust issues between individuals of diverse backgrounds.25 25 Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008.
Since very little is done to diversify neighborhoods, public poli-
cies have prioritized mitigating neighborhood effects of economic
disadvantage by providing additional resources in compensation.
Among these programs intend to treat neighborhood-scale effects
of poverty are tax incentives for job location, magnets schools26 or, 26 Metz 2003.
like the program I examine in detail in this dissertation, assistance
for grant application. If identifying disadvantaged individuals and
household as policy beneficiaries is already challenging, adding an
element of spatial aggregation by targeting disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods contributes to blur the line further. Segregation does not
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create pure homogeneity, and even disadvantaged communities
are diverse. How to recognize, in aggregate, what makes disadvan-
tage? The same aggregate statistic, for instance median household
income can depict an array of vastly different realities, with house-
holds homogeneously clustering around the median value, or in
contrary constituting two groups at the lower and higher end of the
scale. Because of their smaller scale, disadvantaged communities
are particularly prone to geographic biases.
Disadvantaged communities are the focus of policies for social
reasons. It is not mainly because they offer channels for policy ef-
ficiency that they are centers of policy action, but because their
existence and life conditions in these communities hurt our sense
of justice and social fairness. Disadvantaged communities are con-
trasting complements to metropolitan areas for the investigation
of the discrepancy between social and institutional space. They
are, substantially, the product of the same forces that propelled
metropolitan areas into being: increased mobility and commuting,
and subsequent expansion of residential choice, combined with a
concentration of wealth production in large urban settlements.
2.3 Elusive realities with real consequences
Metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities are two sides
of the same coin, an increase in routine mobility and residential
choice since the end of the 19th century. They stand, however, at
vastly different scales. Where the measure of metropolitan areas
attempts to capture entire urban regions, disadvantaged commu-
nities are smaller scale units in the urban fabric. Far from isolated,
metropolitan areas take place in an increasingly important network
of large urban settlements, and disadvantaged communities often
fit into a pattern inside metropolitan areas. Both share four charac-
teristics making them strong grounds to investigate the discrepancy
between social and institutional spaces: 1. there is a general consen-
sus that they exist and they have a common sense definition 2. they
have usually no coextensive government or institutions 3. their pre-
cise delineations is elusive, and 4. they are the target of numerous
public policies
Spatial realities. Metropolitan areas and disadvantaged com-
munities are spatial realities. There is a general consensus that they
exist and are in fact relevant units of social space. Both concepts
have been subject of extensive scientific research for decades.
“Metropolitan areas” appears in 491 000 occurrences in Google
Scholar along with United States. “Disadvantaged communities”
appears in 30 300 occurrences. For metropolitan areas, the word
has risen in use in parallel with the reality. The use of the expres-
sion “Disadvantaged community”, however, is a more recent way
to describe what might have been named “poor neighborhood” be-
fore, in an attempt to neutralize social stigma and include a wider
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range of potential disadvantage. “Disadvantaged community” is
also used to describe non-geographic unit, involving any commu-
nity suffering from a disadvantage. For these reasons, contours of
disadvantaged communities are more blurry. Both realities have
graspable definitions. Metropolitan areas are urban spaces where
people live their everyday life. Disadvantaged communities are
local communities at a disadvantage, mostly economic.
No coextensive institutions. Metropolitan areas and disad-
vantaged communities have generally no coextensive government
or institution, in the United States. Attempts of consolidating local
government in metropolitan areas, or to create a new government
layer encompassing whole metropolitan areas have largely failed.
Few exceptions have not eliminated local governments but rather
complemented them. Disadvantaged communities come in all
shapes and form. Therefore, if they sometimes happen to coincide
with municipal boundaries, it is often not the case. On the contrary,
wealthy communities have been leading the way in municipal in-
corporation, precisely because they had access to more resources
and driven toward optimizing their fiscal environment and control-
ling access.27 27 Burns 1994.
Elusive delineations. If they have intuitive lay definitions,
metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities are difficult
to precisely delineate for policy purposes. Lay perceptions of the
same reality can be diverging and contradictory. For instance, every
resident of the San Francisco Bay Area has a sense of what the Bay
Area is, but what exactly are the contours of the Bay Area? Indi-
viduals perspectives are diverse, and someone commuting 50 miles
from North to South Bay everyday might have a different under-
standing of someone biking to work in San Francisco. By contrast
with the relative consensus on externalities, metropolitan-wide
identification is generally weak.28 Equally, there can be a general 28 Kübler 2005.
sense that a neighborhood is struggling economically, but very lit-
tle consensus on how to draw the border of this neighborhood.
Neighborhood identification and labeling is usually unstable.29 29 Coulton et al. 2001.
Metropolitan areas, and urban ensembles in general, have mul-
tiple definitions, but the White House’s Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) definition, implemented by the US Census Bureau,
serves as a reference.30 Disadvantaged communities do not benefit 30 Office of Management and Budget
2013.from such a standard.
Public policies. Absent operative ambition, realities with elusive
definitions have little relevance. Metropolitan areas and disadvan-
taged communities, however, are the intended targets of countless
public policies. Because they do not have coextensive institutions, it
behooves every policy to define precisely how to delimit them.
Metropolitan areas are targeted by policies from the Federal
government, State governments, and local governments collaborat-
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ing to solve common problems. These three layers often interlace
and instruments mandated by the Federal government, such as
metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) are also vested by state
programs with other policy powers. Metropolitan policies most
often deal with domains presenting strong metropolitan-wide exter-
nalities such as housing, economic development, transportation and
transit. Increasingly, metropolitan areas are also designated to con-
duct environmental protection programs, even if ecosystems and
watersheds seldom co-locate precisely with metropolitan areas. Be-
cause of this history of policy mandates, metropolitan areas present
an important degree of inertia, with long-standing structures and
networks of inter-governmental collaboration, appealing to policy
makers.
Disadvantaged communities are the target of social and spatial
justice policies, most often from federal and state governments.
Rarely do local governments go to the extent of setting a definition
for local disadvantaged communities. Because there is no com-
mon standard delineation nor denomination, each policy defined
its own guideline. The California cap-and-trade program, for in-
stance, generates millions of revenue earmarked for disadvantaged
communities every year. Public health is also an important area of
policy interventions.31 Neighborhood-level public policies in disad- 31 Kawachi and Berkman 2003.
vantaged communities follow two distinct goals: 1. to compensate
for their relative lack of resources and allow these communities to
perform at the same level of more resourceful ones, for instance by
making sure they receive their fair share of grant allocations 2. to
compensate for neighborhood effects on individuals and house-
holds in the community, for instance by providing better education
locally
3 Fragmentation and federalism in the United States
The United States are a particularly good field to understand the
discrepancy between social and institutional space because in both
dimensions of urban development and institutional architecture,
they present a high level of diversity while sharing common deep
trends and patterns. First, I summarize how the urbanization of
the United States has followed shared trends while producing
variegated results (3.1). Then, I describe how the urban and in-
stitutional fragmentation of the country offers an illuminative field
(3.2). Lastly, I explain how federalism principles have conducted
to a large autonomy of local and state governments, producing an
assortment of institutional arrangements to address the discrepancy
(??).
3.1 Regional variations on urban trends
The United States have a rich urban history, from the first colonies
to today’s large metropolises. A seminal dimension of this context
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for this research is the expression of strong underlying trends in di-
verse settings. Two dominant, and interacting, sources of diversity
are the physical geographical context of urban development and the
historical progression or urbanization from East to West. These two
factors explain how different cities have been struck by the same
trends in a different stage of their development and in a different
way.
Trends. America’s urban history can broadly be described as fol-
lowing a series of phases.32 Development of colonial towns follows 32 Boehm and Corey 2014.
the model or urban Europe, with an increased emphasis on division
of land parcels, creating a dense fabric of small towns and agricul-
tural land. From the independence in 1776 onward, opens an era
of simultaneous westward, agrarian colonization and industrial de-
velopment in the East. As rural communities develop in the West,
cities grow and become compact industrial centers in the East.
The emergence of rail, and especially urban rail transit, opens
the door to heavy exploitation of natural resources in the West—
mining, forestry—and suburban development around western
industrial centers. With some delays, the same trends strike western
burgeoning urban centers. Western and Southern cities develop-
ing during this phase do not experience a phase of compact urban
industry, but directly expand horizontally with large urban rail net-
works fledging early suburbs. They also tend to be farther apart,
each one of them attracting a higher share of their region’s growth,
than in the East. Cities are also at the heart of social reform move-
ments.
Starting in the inter-war period and accelerating after World
War II, the advent of the car, facilitated by freeway construction
programs and decline in public transit, fosters an intense subur-
banization of demographic and economic growth. Downtowns
loose their role of major employment centers in favor of suburban
centers. Where big eastern cities had large, weighty downtowns
that managed to retain an important share of employment, south-
ern and western downtowns were all but economically wiped out,
concentrating poverty as affluent white population left for the sub-
urbs. This trend has pinnacled in the late 20th century with de-
industrialization, concentration of employment in “edge cities” and
growth in the suburban sunbelt.
A movement or re-urbanization has only recently brought de-
mographic and economic growth back to central cities and their
downtowns. This growth has not balanced yet effects of decades of
intense suburban growth, but is markedly reshaping central cities’
social fabric.
Since the inception of suburbanization, different trends of ur-
banizations have fostered different types of segregations and socio-
spatial fragmentation. Expansion of commutes and residential
choices have obliterated necessities of co-location between groups
of diverse background, race and class. Metropolitanization is also
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the story of the expansion of an urban environment more diverse
as a whole but more homogeneous in its parts. This contrast creates
new challenges to gear public policy toward them.
Cities in the United States have experiences similar waves of
urban development. But these waves have struck them in a very
different context and period of their development, explaining the
diversity visible today.
Diversity. If common trends are visible in all American cities,
their history make them diverse. Portrayed elementarily, the North-
east is composed of a denser network of cities and towns, in a large
urban continuum. This continuum has been describe as a mega-
lopolis with no clear separation between each large city’s zone of
influence.33 The urban hierarchy has been further befogged by 33 Gottmann 1957.
growth in peripheral employment centers—edge cities34—often not 34 Garreau 1991.
sitting at the edge of a specific city but drawing commuters from a
large area. This continuity renders delineations particularly diffi-
cult in the Northeast, because there is no clear border in a network
of interrelated places. Dense interlacing of places of very different
character creates challenges in evaluating a place’s context, and
pool of resources that its residents have access to.
The South and, in large part, the Midwest, are composed of
larger isolated cities. Municipalities in the South are significantly
more populous, because they progressively annexed a large pro-
portion of their own suburbs over time. Midwestern and Southern
cities are separated from each other by large swathes of rural land.
Nevertheless, the line is often blurry between urban and rural land,
as large suburban developments progressively encroach rural land
and interlace with it in a patchwork. Edge cities, large employment
centers commonly surpassing downtowns in job counts. They are
sometimes associated with expansive planned communities, such as
the Woodlands, north of Houston, TX.
The West exhibits a significant contrast between inland isolated
cities separated by large topographical features and expansive ur-
ban regions on the Pacific Coast. Coastal cities have comparatively
retained more of their downtowns, and experiences a stronger
urban renewal since the 1990s. Coastal cities are still very subur-
banized, however, and the back to the city narrative must be coun-
terbalanced by continuing development of boomburgs of suburban
character and growth of peripheral networks of middle-size cities
forming regional inland empires.
3.2 Fragmented federalism
Across the United States, metropolitan areas and disadvantaged
communities do not look the same. Yet, everywhere they are spatial
realities with no coextensive institutions. Strategies to identify
and manage them vary from place to place, due to an important
institutional fragmentation combined with a large degree of state
introduction 23
and local autonomy. Fragmentation and autonomy is a source of
variation in the way the discrepancy between social and political
space is resolved locally.
Fragmentation. The United States are an institutionally frag-
mented country. This fragmentation arises differently in different
regions. Firstly, as a federal country the United States are com-
posed of 50 different states with a large degree of legislative and
regulatory autonomy. States do not uniformly divide the Ameri-
can territory. They tend to be much smaller in the Northeast. As a
result, urban regions often span over state lines, placing different
parts of a same metropolitan area in different state jurisdictions.
In the Midwest and in the South, larges rivers like the Mississippi,
Missouri, Red River or Ste-Croix River serve as state borders. These
rivers frequently host large cities on their banks. These cities’ areas
of influence cross the river and extend over multiple states. Mem-
phis, TN, is for instance located along the Mississippi River, close
to the border with Arkansas and Mississippi. Kansas City, on the
Missouri River, spans over the two states of Kansas and Missouri.
In the West, urban regions are mainly contained in a single state.
With many exceptions, state borders primarily cross rural, desert or
mountain land.
Local governments are, more than states, the major source of
political and institutional fragmentation in the United States.
According to the census of governments, there were 89 004 local
governments in 2012. This include counties (3 031), municipalities
(19 522), townships (county subdivisions with political power in
the Northeast and Midwest, 16 364), special districts (37 203) and
school districts 12 884. By contrast with many other countries, mu-
nicipalities do not cover the whole American territory, but have to
be specifically incorporated. Counties are the base political subdivi-
sion, and directly administrate territories that are not incorporated
in a municipality. A metropolitan area will typically encompass
several counties, many municipalities of various sizes, and portions
of unincorporated, but sometimes populous land. The number of
independent special-purpose governments is an equally distinctive
trait of the United States.
Schools are controlled by local school district, whose board
is directly elected. Beyond schools, special districts are motley
and abundant. They provide services and resources, levy taxes,
pace bonds on the ballot, fund, build and operate infrastruc-
tures. . . Board members are elected or appointed, but special dis-
tricts have a large degree of autonomy, beyond a mere collaboration
of general-purpose local governments. A metropolitan area con-
tains many special districts. Absent a register of special districts,
determining the count and delineations of existing special districts
serving or enclosing a given neighborhood is an Augean task. Com-
munities can find themselves in a myriad different institutional
settings: incorporated or not, served by special districts. . . leaving
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their identification all the more uncertain.
Federalism. The high degree of local autonomy held by local gov-
ernments is a major driver in the fragmentation. The United States
Constitution protects state rights without saying much about lo-
cal governments, governed by state law. They are, in effect, largely
autonomous. Their effective independence from state government
vary from state to state. The optional character of local govern-
ment creation and ubiquity of elected offices reinforce this sense of
autonomy.
States have extensive latitude to set local governments’ legal
framework. New England municipalities have different powers
and typical organization than western municipalities. Western
local governments enjoy more autonomy, including in how they
wish to organize themselves, and more policy powers. Local di-
versity of organization add to state-level diversity. In high local
autonomy states—home rule states—local governments organize
freely by adopting a chapter. In states with reduced local auton-
omy, municipalities enjoy several possible forms of organizations
pre-determined by law. Special districts experience considerable
diversity of organization.
States are not federations of local governments. However, the
institutional architecture of the United States prioritizes local au-
tonomy before centralization. This generates a capacity of adaption
to local conditions, but hinders our ability to gain comprehensive
information about the functioning of local governments. If cities
are generally monitored and controlled by state administration,
information about special districts is hard to collect.
Because of this diversity of organizational form, added to the
scale of institutional fragmentation, local governments do not pro-
vide a good base to identify spatial realities based on social prac-
tices, such as metropolitan areas and disadvantaged communities.
4 General research question and hypotheses
Research question
4.1 How to design policies addressing spaces with no coextensive in-
stitution?
Complexifying social spaces and increased institutional fragmen-
tation have jointly created a situation where numerous spaces of
relevance for public policies are at once blurry and devoid of direct
institutional instrument. Metropolitan areas and disadvantaged
communities are two examples of these spaces. To policy makers,
this situation creates an unprecedented quandary. This research
project contributes to shedding light on the tactics at use today to
delineate theses spaces for policy purposes, and evaluate if a better
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path can be taken.
In order to do so I formulate three general hypothesis of the
research. The hypotheses are of high-order and are developed in
specific form in each of the three papers composing this disserta-
tion. The work that follows informs theses hypotheses by focusing
on the specific cases of metropolitan areas and disadvantaged com-
munities.
Hypothesis 1
4.2 Geographic context drives local institutions
The first general hypothesis of the research can be summarized
by one size does not fit all. Much of the work on local governance
has focused on common traits between different local situations. I
make the hypothesis that local specificity is more important than
common traits. This hypothesis does not imply that scholars should
abandon comparative work, or the quest for shared characteristics.
On the contrary, shared methods need to be used to compare local
contexts with each other. Commonalities can be found between
different local contexts. A comparative toolbox for understanding
and comparing local conditions can help bring better policies better
than a tentative unifying theory of local governance.
Hypothesis 2
4.3 Spatial realities are continuous
Policies addressing the two spatial realities at the center of this
research use a binary measure of space. A place is either in a
metropolitan area, in a disadvantaged community, or it’s not. In
the American context of segregation and fragmentation, space has
many discrete dimensions. Movements of people and social use
of space, however, is more continuous than discrete. By trying to
find a univocal, binary measure of social space, these policies cre-
ate considerable room for bias and exploit, undermining their core
objectives.
Hypothesis 3
4.4 An experimental approach to policy is viable
Accounting for local contexts to define policies is challenging.
Moreover, in a fragmented, federal country like the United States,
political paths for policy implementation can appear labyrinthian.
We have methodological instruments to understand people’s pref-
erences in decision settings. Therefore, beyond observational data,
useful to set the stage and inform specific policy hypotheses, ex-
periments involving local residents, voters and policy-makers can
contribute productively to shaping effective and befitting policies.
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Abbreviations
GIS Geographic Information Systems
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organi-
zation
OMB (White House) Office of Man-
agement and Budget
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THE SPACE OF URBAN L IFE 
DELINEATING AMERICAN  
METROPOLITAN AREAS
Chapter I

The Space of Urban Life: Delineating American
Metropolitan Areas
Policy take-aways
• Commuting ties is a good instru-
ment to understand the structure of
metropolitan areas.
• This structure cannot be captured
by a single delineation.
• Metropolitan delineations from the
OMB are neither internally valid
nor robust.
• Metropolitan areas are forming
differently in Eastern, Western &
Southern United States.
• The relevant delineation depends on
each policy, and should be a part of
each grant application.
The expansion of urban development beyond central cities during
the 20th century has begotten larger integrated urban areas. These
metropolitan areas are the functional units of urban life. Many poli-
cies, such as housing or transit support programs, are directed to
metropolitan areas. Hence, the delineation of these areas has direct
consequences on policies.
The US Census defines metropolitan areas as clusters of counties
linked together by a high degree of commuting integration. When
two counties are part of the same commute pool, they are in the same
metro area. In this paper, I test the robustness of this definition and
evaluate its fitness for policy purposes.
I use hierarchical clustering to assess how counties group to-
gether on the continuous scale of commuting integration, forming
metropolitan areas, urban regions, and larger commute sheds.
I find that commuting integration between counties reveal the
functional structures of urban America, but does not exhibit a clear
threshold that would allow a definite identification of which county
is part of which metropolitan area. Furthermore, commuting integra-
tion varies geographically inside the United States, following urban
settlement patterns. Commuting patterns are different between the
urban continuum of the coasts and the isolated urban centers sur-
rounded by rural or desert environment in the Mid-West and the
South.
I recommend that studies and policies based on metropolitan
areas not rely on a one size fits all definition based on commuting in-
tegration, but on a metropolitan dashboard, taking into consideration
different structural properties of urban clusters.
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1 Literature review
Metropolitan areas have been of growing relevance for public poli-
cies over the last decades, because their advent and development
is the product of the evolution in how our largely urban societies
organize themselves spatially. Metropolitan areas reflect and expose
how urban societies use space to function. Because of this interde-
pendence, what happens in a metropolitan area has consequences
on all of its residents. In this section, I first expose how the U.S.
Census measures and delineates metropolitan areas today. Then, I
expose how metropolitan areas have taken the shape and structure
they posses today, over the courses of the past century. Finally, I
show how relevant this concept is for public policy, and therefore
the importance of evaluating the U.S. Census’ way of delineating
metropolitan areas.
1.1 Delineating metropolitan areas as functional units
United States statistical areas
Primary Statistical Areas, 2010 Census delineations
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Houston
Philadelphia
Phoenix
San Antonio
San Diego
Dallas
Austin
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
San Francisco
Columbus
Charlotte
Fort Worth
Detroit
El Paso
Memphis
Seattle
Denver Washington
Boston
Nashville-Davidson
Baltimore
Oklahoma City
Portland
Las Vegas
Milwaukee
Albuquerque
Tucson
Kansas City Virginia Beach
Atlanta
Omaha
Raleigh
Miami
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Cleveland
Wichita
New Orleans
Tampa
St. Louis
Corpus Christi
Pittsburgh
Cincinnati
Orlando
Salt Lake City
Boise
Micropolitan, single-core
Micropolitan, multi-core
Metropolitan, single-core
Metropolitan, multi-core
Figure 1: United States Primary
Statistical Areas, by type, 2010 Census
delineations.
Metropolitan areas are urban areas of strong interdependence
between actors (residents, institutions, economic actors. . . ). There
are many and frequent exchanges between parts of a metropolitan
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areas. These exchanges make actions and policies conducted in
parts of the metro area relevant to other parts, and to the area as a
whole. Actions taken in the metro area have externalities for others
in the metro area.1 1 Lucas 2001.
For instance, a municipality that plans a large employment area,
attracting many jobs, will put the transportation and transit system
of the whole region under increased use. Likewise, municipalities
that refuse to build housing to accommodate demographic growth
put housing markets all over the metropolitan area under pressure,
thus creating a regional housing shortage.2 Industrial specializa- 2 Saks 2008.
tion creates spatial spillovers that benefit regional innovation and
competitiveness, beyond local borders.3 Roads themselves create 3 A. Marshall 1890; Panne 2004.
externalities that impact congestion and pollution beyond their
particular location.4 4 Anas and Lindsey 2011.
Actions with strong externalities often create contentious debate
in metropolitan areas, and the best course of action to address
these externalities is often difficult to foresee. However, the fact that
these externalities are real is of little debate. Even the public choice
school of thought, emphasizing the efficiency of competing local
governments, recognizes the importance of externalities,5 arguing 5 Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961;
Frey and Eichenberger 2004.that competition is the most efficient way to address them.
The U.S. Census Bureau started to measure metropolitan areas
in 1952, using the 1950 decennial census, as “integrated economic
area[s] with a large volume of daily travel and communication be-
tween the central city or cities and the outlying parts of the area”6. 6 Klove 1952, p.96.
Details of the definitions have evolved since then, but the underly-
ing basis has stayed the same, composed of two elements:
1. An urban core. A large central city, or a number thereof, is the
core of the urban region.
2. Exchanges between core and periphery. Interdependence be-
tween parts of the region is measured through commuting rela-
tionships between center and periphery.
Metropolitan areas are defined at the level of the county, the
only level where commuting data is exhaustively collected. To-
day, county-to-county commuting data is gathered on a sampled,
yearly basis by the American Community Survey (ACS), and av-
eraged over several years. Place-to-place commuting estimates are
available between large places only. Because the ACS is a sampled
survey, it produces uncertainty in measurement estimates. This
uncertainty is reduced with the size of the geographic unit of ag-
gregation. Regarding commuting, estimates for larger counties is
more certain than for smaller, often rural counties. In fact over the
136 794 county-to-county commuting estimates in the 5-year ACS
2010, only 40 077 have an estimate larger than the margin of error.
OMB’s definition of metropolitan areas follows Christaller’s Cen-
tral Place Theory,7 whereby urban geography is understood as a 7 Christaller 1933.
hierarchy of cities and their areas of influence, nested inside each
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other, with little or no overlap between centers of the same level.
For instance, a large city would exert influence over a whole re-
gion, a series of peripheral centers would be centers quarters of this
region, and towns and villages would command their immediate
countryside. At each level, services and retail serve their respective
region. In this model, the main function of cities is to be service
centers for an area.8 The U.S. Census’ definition adheres to this con- 8 A. Getis and J. Getis 1966, p.220.
cept by defining metropolitan areas as areas directly under the in-
fluence of large central cities, as opposed to more rural areas, under
looser influence of secondary centers. In his account, and critique,
of the continuity of this definition up to today, John Adams exposes
how the Census has relied on the same underlying principle over
the decades.9 Indeed, latest standards for metropolitan areas delin- 9 Adams, VanDrasek, and Phillips 2013,
p.695.eations, defined by the White House’s Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), follow the same structure.10 10 Office of Management and Budget
2010, p.37249.Urban settlement patterns have evolved and complexified since
the first definition of 1950, as I expose hereafter in section 1.2, with
metropolitan areas expanding and merging with each other. To
account for these evolutions, the OMB has refined its definition,
introducing a layer of possible multi-centrality for metropolitan
areas. The OMB has now three possible layers of definition:11 11 Office of Management and Budget
2010, p.37249.
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) composed of one and only one
urban center of more than 10 000 inhabitants, and adjacent coun-
ties with a high degree of socio-economic integration as mea-
sured by commuting ties. CBSAs themselves are divided in two
classes, depending on the population of their urban cores:
Micropolitan Statistical Area with an urban core of more than
10 000 and less than 50 000 inhabitants.
Metropolitan Statistical Area with an urban core of more than
50 000 inhabitants.
Combined Statistical Area (CSA) combining adjacent CBSAs with
a high degree of socio-economic integration as measured by
commuting ties between themselves.
Primary Statistical Area (PSA) are a composite class composed of
CSAs and all CBSAs that have not been combined in CSAs. PSAs
represent the highest level of metropolitan integration for each
county.
1.2 Metropolitanization since the 20th century
The urban fabric of the United States looks very different today
that it did in the 19th century. During the 20th century, the United
States have evolved from a clear separation between small rural
places living from agriculture and large industrial cities to a realm
of poly-centric metropolitan areas.12 As I have shown in section 1.1, 12 Oliver 2001, p.35.
however, the official definition of metropolitan areas has hardly
budged to adapt to new metropolitan realities. I trace the evolution
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of metropolitan areas in four periods, from 1870 to today: street-
car suburbs, the advent of the automobile, the diffusing city, and
merging metropolises. Each period, roughly delimited in time,
corresponds to variations in mobility and commuting practices,
opening different spatial opportunity for residential location and
economic development. Although less dramatic than the variations
in commuting, each period corresponds to different institutional
organizations and local governance patterns.
From 1870 to World War I, urban rail transit expands
the industrial city. From the beginning of the 19th century to
1870, the industrial revolution has fed the growth of American cities
as large centers of employment and economic activities.13 Lack 13 Olson 2002.
of transportation meant that workforce and industries had to be
co-located in dense, compact cities. This co-location constraint fell
with the advent of urban rail transit, from 1870 onward. Streetcars
and other urban railways started a “reverse exodus”14 of suburban- 14 Z. L. Miller 1968.
ization, initiating a wave of “streetcar suburbs”.15 Thanks to rail 15 S. Warner 1962.
transit, it was now possible to live relatively far away from employ-
ment centers, industrial or commercial, and commute between places
of residence and places of work. Cities stayed heavily mono-centric,
but residential neighborhoods spilled further away from the center,
as wealthier residents were able to afford suburban houses around
rail corridors.
A series of mono-graphic works recount this process, repeated in
many large American cities, such as Boston,16 or Cincinnati.17 Even 16 S. Warner 1962.
17 Z. L. Miller 1968.Los Angeles, considered in the second half of the 20th as the epit-
ome of the car-oriented city, expanded heavily around the streetcar
network.18 18 Fogelson 1993; Wachs 1984.
Politically, the first wave of suburbanization corresponded to a
rise in municipal incorporation, the formation of new local govern-
ments to manage newly developed land.19 New municipalities were 19 Teaford 1979.
mainly formed to provide services to newly suburban residents.20 20 Burns 1994.
The increased social segregation between suburbs and city centers
opened the door of central city politics to urban bosses, at the head
of political machines.21 21 Z. L. Miller 1968; Stave et al. 1988.
Entering into World War I, Americans were mostly living either
in small rural places or mono-centric industrial cities.22 22 Wallis 1994a.
In the inter-war period, the advent of the automobile.
The increased availability of individual automobile reinforced the
movement of suburbanization around industrial cities in the inter-
war period. Americans transitioned from a rail commute to a car
commute but, before freeways could drastically change their mo-
bility habits, cars essentially reinforced trends started during the
streetcar suburbs expansion. The economic boom of the 1920s, pre-
ceding the great depression, fueled urban demographic growth
as nascent car congestion started to trigger a decentralization of
economic activities.23 Road patterns started to adapt to individual 23 Wachs 1984.
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cars, with cul-de-sacs and other discontinuities, and be less oriented
to pedestrian traffic around public transit.24 The 1920s are a piv- 24 Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball
2015.otal period, prolonging the suburbanization movement initiated by
rail transit, while adapting the urban fabric to a more diffuse, less
hierarchical organization fitting individual car mobility.
In the post-war period, the era of the freeway and the
diffusing city. It it only after the war that cities begin to change
drastically in response to the automobile. Specifically, the Federal
Aid Highway Act of 1956, that oversaw the construction of the
41 000 miles-long Interstate system in the United States, caused a
diffusion of development further away from city centers.25 This 25 Baum-Snow 2007.
diffusion concerned not only residential development, but also
economic activities, de-concentrating from city centers to spread
along freeways in metropolitan areas.26 26 Gordon and Richardson 1996; Bogart
and Ferry 1999; Lang and LeFurgy
2003.
Politically, this diffusion of development caused a partisan po-
larization, between Democratic central cities and Republican sub-
urbs.27 In conjunction, the incorporation movement of new munici- 27 Nall 2015.
palities did not slow down. With the adoption of the civil rights act
of 1964, outlawing most obvious means of racial spatial segregation,
land use, and the control over incoming population that land-use
regulation provides, has become the primary motivation for new
municipal incorporation, along with tax optimization.28 Alongside 28 Burns 1994.
continued fragmentation of general purpose local government, the
post-war era has witnessed the explosion of single-purpose and
multi-purpose policy special districts.29 29 Burns 1994; Stephens et al. 1998.
From the 1990s to today, merging metropolises and urban
renewal. The 1990s and, more markedly, the beginning of the 21st
century have seen a renewal of interest for central cities, following
a movement of gentrification that pushed young elites back to dense
and central environments. Concurrently, however, metropolitan
areas have accentuated their diffusion beyond the central city /
suburb dichotomy into loosely hierarchical networks of places.
The reinforcement of this metropolitan networks dimension has a
double engine, both fueled by the expansion of mobility.
On the one hand, places in an ever-expanding metropolitan
area cease to cede precedence to central cities to acquire a role of
their own. Metropolitan areas are redundant networks where the
disappearance of a node, the central city or the historical downtown
thereof, would only marginally impair the capacity of the network
to function.
On the other hands, expanding metropolitan areas are merging
with each other. This phenomenon is visible in San Antonio and
Austin, Texas, where municipalities between the two central cities
are experiencing a strong growth, both in population and in eco-
nomic development, linking the two areas in a single metropolitan
continuum.
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The structure and functioning of American metropolitan areas
have changed significantly since World War II. Metropolitan areas
have greatly expanded and become less hierarchic and centralized,
with a diffusion of development, both demographic and economic.
This diffusion has brought a decline in the relative importance of
central cities. Metropolitan areas can now be understood as an ur-
ban area of local interdependence, rather than the hierarchical area
of influence of a single central city. The bulk of the demographic
growth has happened in small municipalities or unincorporated
communities in large urban environments revolving around multi-
ple urban cores.30 The relative demographic importance of big cities 30 Wallis 1994b; Jackson 1985.
in these areas has been continuously diminishing, while the num-
ber of municipalities was increasing. The upscaling of these areas
has created a spatial institutional pattern of fragmentation. People
are scattered into many different political entities—incorporated
places, counties, states—and are mobile between these places. How-
ever, the OMB still bases its definition of metropolitan areas on
the old Central Place Theory model. This discrepancy between how
metropolitan have evolved and how they are still measured moti-
vates an evaluation of the current definition’s validity.
1.3 Policy relevance and current progress in the understanding of the
metropolitan reality
Changes in the structure of metropolitan areas have prompted pol-
icy makers to recognize the policy-relevance of the metropolitan
scale, therefore triggering an endeavor to imagine ways of govern-
ing metropolitan policies. In turn, this public administration effort
to define ways of governing the metropolis has conducted scholars
to develop better instruments of understanding and delineating
metropolitan realities.
Policy relevance of metropolitan areas Because of their
growing significance as the unit of everyday social life, metropoli-
tan areas have been a flourishing focus of federal and state policies
since the post-war period. In 1960, Connery & Leach counted nine
main policy areas of action for the federal government targeting
metropolitan areas: housing, water resources, water pollution con-
trol, airports, military installations and defense industries, civil
defense, highways, air pollution control and recreation.31 The 31 Connery and Leach 1960.
shift in focus from cities to metropolitan areas resulted from an
acceleration of suburban growth, resulting in more metropolitan
externalities and rendering large central cities less relevant to ad-
dress urban problems comprehensively. Housing aid and planning
grants have been the first policies to explicitly target metropolitan
areas.32 Since the end of the cold war, civil defense and military in- 32 Gelman 1959.
stallations have phased out and transportation, environmental and
social justice programs have intensified, both from federal and state
governments.33 In a federal country like the United States, with a 33 Lewis and Sprague 1997; Barbour
2002.
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large degree of local autonomy and little means to force collabo-
ration or consolidation, these programs often come in grants. The
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991,
especially, has accelerated the role of Metropolitan Planning Orga-
nizations (MPO) in the planning, funding and grant funneling in
metropolitan areas.34 Most of metropolitan planning and funding 34 Goldman and Deakin 2000.
organizations, however, are policy-specific and do not constitute
general-purpose governments. Adams et al. give an extensive and
diverse list of federal use of metropolitan areas’ delineations for
federal policy purposes.35 35 Adams, VanDrasek, and Phillips
2013, p.702.
Governing metropolitan areas Existing local governments
as well as state and federal governments have implemented new
institutional instruments to address metropolitan policy issues, but
with little exception, no general-purpose new layer of government
has been created. The description of metropolitan areas as “legal
non-entities”, recognizing that “the people of a metropolitan re-
gion have no general instrumentality of government available to
deal directly with the range of problems which they share in com-
mon”, made by Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren in 1961 is as valid today
as it was then.36 This fragmentation has even intensified, with the 36 Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961.
incorporation of new municipalities,37 largely within metropoli- 37 Teaford 1979; G. J. Miller 1981.
tan areas, in order to perform fiscal optimization38 or control who 38 Rodriguez 2000.
can live in one place via land-use regulations.39 In addition to new 39 Burns 1994.
municipalities, special purpose institutions have been created to
address a single policy issue or a limited set thereof. Special dis-
tricts, in particular, to fund and manage infrastructure and service
provision.40 Special districts are independent institutions of various 40 Burns 1994; Stephens et al. 1998.
shape, sometimes able to levy their own taxes, with a board directly
elected by the population or appointed, in charge of missions as
varied as airports, mosquito control, transit operation, or water
supply. Local governments can also create a formal entity to exer-
cise their powers in common in certain areas. States have different
frameworks to do so. In California, Joint Powers Authorities serve
this purpose.41 Informal cooperation between local governments 41 Cypher and Grinnell 2007.
is also very present in the United States, especially in areas where
municipalities have most of the power, like police, fire, or roads.42 42 Bel and M. Warner 2015.
At last, states and federal governments sometimes mandate inter-
governmental institutions be created to funnel and implement state
programs locally, often with the goal to foster local coordination
beyond state programs only. Metropolitan planning organizations,
for instance, are federally mandated organizations interacting with
states and federal governments in planning, often applying to and
channeling grants.43 43 Lewis and Sprague 1997; Goldman
and Deakin 2000.
The quest for a fitting metric The growing relevance of
metropolitan areas for public policies, joined with the stability
of its measurement in the past decades has conducted scholars
to re-examine the standard definition. Many of these studies are
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conducted outside of the United States. As metropolitan areas’ def-
inition is based on common standards, their methods are equally
applicable in the United States. These endeavors to better measure
the metropolitan reality have taken two forms. One is to go beyond
commuting data to find other measures of social use of space. The
other is to go back to commuting data and propose a more robust
treatment of the data.
The first approach recognizes metropolitan areas as the place
of society’s daily routine but criticizes the use of commuting data,
either as being insufficient or as being unnecessarily complex. A
major critique of commuting data is that it only captures journey
to work, excluding all other forms of mobility or communication,44 44 Lofland 1975.
or workers that do not have a regular commute, such a mobile
workers for instance.45 Bode proposed to use land-prices to use 45 Pratt 1997.
the fraction of land prices attributable to agglomeration effects to
measure metropolitan areas, applying it to Germany.46 Adams 46 Bode 2008.
et al. argue that population density alone is a good measure of
metropolitan areas.47 47 Adams, VanDrasek, and Phillips
2013.Karlsson & Olsson summarize the second approach as based on
a “high frequency of intra-regional interaction”, as measure by local
labor market, commuting ties or accessibility.48Lastly, Dash Nelson 48 Karlsson and Olsson 2006.
& Rae have attempted to delineate “megaregions” by optimizing
modularity in the network of commutes between census tracts.49 49 Dash Nelson and Rae 2016.
Modularity is the property of groups of nodes in a network to have
denser connections inside groups than between groups.50 50 Newman 2006.
Using commuting data poses an external validity question. Is
commuting a good indicator of social use of space in general, since
we want want to capture people’s daily routine? Commuting pat-
terns are strongly linked to urban form.51 Journey to work is a 51 Stead and S. Marshall 2001; Giuliano
and Narayan 2003; Ewing and Cervero
2010.
good indicator of other routine mobility—retail, everyday leisure,
family and social—but not necessarily of occasional mobility, where
residents of dense urban centers also tend to have longer distance
occasional mobility (day trips and overnight trips).52 It appears that 52 Munafò 2015.
commuting is indeed a good proxy for routine mobility and for
social use of space in general, either as a product of a correlate of
other variables of interest.
2 Research question
In section 1 I have reported that official OMB’s definitions of sta-
tistical areas dates from the 1950s and has scantly changed since.
Metropolitan areas themselves, however, have evolved considerably,
expanding in area and growing in complexity. This has prompted
scholars to propose new methods of delineation. Nonetheless, the
quest for a better metropolitan metric should start by a thorough
assessment of the strength and shortcomings of the current one.
Relying on robust metropolitan delineations is important to pro-
vide a solid framework to the on-going and unsettled debate about
metropolitan governance, as well as for the numerous federal and
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state policy programs directed at metropolitan areas.
2.1 How valid is OMB’s definition of metropolitan areas?
I first aim to assess the validity and robustness of the current def-
inition of metropolitan areas, based on commuting ties between
places. Since external validity of using commuting as a metric has
been established, by correlation with both urban form and other
forms of routine mobility (see 1.3), I will focus on internal validity
of the commuting metric. That is, using county-to-county commut-
ing relationships, can the OMB effectively delineate robust clusters
of counties using their method? Robustness is the property of a
measure to cope with errors. In this context, a robust measure is a
method able to correctly portray metropolitan areas regardless of
the imprecision contained in the commuting data. I use a compre-
hensive clustering of counties with multiple methods an compare
my results with OMB’s delineations.
2.2 Can we create a better measure of metropolitan areas?
In a second time, based on the assessment of OMB’s official defini-
tion, I seek to propose a more robust delineation method, based
on the same commuting data. Using commuting data, can we find
a more robust and internally valid delineation method? Construc-
tion of a new potential metric stems from an examination of the
structural properties of metropolitan areas, as revealed by com-
muting ties between counties. In particular, the proposed metric
interrogates a series of given properties of OMB’s metric: the pre-
definition of an urban core as a way to seed county clustering in
urban ensembles, uniform nation-wide commuting threshold, type
of clustering and its interpretation to understand metropolitan
functional structuring, and even the relevance of a single metric, as
opposed to an array of different measures to be used in conjunc-
tion.
3 Methods
In order to assess the robustness of the OMB’s definition, I evaluate
the stability of the original metric: county-to-county commuting re-
lationships. First (3.1), I run a series of clustering algorithms on the
network of commute relationships to gage how counties cluster to-
gether at different scales. Second (3.2), I calculate cumulative statis-
tics of aggregation along the dimension of commuting strength to
determine if there is a natural, obvious cutoff point that could serve
as a threshold for determining which clusters form natural aggre-
gates that would be good candidates for delineating metropolitan
areas. Lastly (3.3), I evaluate if the clustering of counties along com-
muting ties strength behaves homogeneously over the contiguous
United States, in order to assess the relevance of using a unique
definition for the whole country.
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3.1 Hierarchical clustering of counties by commuting ties
Metropolitan areas are, in the current definition used by the OMB,
clusters of counties linked by strong socio-economic ties as demon-
strated by commuting relationships. I scrutinize the foundation
of this definition by studying how counties cluster together based
on commuting statistics. The data comes from U.S. Census 2009-
2013 5-Year ACS. Because the ACS is a sampled survey (see 1.1),
estimates of commuting flows have large margins of errors for
small counties. I address this uncertainty conservatively, by sub-
tracting the margin of error from the estimates to calculate a strict
estimate. I discard commuting relationships where the margin of
error is greater than the estimate. The resulting data is a graph,
where nodes are counties and edges commuting ties between them.
I weigh each edge relative to the proportion of the total number of
county’s commuters going to work in linked county. The graph is
directed. The commuting link from county A to county B is the pro-
portion of the total number of commuters from county A (including
internal commuters of the county, living and working in the same
county) going to county B.
I use four different clustering methods, selected for their inter-
pretability regarding metropolitan areas: single, complete, average
and combined linkage. Single, complete and average linkage clus-
tering are well-documented methods of hierarchical clustering.53 53 Everitt 2011, p.73-84.
These three methods follow the same principle, and vary by the
computation of distances between clusters. With combined-linkage
I extend these methods to the case where the measure of distance
between clusters can be recalculated by pooling together base units
of each cluster, in this case commuters. These four methods share
two important characteristics:
Deterministic Running the algorithm multiple times on the same
data will produce the exact same result. There is no element of
random sampling or other stochastic element in the calculation
of clusters.
Hierarchical The algorithm constructs a hierarchy of clusters,
whereby higher order clusters are composed of multiple lower
order clusters merged together. At the bottom, each individual
node is a cluster and at the top, there is only one cluster. Results
can be represented as a dendrogram, displaying the hierarchical
structure of clusters. The hierarchical nature of these methods
allows me to test if there is a natural threshold in commuting to
delineate clusters.
Agglomerative The clustering hierarchy is constructed from the
bottom-up. At the beginning, each node is its own cluster and
at each step of the process, two lower order clusters are merged
into one higher order cluster until there is only one cluster com-
prising all nodes. This is by contrast with divisive hierarchical
clustering, where the process starts with a single cluster contain-
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ing all the nodes that is at each step divided into lower order,
smaller clusters.
These four methods originate in hierarchical clustering of multi-
dimensional spaces. In such spaces, one can produce a dissimilarity
matrix measuring the distance between any two objects within the
space. Weighted graphs, such as the graph of county-to-county
commuting relationships, are simply a specific case wherein the dis-
similarity matrix is sparse. In this case, some pairs of objects have a
distance, when they are linked by an edge in the graph, and others
do not. Moreover, because the county-to-county commuting graph
is directed, the distance matrix is not only sparse but also asymmet-
ric. That is, the distance between county A and county B is different
in the matrix from the distance from county B to county A, because
the proportion of commuters they send to each other is different.
The distance matrix that I use for the clustering is directly inferred
from commuting relationships and composed of direct county-to-
county relationships only. The distance of A to C, for instance, is
only the proportion of total commuters from A commuting to C
and does not include indirect relationships like A to B and B to C.
End
Start
Put each node into a 
different cluster
Compute distances 
between new clusters 
and neighbors
Distance function depends 
on clustering type (single, 
average or complete link)
Merge the two 
closest clusters
One cluster left?
Yes
No
Figure 2: Clustering Algorithm
I adapt these four clustering methods to the specific case of
sparse, asymmetric matrices, using a generalization of Kruskal’s
algorithm.54 These four methods follow the same algorithm, il-
54 Kruskal 1956.
lustrated by figure 2. Compared to the classic implementation of
Kruskal,55, this implementation recalculates distances between clus-
55 Cormen 2009, p.631.
ters at each iteration. The only difference between each method is
the metric used to compute the distance between two clusters.
Starting with each node—each county—being its own cluster of
one element, the algorithm merges two clusters into one at each
step of the process. In the end, clusters are reduced to one single
cluster composed of all original nodes. At each step, the merge
occurs between the two clusters that are the closest to each other.
However, the way of measuring how close clusters are differs for
each of the four methods, and induces a different interpretation in
regards to metropolitan areas.
For single, average and complete linkage, the algorithm produces
a minimum spanning tree,56 because it is guaranteed that edges of 56 Gower and Ross 1969.
later iterations are longer than edges of earlier ones. Combined-
linkage, however, is not guaranteed to yield a minimum spanning
tree. For single, average and complete linkage, distances between
clusters are computed from distances between nodes in the clus-
ters, such as distances in a later iteration are always higher than
distances used for earlier merges. However, combined-linkage re-
calculates distance between clusters by pooling together all the
commuters of each cluster, as if, once merged in a cluster, counties
lost their identity. Because the distance between clusters is a pro-
portion of commuters and not an absolute count value, distance
between clusters at later iterations can sometimes be lower than
distances at earlier ones.
Figure 3: Single-Linkage Clustering
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The distance between two counties in the space of county-to-
county commuting relationships is formulated as:
dN!M =
Â [N ! M]
Â [N ! X]
The distance from county N to county M is the proportion of
the total number of commuters from county N—X, including com-
muters staying in county N—commuting to county M.
Single-linkage clustering This method favors proximity be-
tween immediate neighbors in the graph. Distance between two
clusters is equal to the distance between the two closest nodes of
the clusters, as shown by figure 3. Applied to commuting, single
linkage emphasizes continuity of commuting relationships in the
metropolitan area, at the expense of internal cohesion. Using single
linkage, it is possible that some counties in the same cluster have
little to no relationship as measured by commuting. They are clus-
tered together because there is a chain of such tight relationships
between them. County A is linked to county B, in turn linked to
county C. In this case, counties A and C can be in the same cluster
even if they do not send commuters to each other.
dA!B = min {dN!M|N 2 A ^M 2 B}
Figure 4: Complete-Linkage Clustering
Complete-linkage clustering This method favors proximity
of all members of a single cluster. Distance between two clus-
ters is measured by the distance between the two elements that are
the farthest apart from each other, as illustrated by figure 4. For
our purpose, complete linkage emphasizes internal cohesion of
metropolitan areas, to the expense of continuity. For instance, it
is possible that two counties having close socio-economic ties are
separated in two distinct clusters because other counties in their
clusters are too far apart in the measurement of commuting rela-
tionships. Furthermore, complete-linkage indicates specificity in
the relationship between two clusters, because the overall distance
between two clusters is measured as the distance between the weak-
est relationships of nodes of both clusters.
dA!B = max {dN!M|N 2 A ^M 2 B}
Figure 5: Average-Linkage Clustering
Average-linkage clustering Distance between two clusters
is measured as the mean distance between any two nodes of each
cluster, as shown by figure 5. Therefore, this method is a trade-off
between internal cohesion and immediate proximity. Average-
linkage takes counties as the base unit of distance computation,
and not directly commuters inside these counties. In the average
distance, each county has the same weight, regardless of its size or
number of commuters. Distance is unweighted in regards to the
number of commuters in each county.
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dA!B =
1
n
⇥
n
Â {dN!M|N 2 A ^M 2 B}
Figure 6: Combined-Linkage Cluster-
ing
Combined-linkage clustering Distance between two clusters is
recalculated every time from the aggregation of properties of each
node in the clusters, as if nodes in each clusters were merged to-
gether, illustrated by figure 6. By contrast with single, complete and
average linkage, combined linkage is not guaranteed to produce a
clustering that is linear in regards to the measure of distance. That
is, merges happening later in the process can be between clusters
that, with their recalculated distance, are closer to each other than
previously merged clusters. This cannot happen with the other
three methods. Thus, this method reveals relationships between
groups of counties considered as whole.
dA!B =
Â [A! B]
Â [A! X]
Clustering structure These four methods produce different
types of clustering structures. At each step, this structure is best
summarized by the balance of the merge. I expand the concept
of balance from weight-balanced binary trees (WBTs).57 In WBTs, 57 Nievergelt and Reingold 1973.
balance is calculated from the size of each sub-tree attached to a
node. I replace the size of sub-trees by total weight in number of
commuters of each cluster. Therefore, balance measures the dif-
ference in total number of commuters originating from each of
the two merged clusters. A merge of two clusters of identical size
will be perfectly balanced, like a merge of two densely populated
part of a metropolitan area. A merge between clusters of very dif-
ferent population will have a low balance, like a single peripheral
county being aggregated to a cluster of central, urban counties in a
metropolitan area. The balance B{N,M} of a merge between clusters
N and M of respective population PN and PM is measured as:
B{N,M} = 1 
✓✓     PNPN + PM
      0.5◆⇥ 2◆
A perfectly well balanced merge will have a balance value of 1
and un-balanced merges tend to 0.
3.2 Identifying ranges of stability in the clustering for threshold val-
idation
In a second time, I evaluate the presence of an internal natural
cutoff point in county-to-county commuting relationships. Such
a cutoff could serve as an internally valid threshold to identify
metropolitan areas. I approach the threshold in two different ways.
Global stability. A global threshold is a value of commuting
strength that can be used to delineate metropolitan areas uniformly
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in the United States. To ensure that such a threshold is robust and
internally valid, it must be an area of stability in merges along
the domain of commuting strength. The OMB sets this thresh-
old at 15%, without justifying this arbitrary choice. To test for the
presence of areas of stability in the data, I compute the cumulative
count of merges along the domain of commuting strength and iden-
tify the rate of change in the count at each point. Areas of stability
that would be valid candidates for a nation-wide threshold are ar-
eas where the rate of change is close to or at zero. I perform this
analysis on for all four clustering methods.
1
2
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3
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Height
Figure 7: Individual cluster stability
Local cluster stability. The objective to find an internally
valid threshold of commuting strength serves to identify a good
delineation criterion for metropolitan areas. Such a threshold, how-
ever, does not need to be universal. Beyond regional variations
that I examine in 3.3, each cluster has its own stability value. In-
dividual cluster stability measures how long a cluster stays stable
before being merged with another cluster. Therefore, cluster sta-
bility is measured by the difference between the commuting level
that creates the cluster by merging two lower-order clusters, and
the commuting level that will see the cluster disappear, merged in
another, higher-order cluster. Figure 7 illustrates individual cluster
stability. In the figure, 5 nodes hierarchically cluster into one, from
a height of 1 to 4. The cluster {1, 2} formed by nodes 1 & 2 forms at
a height of 1, and is merged with another cluster at a height of 4.
The cluster has a stability of 3 (4  1). By contrast, nodes 3 & 4 also
cluster together at 1. But the cluster they form is less stable, because
it merges with another cluster at height 2 (merging with node 5, to
form another, distinct cluster). Therefore, the stability of cluster {3,
4} is of 1.
End
Start
Select cluster with the 
largest county and the 
highest isolation
Any cluster left?
Remove clusters with 
counties in the 
selected cluster
No
Yes
Figure 8: Identification of metropolitan
areas by optimizing cluster stability
After having identified the clustering method producing clus-
ters that are closest to what is usually understood as metropolitan
areas, I select clusters based on their population and stability as
metropolitan areas, following the algorithm described in figure 8.
The process starts with all possible clusters in the hierarchical tree.
For instance, the example of figure 7 has 4 different clusters: {1, 2},
{3, 4}, {3, 4, 5} & {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The algorithm first selects the most
stable cluster containing the most populous county (for contiguous
United States, Los Angeles County, CA). With this cluster selected
as the metropolitan area of this county, the algorithm then removes
all remaining clusters containing members of the selected cluster.
The removal step is crucial to ensure that no overlapping clusters
are selected as metropolitan areas. This process is repeated as long
as there is still clusters that have not been either selected or elimi-
nated in the list. In this case, it would select the most stable cluster
containing the second most populous U.S. county, Cook County, IL,
containing Chicago. This process leaves a number of isolated coun-
ties, that are not part of any selected stable cluster. These counties
are more stable isolated than they are clustered.
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3.3 Variations of clustering between regions of the United States
Third, I study how structural properties of clusters, balance and
stability, vary geographically. Specifically, I search for regional
differences. Are clusters more balanced in a given region of the
United States than the other? Is there a more robust commuting
threshold by region than at the nation-wide level?
Urban settlement patterns vary geographically in the United
States, for historical, cultural, topographical and climate reasons.
Variations in settlements may correspond to variations in commut-
ing patterns as well, therefore influencing clustering structures. For
instance, the urban continuum of the Northeastern United States
has been described by Jean Gottman in 1957.58 John Rennie Short 58 Gottmann 1957.
describes this large ensemble of 45M inhabitants from Boston to
Washington D.C. as “liquid”,59 without clear internal borders. On 59 Short 2010.
the other hand, in the MidWest, Texas and part of the South, ma-
jor cities are isolated from each other by large areas of rural or
desert land. The non-coastal West is divided by expansive moun-
tain ranges, oriented North-South, and deserts, impending possible
continuities between urban settlements. The Pacific Coast comprises
a number of large cities, from Seattle in the North, to San Diego
in the South, and alternates large population centers sometimes
composed of multiple urban cores with vast rural areas.
In a first approach, I test if these regional ensembles can be iden-
tified by the clustering data, looking at the last steps of each clus-
tering process. In these last steps, counties have largely clustered
together in a limited number of large clusters. I assess if these clus-
ters correspond to regional ensembles.
In a second time, I test if structural measures of clustering, bal-
ance and stability, differ significantly between clusters of different
regions of the United States. For instance, it could be expected
that region with isolated cities, such as Texas, have more stable
metropolitan clusters. Once the limit of the urban region reached
by the clustering algorithm, the cluster is stable for a longer range
of commuting values before merging with another cluster. In the
North-East, clusters are expected to be less stable, continually merg-
ing until encompassing the whole “Megalopolis”.
4 Results
4.1 Hierarchical clustering reveals structures of urban America
To illustrate differences between clustering methods, I take the
example of the San Francisco Bay Area, displayed in figures 9
to 13. The Bay Area is illustrative because it is a large, multi-polar
metropolitan area, revolving around San Francisco and Oakland
on the one hand, and San Jose and the Silicon Valley on the other
hand, with multiple, smaller urban centers spread along 100 miles
from North to South. The San Francisco Bay Area is also close, and
closely linked to, the greater Sacramento in the North-East. Fur-
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thermore, as the Bay Area experiences an important economic and
demographic growth, its extension beyond the Diablo mountain
range deep into the central parts of the California Central Valley,
around Stockton and Modesto, is often mentioned. Topographically,
however, there is a stronger continuity between Sacramento and the
rest of the Central Valley. Hierarchical clustering sheds light on the
functional relationships between counties in the Bay Area.
Hierarchical clustering of counties in the San Francisco Bay Area
Method: single-linkage
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Figure 9: Hierarchical clustering of
counties in the San Francisco Bay Area,
single-linkage
Figure 9 shows the clustering of Bay Area counties with the
single-linkage method. Single-linkage emphasizes continuity and
chains of commuting relationships. As expected, figure 9 exposes
three distinct phases of clustering. First, urban counties like San
Francisco, San Mateo, Marin (Peninsula and West Bay cluster),
or Alemeda and Contra Costa (East Bay cluster), or Santa Clara
and San Benito (Silicon Valley cluster), agglomerate into urban
core clusters of relatively limited size. In a second phase, these
urban clusters merge together, attracting in the process a number of
suburban counties, forming what we usually mean at the Bay Area.
In a third phase, the Bay Area merges with the greater Sacramento,
and together they progressively, linearly agglomerate a number of
suburban and rural counties around them.
Complete-linkage, in figure 10, comes in stark contrast with the
previous description of single-linkage clustering. Local clusters of
the West Bay (San Francisco and Marin) and the Peninsula and Sil-
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Hierarchical clustering of counties in the San Francisco Bay Area
Method: complete-linkage
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Figure 10: Hierarchical clustering of
counties in the San Francisco Bay Area,
complete-linkage
icon Valley (Santa Clara, San Benito & San Mateo) merge together
relatively late, and cluster with part of the Central Valley around
Stockton (San Joaquin, Calaveras, Amador & Tuolomne). East Bay
(Alameda, Contra Costa) and North Bay (Napa, Solano) counties do
not merge with other part of the Bay Area until the very last merge
event. In the San Francisco Bay Area, complete-linkage demonstrate
that the three ensembles of San Francisco-Marin, East Bay, and Sili-
con Valley function relatively independently. Revealing commuting
relationship specificity, complete-linkage also reveals the connection
between the Bay Area and part of the Central Valley.
The way complete-linkage highlights specificity is particularly
visible when examining clustering around large cities in Texas (fig-
ure 11). Each large city—Houston, Dallas, Fort-Worth, San Antonio,
Austin and Corpus Christi—is in its own cluster. Texas is a reveal-
ing case for complete linkage because the state is formed of numer-
ous large cities with sprawling suburbs and rural, arid regions in
between them. Two pairs of cities, Dallas and Fort Worth on the one
hand, San Antonio and Austin on the other hand, are close to each
other and often portrayed as twin cities, especially for Dallas and
Fort Worth. Complete-linkage reveals the specific zone of influence
of each member of the pair. San Antonio and Austin each com-
mand long, continuous bands of hinterland. Counties immediately
in between the two cities—Hayes, Comal & Guadalupe—exhibit
an attachment to the more distant Houston. By contrast with San
Antonio and Austin, Dallas and Fort Worth display an intertwined,
tiled influence over surrounding counties and large parts of the
region around them independently cluster into a third, suburban
group of counties. Moreover, complete-linkage also reveals network
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Complete-linkage clustering in Texas
Clustering method: complete-linkage; Commuting level: 0.001
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Figure 11: Complete-linkage clustering
in Texas
of cities spanning large territories. Austin, for instance, is in the
same cluster as Orlando, FL, and part of Northern Florida around
Lake City.
This combination of urban networks and specific hinterland is
particularly visible in Louisiana, also shown on figure 11. New
Orleans clusters with Baton Rouge and a rural part of North-
East Louisiana, but not with other large cities on the coast of
Louisiana—Lafayette, Lake Charles—although they are much
closer, while the Northern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, close to
New Orleans, clusters with Houston.
Average-linkage, in figure 12, shows a multiplicity of smaller,
local groups of counties: West Bay, Silicon Valley, East Bay, Cen-
tral Valley, Greater Sacramento and Sierra Nevada. These smaller
groups all cluster together relatively late in a continuum of com-
muting relationships from the Pacific to the Sierra. Inside these
clusters, merges are progressive along the scale of commuting
strength, and it is therefore challenging to identify the proper level
of identification.
Combined-linkage, shown in figure 13 distinguishes clearly
between a greater Bay Area on the one hand, and the Greater Sacra-
mento on the other hand. It is notable that counties of the Central
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Hierarchical clustering of counties in the San Francisco Bay Area
Method: average-linkage
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Figure 12: Hierarchical clustering of
counties in the San Francisco Bay Area,
average-linkage
Valley like Stanislaus and Merced agglomerate relatively quickly
with the Bay Area, before the South Bay and the Silicon Valley are
merged with the rest of the Bay Area. Combined-linkage cluster-
ing also exhibits a type of progressive agglomeration, like single-
linkage, inside large clusters.
These four methods are complementary in revealing different
structural aspects of urban ensembles. We can learn about a spe-
cific region by looking at the four of them in parallel. In the specific
case of the San Francisco Bay Area, we confirm that the Bay Area
has close ties with the Greater Sacramento, and the two of them
function as a continuous urban region on a higher level. We get
a precise sense of the direct rural hinterland of the region, incor-
porating part of the Sierra Nevada. We understand that different
urban cores as parts of the region: San Francisco and Marin, East
Bay, Silicon Valley, Sacramento, North Bay, Central Valley. The U.S.
Census’ definition of the Bay Area as a Core-Based Statistical Area
(CBSA) merges San Francisco and Oakland (Alameda County) as a
single urban core. Hierarchical clustering shows that the East Bay
(Alameda & Contra Costa) keeps an important specificity. We also
learn of the definite attachment of part of the Central Valley to the
Bay Area. Overall, hierarchical clustering brushes a much richer
portrait of the Bay Area, its internal structure, and its ties with sur-
rounding areas.
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Hierarchical clustering of counties in the San Francisco Bay Area
Method: combined-linkage
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Figure 13: Hierarchical clustering of
counties in the San Francisco Bay Area,
combined-linkage
Regarding clustering methods, combined-linkage is the closest
to what is usually understood as a metropolitan area, a region
with one or several urban cores, and a large following of suburban
or peripheral settlements. Combined-linkage also shows relations of
proximity between a metropolitan area and its neighbors. Average-
linkage reveals smaller urban ensembles. Single-linkage shows
urban cores and progressive agglomeration around them, exposing
progressive degrees of metropolitan integration. Complete-linkage
unveils specificity in commuting ties between counties.
These methods differ in regards to the structural property of
clusters they produce, as evidenced by merges’ balance (see 3.1).
Table 1 shows that combined and single-linkage produce merges
that are generally less balanced than average and complete-linkage.
Combined and single-linkage tend to progressively aggregate
smaller clusters or individual counties to already large ones, where
average and complete-linkage merges together clusters that are
comparable in size. This is consistent with the examination of
merges in the San Francisco Bay Area. Average-linkage tends to
identify local clusters and then merges them together, where the
high specificity of complete-linkage tends to keep urban counties
separate for a long time until merging them later when the com-
muting threshold is close to zero.
These structural differences are visible in more details on fig-
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Clustering method Median balance
average 0.403
combined 0.209
complete 0.401
single 0.214
Table 1: Balance statistics by hierarchi-
cal clustering method
Heatmap of merges by balance and commuting strength threshold
By clustering method
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Figure 14: Heatmap of merges by
balance and commuting strength
threshold, by clustering methodure 14, a series of heatmaps of merges by balance and commuting
strength threshold broken down by clustering method. Figure 14
shows that for all clustering methods, the range of merge balances
tends to widen as the commuting threshold is lowered, with early
merges being largely unbalanced, clustering together populous
counties with smaller ones. As the commuting threshold is low-
ered, average and complete-linkage produce more merges all over
the balance scale, while combined and single linkage do produce
balanced merges, but in smaller quantities.
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4.2 Metropolitan clusters can be locally optimized for stability, but not
nation-wide
In section 4.1 I have shown that different clustering algorithms
produce different agglomeration patterns offering a diversity of in-
terpretations on how counties group together to form metropolitan
areas and urban regions. The OMB uses a similar process to delin-
eate specific metropolitan areas. For this criterion to be suitable, it
should display an evident, internally valid threshold. All counties
linked together by commuting ties stronger than the threshold form
a metropolitan area together. In this section I examine if the data
exhibits an obvious candidate value for such a threshold.
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Figure 15: Cumulative count of merges
by commuting threshold
Global stability. Figure 15 displays the cumulative count
of merge events between clusters along the scale of commuting
strength between counties. That is, when the threshold of commut-
ing strength is lowered, more clusters merge. The cumulative count
measures how many such merges have been performed by the al-
gorithm from the highest possible commuting strength down to the
current commuting strength threshold.
In regards to this cumulative count, figure 15 shows that the four
clustering methods are behaving differently. Complete and average-
linkage methods display a similar exponential growth. However,
as I have explained in section 4.1, this similarity conceals a differ-
ent interpretation. Single-linkage exhibits a growth curve more
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akin to a logarithmic one, with merge events accelerating and then
slowing down towards the end. Combined-linkage displays a poly-
nomial growth of merge events, more steadily accelerating the rate
of merge events as the commuting strength threshold is lowered.
If a nation-wide natural threshold existed in the data, we should
see the curve flatten around one or more commuting strength val-
ues, indicating that no merge is being performed around this value.
None of the clustering method exhibit this pattern in figure 15.
Derivative of cumulative count of merges by commuting threshold
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Figure 16: Derivative of cumulative
count of merges by commuting thresh-
old
This is confirmed in figure 16, displaying the derivatives of cu-
mulative merge counts. Derivatives express the rate of change of
the cumulative count, and a natural threshold would correspond
to a point where the rate of change is close to zero, preferentially
staying around zero for a range of values around the threshold. If
figure 16 reveals differences in the distributions of merge events
produced by the four clustering methods, none of them is exhibit-
ing a rate of change close to zero. Therefore, there is no internal,
nation-wide threshold in the data.
Local cluster stability. There is by definition a point of opti-
mal local clustering stability for each county. That is, each county is
part of multiple clusters, and one of them is the most stable. I have
determined in section 4.1 that combined-linkage is the clustering
method producing clusters that are the closest to what is usually
understood as metropolitan areas. I process hierarchical clustering
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United States Metropolitan Areas
Using combined-linkage hierarchical clustering and optimized cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000 inhabitants
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Figure 17: United States Metropoli-
tan Areas, using combined-linkage
hierarchical clustering and optimized
cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000
inhabitants
produced by each clustering method—single, complete, average &
combined—with the local stability optimizing algorithm described
in section 3.2 and illustrated by figure 8. This algorithm optimizes
the stability of clusters in descending order of their population. Ta-
ble 2 shows summary statistics for metropolitan clusters identified
with each of these methods. When all clusters are considered, there
is little difference between these methods, all of them having a me-
dian cluster stability of 0,14. Combined and complete-linkage tend
to select more populous clusters. More salient differences appear
by selecting clusters with a population above 50 000 inhabitants, the
population threshold used by the OMB to delineate metropolitan
areas. With clusters above 50 000 inhabitants, combined-linkage
selects metropolitan clusters markedly more populous than other
methods, with a median population of 252 068. Median stability of
metropolitan clusters is, however, slightly lower than with average
and complete, but above single-linkage. The fact that combined-
linkage selects larger clusters without sacrificing stability reinforces
the conclusion of section 4.1 that this methods reflects metropoli-
tan reality more effectively. An examination of map 17, displaying
metropolitan clusters with combined-linkage, confirms it.
At first glance, clusters selected for their local stability validate
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type average combined complete single
Mdn stability 0.146 0.141 0.137 0.141
Mdn population 55365 77314 74801 64019
# 50000+ 1691 1886 1951 1757
Mdn stability 50000+ 0.141 0.122 0.137 0.100
Mdn population 50000+ 133544 252068 162806 189093
Table 2: Summary statistics of
metropolitan clusters by clustering
method
this approach because they are indeed close to what is understood
as metropolitan areas. Some specific delineations can appear un-
expected, such as in the San Francisco Bay Area, for instance. San
Francisco’s metropolitan cluster comprises counties of the Central
Valley that are usually not counted as part the Bay Area, while part
of the Silicon Valley—Santa Clara & San Benito counties—are sep-
arated from the rest of the Bay. However, the close examination
of county-to-county relationships in section 4.1 provided context
for this result, and it shouldn’t be surprising. In the same way, I
have shown how Dallas and Fort Worth are more independent, as
measured by their commuting ties, than usually accounted for, and
their placement in two separate areas should therefore be expected
as well. Compared to maps of locally stable clusters under other
methods (figures 25 to 27 in appendix), combined-linkage is clearly
closer to the expected delineation of metropolitan areas. Combined-
linkage is the clustering method that encapsulates and conveys
more information. Especially, other methods exhibit substantially
more fragmentation around large cities. See, for instance, the areas
around San Francisco or New York in figures 25 to 27.
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Figure 18: Distribution is metropolitan
clusters’ stability
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Metropolitan clusters by population and stability
Using combined-linkage hierarchical clustering and optimized cluster stability
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Figure 19: Metropolitan areas by
population and cluster stability.
The stability optimizing identifies 1 585 clusters, of which 917
are isolated counties. Isolated counties tend to be rural, but some of
them are rather populous. As in the OMB’s official metropolitan de-
lineation, San Diego is, by far, the most heavily populated isolated
county, with 3 095 313 inhabitants in 2010. The median population
of isolated counties is 19 286.
Optimizing local cluster stability captures much of the informa-
tion on commuting relationships between counties. In figure 20, I
illustrate it with a map of metropolitan clusters in Northern Cal-
ifornia, around the San Francisco Bay Area. This map should be
compared with figures 9 to 13, section 4.1, displaying dendrograms
of clustering counties in Northern California for each method. Fig-
ure 20’s map shows topography, because topography often shapes
perception of social space, without necessarily shaping social space
itself. The nine counties usually understood as part of the Bay
Area—Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma—are all touching the Bay.
The Bay itself occupies a large valley nestled in the California Coast
Ranges, separated from the Pacific by the Santa Cruz Mountains
in the South and the Marin Hills in the North, and bordered on
its eastern side by a series of successive mountain ranges includ-
ing the Diablo Mountain Range. East of the Coast Ranges lies the
California Central Valley, north of which Sacramento is located.
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OMB’s Primary Statistical Area of San Jose-San Francisco-
Oakland include three more counties not bordering the Bay—San
Joaquin, Santa Cruz & San Benito. San Joaquin is in the Central
Valley, with Stockton and Tracy as notable cities. Figure 21 shows
OMB’s delineation of primary statistical areas in Northern Cali-
fornia. The map makes apparent how, with the exception of San
Joaquin county being attached to the Bay Area, delineations usu-
ally follow topographical features. Counties in the same valley are
usually grouped together in a PSA, and moutain ranges separate
PSAs. This can be explained, in part, by how statistical areas are
constructed by the OMB. The raw data of commuting ties is adjusted
with input from local authorities. It is therefore expected, given
this manual input, that statistical areas would correspond closely to
perceptions of urban and metropolita areas.
Metropolitan clusters in Northern California
Method: complete-linkage, optimized local cluster stability
Figure 20: Metropolitan clusters in
Northern California, complete-linkage
clustering, optimized local cluster
stability.
Optimized local cluster stability offers a different picture, as
illustrated in figure 20, with two main differences compared to
OMB’s definition. The first is that part of Silicon Valley—Santa
Clara & San Benito counties—is not included in the same metropoli-
tan cluster, even though there is a topographic and urban continuity
between the two. Santa Clara demonstrates enough specificity to be
counted apart. The second important difference is that the northern
part of the San Joaquin Valley, occupying the central parts of the
Central Valley, is firmly attached to the Bay Area. Beyond the sole
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San Joaquin county included in OMB’s delineation, the Bay Area
extends to Stanislaus, Calaveras & Merced counties, including fairly
large cities like Modesto, Turlock & Merced.
These differences are consequential concerning how metropolitan
problems are framed. The San Francisco Bay Area is facing a hous-
ing shortage fed by a strong economic and demographic growth,
and a slowdown in construction after the Great Recession of 2008.60 60 Paciorek 2013.
This shortage generates controversies regarding if and where new
housing should be built to accommodate the area’s growth, pitting
South Bay municipalities accused of building too much office space
for too few housing units, against San Francisco. The metropolitan
map I present here, however, shows that the South Bay is relatively
functionally independent from the rest of the Bay, and that the re-
gional housing shortage is likely spurring growth and commuting
to the Bay Area from beyond the Coastal Ranges in the Central
Valley.
Similarly, the State of California and local governments are mak-
ing important investments to develop rail transit along the Bay,
building an extension to regional rail system BART, 61 linking East 61 See VTA’s BART Silicon Valley Exten-
sion, http://www.vta.org/bart/and South Bay, and electrifying commuter rail Caltrain between San
Francisco and San Jose. 62 Transit links between the Central Valley 62 See Peninsula Corridor
Electrification Project, http:
//www.caltrain.com/projectsplans/
CaltrainModernization/
Modernization/
PeninsulaCorridorElectrificationProject.
html
and the Bay are seldom the focus of public debate, even though a
large part of the valley is linked to the Bay. The only rail commuter
service linking the Central Valley to the Bay is a commuter service
to San Jose. 63
63 See Altamont Corridor Express, https:
//www.acerail.com/
Figure 20 exposes a potential bias of using counties as units
of aggregation for commuting statistics. Counties are large and
diverse, and commuting links could reflect small but populous
part of counties. This is especially salient north of the Bay and
east of Sacramento. A small part of these counties is urbanized,
and accounts for much of the county’s commuting, while other
parts of the county are more rural. Such aggregation bias could be
alleviated by using smaller-scale statistics.
Each metropolitan cluster is optimized for its stability, but it does
not mean that each metropolitan cluster is equally stable. The me-
dian stability for non-isolated metropolitan clusters is relatively
low at 0,11. Figure 18 shows a wide distribution of the stability of
metropolitan clusters, with few being very stable. However, fig-
ure 19, presenting stability in regards to cluster population, shows
that there is little correlation between a cluster’s stability and its
population. Even though the algorithm is designed to optimize sta-
bility for populous counties, some dense areas integrated in large
urban continuums are not part of any stable cluster. It is notably
the case in the northwestern “megalopolis”. For instance, Washing-
ton D.C.’s metropolitan cluster, comprising 8 counties and 3 032 133
inhabitants, has stability of only 0,023. Similarly, nearby Philadel-
phia’s metropolitan cluster, with 10 counties and 5 445 362 has a
stability of 0,031. For both of these metropolitan clusters, it takes
very little change in the commuting ties threshold to change their
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Primary Statistical Areas in Northern California
2010 Census delineations
Figure 21: Primary Statistical Areas
in Northern California, 2010 Census
delineations.
delineation, undermining their robustness. It appears on map 17
that stable metropolitan clusters tend to be concentrated in the
South. I examine geographic variations in section 4.3.
4.3 Regional ranges of clustering stability
I have shown in section 4.2 that there is no internal, natural threshold
in the data to distinguish which counties would be inside or out-
side metropolitan areas. It is possible, however, that this is part due
to geographic heterogeneity in the United States. A first glimpse at
single-linkage clustering at a commuting level of 2,6%, in figure 22
makes readily apparent a stark contrast between the Eastern and
Western halves of the country. Single-linkage, as explained in sec-
tion 3.1, reveals local continuity at the expense of overall internal
homogeneity in the cluster. Figure 22 exposes that the continuity of
commuting relationships between places breaks more rapidly in the
West than in the East. With the exception of Highland County, VA,
and Aroostook County, ME, the East is a continuum of commuting
when the West is already broken into many different commute-
sheds and isolated counties, from the 100th meridian westward.
Figure 22’s map also shows clustering of urban counties along the
Pacific West Coast, with Portland and Seattle in the North, and
California in the South.
To understand if commuting relationships between counties
the space of urban life 64
County-to-county commuting clusters
Clustering method: single-linkage; Commuting level: 0.027
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Figure 22: Map
are significantly different in different parts of the country, I use
combined-linkage clustering to divide the contiguous United States
in three major regions. The East comprises all of the East Coast
from Maine to Florida and a large part of the Midwest. The South
is mainly composed of Texas, Louisiana and the southern parts of
New Mexico, Mississippi and Alabama. The West spans from the
Rocky Mountains to the Pacific. Figure 28 in appendix presents
a map of the three regions. A number of isolated counties and
smaller clusters are excluded from the three regions.
Figure 23 shows the cumulative count of merges in each of these
three regions, in a similar fashion that figure 15 is doing for each
clustering method. Because these three regions have a different
number of counties, therefore a different number of merge events,
the count is normalized by the total of merge events. For instance,
a value of 0,2 corresponds to 20% of cumulated merges up to this
point. Combined-linkage clustering is not a linear process in re-
gards to commuting strength, because distance between clusters
is recalculated at the level of the whole luster, not member coun-
ties. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that, along the scale of
commuting strength, the count of cumulative merges goes up and
down. In practice however, the count seldom goes down. Figure 23
the space of urban life 65
Cumulative count of merges by commuting threshold
Combined-linkage clustering, by US region
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00.20.40.6
County-to-county commuting proportion threshold
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
co
un
t o
f c
lu
st
er
 m
er
ge
s
Region
West
South
East
Figure 23: Cumulative count of merges
by commuting threshold, combined-
linkage clustering, by US region.
exposes a difference in the rhythm of clustering merges between
regions. In the East, clustering is more steady for higher values of
commuting strength, reflecting more continuity in commuting re-
lationships between counties. In the West, clustering is slower for
high values of commuting ties, and accelerates towards the end
of the process as the threshold approaches zero. The South is on
par with the East for commuting ties above 35%, denoting strong
ties linking a suburban county with a central city. Clustering then
slows down and exhibits a series of plateaus, that could reflect the
isolation between large urban areas, before accelerating again as the
commuting threshold comes close to zero.
To clarify these differences, figure 24 displays the derivative of
cumulative count of merges by region. The derivative is simply
the rate of change of the count for any given value of commut-
ing strength between counties. Areas of stability have a rate of
change close to zero. Since the cumulative count is coarse, the rate
of change at each value of commuting strength—the commuting
strength value of each merge between two clusters—varies widely
locally, a evidenced by figure 29 in appendix. In order to make the
information contained in the rate of change more apparent, I use
locally weighted smoothing (LOESS).64 64 Cleveland, Grosse, and Shyu 1992.
Figure 24 reveals that clustering shares a similar structure be-
tween regions, but that the specific commuting values differ, ob-
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Derivative of cumulative count of merges by commuting threshold
Combined-linkage clustering, by US region, LOESS smoothing
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Figure 24: Derivative of cumulative
count of merges by commuting thresh-
old, combined-linkage clustering, by
US region, LOESS smoothing.
fuscating this structure at a national level. Starting from higher
commuting values, the more stringent threshold for clustering, all
three regions exhibit an area of stability in the higher values, fol-
lowed by an area of rapid clustering, followed by another area of
relative stability, before clustering rapidly again. Table 3 summa-
rizes areas of stability for each region. Where East and West show
ranges of stability both in high and low commuting, the South dis-
plays sharper thresholds. While these areas of stability are readily
apparent in figure 24, the use of locally weighted smoothing be-
clouds the noisy nature of clustering revealed by figure 29. These
areas are, consequently, not areas of complete stability defining per-
fect internal threshold but rather areas of relative stability revealing
a regional tendency.
Region Higher area Lower area
East 0.6 - 0.5 0.18 - 0.11
South 0.31 0.11
West 0.3 - 0.5 0.1 - 0.05
Table 3: Areas of clustering stability by
region
This particular structure can be used to define a double regional
commuting threshold. The higher one defines urban cores, while
the lower delineates metropolitan areas. Figure 30’s map in ap-
pendix shows the former while figure 31 shows the latter. Com-
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pared to figure 20, showing locally stable metropolitan clusters in
Northern California, metropolitan clusters of figure 31 capture less
information. They expose how part of the Central Valley attached
to the Bay Area, but not the specificity of the South Bay.
If these areas of stability reveal regional differences, they do
not, however, account for specific local conditions as precisely and
as robustly as optimizing local stability and are still a relatively
blunt tool to understand how a particular place functions for policy
purposes. Nevertheless, they reveal broad differences in settlement
patterns in the United States, by focusing on the actual use of space
beyond physical characteristics.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Commuting data reveals many facets of urban America
As I have shown in the account of the four clustering methods
(section 4.1), county-to-county commuting relationships reveal
important dimensions of the functioning of urban America. Com-
muting is one of the only metric of socio-spatial relations available
nation-wide. As I summarize in table 4, each hierarchical cluster-
ing method reveals a different structural aspect. Single-linkage
emphasizes continuity, making apparent chains of counties linked
by their commuters. In this sense, single-linkage starts to show
that if we can create separate clusters of counties, there is a con-
tinuum of commuting exchanges between counties in the United
States. Complete-linkage exposes the opposite, the specificity in
these exchanges. This specificity reveals networks of relations that
are not territorially continuous, but jumping over large swathes of
land to link together both local hinterlands and nation-wide ur-
ban networks. Average-linkage, a middle-ground between single
and complete-linkage still operating with counties as the base unit
of distance calculation between clusters, exposes local affinities.
Combined-linkage, by blending together all commuters of a cluster,
reveals larger ensembles, akin to metropolitan areas.
Clustering method Reveals
Single Socio-spatial continuity
Complete Relational specificity
Average Local ensembles
Combined Urban regions
Table 4: Hierarchical clustering meth-
ods
All of these measurements are based on county commuting and
population only. There is no information added by identifying
“urban cores” to seed the clustering process, as OMB’s definition
currently does.
Which of these measures is the right measure, however, is hard
to determine without looking at specific policy contexts. All four
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of these characteristics are important to understand how a particu-
lar area of the country functions. As I have demonstrated with the
example of the San Francisco Bay Area in section 4.1, the relevant
urban unit around San Francisco could be as small as the 2 or 3
counties immediately surrounding the city on the oceanside of the
Bay, to a large ensemble of more than 40 counties spanning from
the Pacific to the Sierra. The relevant delineation of the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area depends on the policy to be conducted in this space.
Furthermore, these different spaces are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. For instance, the continuity revealed by single-linkage
is important for transportation policy, where a given place is not
part of an exclusive ensemble but linked to multiple other places.
Local, specific relationships exposed by complete-linkage are highly
relevant to housing development policies. Because commuting is a
relation between places of residence and of work, commuting rela-
tionships are important to understand how economic development
can affect housing demand in other places. However, commuting
relationships are not necessarily relevant to conduct policies where
the social use of space if of secondary importance. For instance,
environmental policies depend on many other factors. Topograph-
ical features are of importance for commuting only insofar as they
influence the type of transportation infrastructure that can be laid
out over a territory, but they are the prime factor in watershed defi-
nition. There is no direct causal link between the two.
5.2 No single measure of metropolitan areas
Reinforcing this conclusion that metropolitan America should be
approached in its structural diversity is the fact that none of these
measures based on commuting relationships provide an obvious
threshold to delineate metropolitan areas and tell them apart. At
each stage, clustering methods provide a different portrait of urban
ensembles, but none of them can be characterized as the right one.
Indeed, as I have demonstrated in section 4.2, commuting data itself
does not exhibit zones of stability where this threshold could be
placed. The overall structure of commuting becomes clearer when
examined regionnally, by contrast with a nation-wide approach.
Regions—East, West, South—show two distinct ranges of relatively
higer stability, and these ranges vary between regions. However,
these more stable ranges are by definition less stable than locally
optimized.
Cluster stability can be locally optimized to offer a picture of
metropolitan America, shown in map 17. Metropolitan areas de-
fined this way, however, are not uniformly stable. In parts of the
country, metropolitan areas are very unstable. Counties are en-
meshed in a dense web of commuting relationships. The density of
this network does not allow for easily carving groups of counties
out of it. The portrait presented by map 17 is recognizable and the
best that can be achieved with commuting data only. Nonetheless,
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this portrait is brittle, and many of its parts are lacking the robust-
ness needed to constitute solid foundations for public policies.
5.3 A pluralist approach to metropolitan areas
OMB’s definition of metropolitan areas is neither robust not inter-
nally valid. However, commuting data provides important informa-
tion about the structure of metropolitan America. Issues with the
current definition stem from the fact that metropolitan America is
more complex than can be captured with a single measure. Com-
muting data, however, could be the main element of a metropolitan
dashboard revealing how counties and places function together to
form urban ensembles.
I suggest that policies that are directed towards metropolitan
areas today include a relevant delineation element, whereby appli-
cants to these programs would justify the relevant local space for
the policy. For the sake of simplicity, combined-linkage local stabil-
ity optimization, in map 17 can form the base-case scenario. Local
cluster stability sets a different bar for justifying a particular policy
delineation. Metropolitan Phoenix or Austin, being locally more
stable, would have less to justify to rely on the base-case than Wash-
ington D.C. or Philadelphia, being highly unstable metropolitan
clusters.
Moreover, policy programs can issue delineation guidelines
based, in part, on the four clustering methods applied in this re-
search, in addition to domain-specific data pertaining to the pol-
icy. The data, as well as accessible supporting material and tools,
should be made available to local applicants, so that they can un-
derstand it easily and make their case efficiently.
The burden of proof to show what is the relevant space for a
specific policy would be local under this scenario. Grant applicants
would have to show that the delineation they propose is indeed
the relevant one for the policy. However, with a proper dashboard
and set of indicators stemming from different clustering methods,
applicants would be helped in this task by the US Census.
The relevant space of collaboration for a specific policy is often
obfuscated by the lack of relevant and graspable data. A metropoli-
tan dashboard can contribute to create a common table where local
actors can discuss and negotiate better collaboration around poli-
cies spanning across county lines, like transportations, housing, and
economic development.
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ACS American Community Survey
CBSA Core Based Statistical Area
CSA Combined Statistical Area
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Appendix: metropolitan clusters by clustering method
United States Metropolitan Areas
Using single-linkage hierarchical clustering and optimized cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000 inhabitants
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Figure 25: United States Metropolitan
Areas, using single-linkage hierarchical
clustering and optimized cluster stabil-
ity, clusters of > 50,000 inhabitants
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United States Metropolitan Areas
Using complete-linkage hierarchical clustering and optimized cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000 inhabitants
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Figure 26: United States Metropoli-
tan Areas, using complete-linkage
hierarchical clustering and optimized
cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000
inhabitants
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United States Metropolitan Areas
Using average-linkage hierarchical clustering and optimized cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000 inhabitants
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Figure 27: United States Metropolitan
Areas, using average-linkage hier-
archical clustering and optimized
cluster stability, clusters of > 50,000
inhabitants
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Appendix: regional variations
United States Regions
Defined by combined-linkage clustering
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Figure 28: United States regions,
defined by combined-linkage
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Derivative of cumulative count of merges by commuting threshold
Combined-linkage clustering, by US region
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Figure 29: Derivative of cumulative
count of merges by commuting thresh-
old, combined-linkage clustering, by
US region
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Metropolitan Clusters by Region, Higher Stability Threshold
Combined-linkage clustering, optimizing regional stability (W=0.40, S=0.55, E=0.31), population >= 50,000
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Figure 30: Metropolitan Clusters by
Region, Higher Stability Threshold.
Combined-linkage clustering, optimiz-
ing regional stability (W=0.40, S=0.55,
E=0.31), population >= 50,000.
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Metropolitan Clusters by Region, Lower Stability Threshold
Combined-linkage clustering, optimizing regional stability (W=0.75, S=0.11, E=0.11), population >= 50,000
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Figure 31: Metropolitan Clusters by
Region, Lower Stability Threshold.
Combined-linkage clustering, optimiz-
ing regional stability (W=0.75, S=0.11,
E=0.11), population >= 50,000.
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On Point: Designing Robust Spatial Targeting for
Public Policies
The Example of Disadvantaged Communities in
California.
Policy take-aways
• Policy targeting on multiple,
overlapping scales, creates sources
of bias due the Modifiable Areal
Units Problem (MAUP).
• Spatial policy targeting should take
geographic context into account.
The same measurement does
not mean the same thing in two
different contexts.
• Geographic biases are reinforced
by trying to measure a continuous
reality, such as economic disadvan-
tage, with a discrete metric.
In the American context of spatial segregation, communities
can have vastly different levels of access to resources. To mitigate
this effect, institutions design spatially targeted policies to provide
resources to the most disadvantaged communities, compensating
for their lack thereof. Delineating these communities is the principal
challenge of this process.
We look at a program designed by the State of California targeting
disadvantaged communities (DACs) to provide better access to water
related projects. These communities are defined by being under 80%
of the state median household income and they can be defined at
different scales (census blocks, places...). In this paper we test the
robustness of this definition and evaluate its fitness for water policy
purposes.
We assess how stable the definition of DACs is across scales and
how this definition correlates with water reliability stress conditions
addressed by the policy.
We find that because they can be measured at different scales fol-
lowing a unidimensional metric of median household income, the
current definition of DACs suffers from the modifiable areal unit
problem: communities can be identified as disadvantaged or not
depending on the scale considered. Because the metric is binary,
context-less and subject to geographic bias, it fails to isolate disad-
vantaged communities from comparatively resourceful communities.
We recommend that institutions designing spatially targeted
policies use a single scale of reference to eschew modifiable areal unit
problems, that they incorporate in the delineation metrics contextual
variables, such as relative cost of living, and variables relevant to the
dimension addressed by the policy, and that they use a continuous
metric rather than a binary one.
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1 Literature review
Public policies are often directed to specific actors or categories of
actors, either to balance an undesired effects, in the case of wel-
fare policies, or to incentivize different behaviors. In this literature
review, I first draw a general picture of the different types of target-
ing mechanisms available to policy makers. Second, I explain more
precisely how these targeting tactics are used in a spatial context,
when they are directed at spaces and not directly at people. Third,
I describe the specific policy examined in this paper, targeting dis-
advantaged communities in California, helping them conducting
water-related projects. Last, I expose the theoretical argument for
potential biases and mis-matches created by the targeting mecha-
nism chosen by the State of California for this policy.
1.1 Public policy targeting.
Policies are often directed at specific individuals or communities,
applying selectively to some and not to others. Welfare policies, for
instance, aim at alleviating inequalities and at helping the less re-
sourceful members of society. Policies looking to foster job creation
are directed at businesses that are believed to be the most likely to
create new jobs. Such policies are targeted. Policy-makers design
targeted policies to benefit only some individuals or communities,
to the exclusion of others, based on set criteria. This targeting can
take two forms, depending on if the selection of beneficiaries is
unilateral or bilateral. If the policy applies to every eligible person
whether they actively seek to benefit from it or not, the targeting
is passive and unmatched. However, if eligible beneficiaries must
apply and be selected by a provider to benefit from the policy, the
targeting is active and matched.
Passive targeting The simplest form of targeting is applying the
policy automatically to all qualifying entities, without requesting
any action on the part of the beneficiary. A sales tax exemption on
necessity goods like food products to alleviate tax burden on lower
income individuals, for instance, applies to all people buying ne-
cessity goods, regardless of any action on their part to benefit from
the policy.1 In fact, the policy applies regardless of their degree of 1 California State Board of Equalization
2014.awareness. The exemption even applies to individuals who have no
idea they are benefiting from an exemption.
A spatial passive targeting applies to all individuals and com-
munities using the space where the policy applies, regardless of
their actions or their awareness. For instance, the effort of a mu-
nicipality to rebuild roads in struggling neighborhoods benefits all
people living in and traveling through these spaces. No one needs
to opt-in to use rebuilt roads, anyone using the road will benefit.
Passive targeting can induce two types of effects arising from
the lack of selection of beneficiaries. First, passive targeting can
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induce supply and/or demand through feedback effects for goods
and services if they change their relative cost for consumers. This
type of behavior change for consumer and/or providers of a good
is sometimes a goal of the policy, but can also be an unintended
or a negative side-effect. Lowering the price of a good with a tax
exemption, for instance, can drive consumers to buy more of this
good. Rebuilding roads in struggling neighborhoods can be part of
an effort to drive in traffic and patrons to revitalize retail. Lowering
the price of public transit, or offering a better service, drives people
towards it. Induced demand is also a potential unintended negative
consequence of a policy. The induced demand created by new road
infrastructure is a well documented phenomenon.2 Typically, new 2 Cervero 2002; Cervero and Hansen
2002.road capacity will only temporarily alleviate traffic and, in the long
term, create more overall congestion through induced demand.
Second, the absence of beneficiary selection has potential to
create dead-weight loss for the policy provider. This effect is es-
pecially present in policies aiming at changing behaviors. Some
beneficiaries would have adopted the behavior regardless of the
policy. Therefore, policy resources are spent on them in vain. For
these actors already behaving as intended, the policy is a windfall
gain, an unexpected gain without anything to do in return. Because
resources are spent without effect, policy resources are inefficiently
allocated in regards to the policy goal: a change in behaviors. Ben-
eficiaries consume the policy good at a discount relative to their
benefit. In regards to general economic theory, a deadweight loss
occurs when the equilibrium between supply and demand cannot
be met, for diverse reasons such as artificial scarcity or externali-
ties. In this case, excess resources are spent while economic value is
unrealized.3 For the specific purpose of evaluating public policies, 3 Hines 1999, p.168.
the United Kingdom’s Treasury broadly defines policy deadweight
as “that part of a public expenditure program which is taken up
by recipients other than those to whom the expenditure should,
if possible, be directed”.4 Policy deadweight is a factor of policy 4 Her Majesty’s Treasury 1988, p.28.
inefficiency.5 More precisely, Anu Tolika describes deadweight as 5 Mceldowney 1997.
“outcomes which would have occurred anyway without interven-
tion”.6 The realized outcome is the desired outcome, but the policy 6 Tokila, Haapanen, and Ritsilä 2008,
p.587.intervention is superfluous because it would have been realized
anyway, hence wasting resources.
Matched targeting A second type of policy targeting relies
on action on both part of the policymaker and the beneficiary. In
a matched targeting policy, beneficiaries need not only be eligible
but must also actively apply to benefit from the policy. In turn,
the policy provider can in some cases make a choice amongst ap-
plicants. These policies are a form of two-sided matching.7 One 7 A. Roth and Sotomayor 1992.
side of the matching is the policy maker or provider, and the other
side is the set of eligible beneficiaries. In general economic theory,
two-sided matching is most often studies as a many-to-many mech-
anism, where each individual actor has a choice between many
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other actors. In consumer banking, for instance, each individual
has a choice between many different banks, and banks can in turn
choose to accept an individual as client or not, and which products
to offer to a given prospective consumer. Applied to public policy,
however, two-sided matching is often heavily asymmetrical, with
one provider selecting many individual applicants.
The provider side of the match can comprise a plurality of
providers, mandated by the policymaker to implement the pol-
icy. Affordable and public housing in the United States often relies
on a plurality of for-profit and non-profit developers. For instance,
San Francisco’s Below Market Rate ("BMR") Inclusionary Housing
Program requires developers to set aside 12% of a project’s units
for low and middle income housing.8 Public housing in the United 8 Housing Requirements for Residential
and Live/Work Development Projects n.d.States is generally provided by non-profit developers to an eligible
population on income conditions. Eligible households must apply
to benefit from an affordable housing unit. The number of eligible
beneficiaries typically exceeds the supply of affordable housing
available and providers must then make a selection amongst eligi-
ble applicants.
Alvin Roth has pioneered work on two-sided matching mecha-
nisms. He describes two-sided matching mechanisms as markets
where money plays little or no role.9 Alvin Roth advocates for a 9 A. E. Roth 2015.
more conscious embrace of the design of such two-sided markets,
lest unplanned detrimental effects of these markets stay unchecked.
Roth was involved in the redesign of Boston’s10 and New York 10 Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and A.
Roth 2005a.City’s11 public school systems matching systems, whereby students–
11 Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and A.
Roth 2005b.or their parents–express a ranked choice for schools and get regis-
tered to a specific school.12 Roth and his colleagues take a mech- 12 Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 2003.
anism design approach to policy. They anticipate and account for
people’s actions over time in the design of the policy itself. In doing
so, they acknowledge that policies are not one way streets, but that
their effects, and their efficiency, depends on the actions of potential
beneficiaries. Taking into account participants’ beliefs, strategies
and actions, what is the best procedure to achieve the policy goal?
Building on game theory,13 mechanism design is about “the optimal 13 Fudenberg and Tirole 1991.
choice of the rules of the game”.14 14 Borgers, Krahmer, and Strausz 2015.
1.2 Does the target really exist? Construct validation in policy tar-
geting.
Both unmatched and matched targeting posit that the target they
define exists as a reality. Two types of targets can be set by policies.
If the definition creates the target, then by definition, the target is
correct. However, if the policy targets an underlying social reality
or group, then the policy applies by delineation of these targets. The
specifics of the delineation mechanism, telling apart who is eligible
from who is not, creates room for bias and mismatch that need to
be controlled when deciding of a target definition.
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Target by definition. In the simplest form of targeting, tar-
gets are correct by definition. Their criterion of selection is what
makes them a target of the policy. For instance, providing recipi-
ents of welfare aid with assistance to employment, as the California
“Welfare to Work” program does, targets recipients of state welfare
support.15 The measurement is direct. 15 Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman 2006.
Target by delineation. When the policy applies to a social re-
ality or a group that is posited to exist outside of the realm of the
policy, policy makers create a definition in an attempt to delineate
as effectively as possible the underlying reality or group. It is the
case of the policy I examine in this paper, targeting disadvantaged
communities in California. The policy postulates that disadvan-
taged communities really exist, that they are different from not dis-
advantaged communities, and that it is possible to delineate them
in order to target them. The problem presented by targeting by de-
lineation is to make sure the definition matches the intended reality.
Are we sure that the definition of disadvantaged communities used
by the State of California actually matches what proponents had in
mind? This problem is akin to construct validation in psychology16— 16 Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Fowler
2013.making sure that a measure actually measures what it claims to
measure— because the measurement is indirect. A construct is an
explanatory variable that is not directly observable.17 A person- 17 MacCorquodale and Meehl 1948,
p.95.ality trait, for instance, cannot be measured directly and must be
approached by indirect measurements. For that reason, psychology
surveys and experiments attempt to measure the same trait using
multiple metrics. The reality they endeavor to measure is the con-
struct. In the same way, DACs are a construct because they cannot
be directly observed but are posited to exist independently of their
measurement.
If all metrics measure, albeit imperfectly, the same underlying
construct, the marginal gain of information achieved by adding
another measure decreases rapidly. If we imagine the underlying
construct as an object, for instance a sculpture, having a picture
of the rear of the sculpture adds a lot of information compared to
having a picture of the sole front. The next picture, maybe from
the left side of the sculpture, will give us more information but not
as much. Each new picture has a lesser influence on the overall
precision of the mental image of the sculpture. At the same time,
having multiple pictures of the same sculpture help us assess that
the sculpture really exists. This is the role of construct validation
in psychology. In a policy context, the construct is the social reality
that the policy addresses. In this paper, they are disadvantaged
communities in California.
1.3 Spatial policy targeting
Spatial policy targeting can take two forms. On the one hand,
a policy can aim to change individual or communities’ spatial
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behavior—behaviors of people in space—,changing the social fabric
of space without directly intervening on the physical characteris-
tics of this space. On the other hand, a policy can also be directed
at changing the physical space, for environmental purposes or in
the hope of lifting the users of this space. Space is an important
component of social inequalities. Disinvestment in neighborhoods
and active spatial segregation, for instance, have fueled racial and
social inequalities after the civil rights movement.18 Today, spatially 18 Sharkey 2013.
targeted policies often aim at reversing these effects.
Changing spatial behaviors. An important part of the research
on spatial matching concerns associational redistribution,19 whereby 19 Durlauf 1996.
the policy aims at altering “the composition of social groups”,20 by 20 Graham 2011, p.967.
directly of indirectly changing the spatial behavior of individuals
or communities. Spatial behavior is the way individuals or commu-
nities use space in their activities. For instance, which route they
choose for their commute, or which sschool they choose for their
children. School desegregation is an example of associational redis-
tribution. By mixing two groups of students previously separated,
desegregation levels available resources for students of the two
groups. Furthermore, desegregation changes the neighborhood effects
at play within a group. By alleviating stark contrasts of available
financial resources, pupils of less affluent background gain access
to an expanded set of role models.21 To the extreme, associational 21 Durlauf 2004.
redistribution can seek to rewire the entire spatial environment of
an individual. This is what the HUD program Moving to Opportu-
nity for Fair Housing (MTO) endeavored to achieve. The program
offered 4 000 low-income families in several metropolitan areas
housing vouchers to move to more affluent neighborhoods.22 MTO 22 Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011; de Souza
Briggs, Popkin, and Goering 2010.has yielded mixed results, being beneficial for participants health
but failing to raise their economic prospects.23 23 Ludwig et al. 2008.
This type of spatial policy seeks to influence specific spatial behav-
iors in a space otherwise left untouched.
Changing spatial characteristics. The second way of ap-
proaching spatial policy targeting is to design policies changing the
physical characteristics of the space, most often for the benefits of
its users, but also for larger goals. These policies often materialize
in infrastructural, capital intensive projects. These policies can be
the main or only source of resource allocation, when the govern-
ment body drafting this policy is the main or sole responsible for
the policy. Most often, however, spatially targeted policies are de-
signed to mitigate the effects of an imbalance of resources between
communities primarily responsible for the policy. In this paper, I
examine water management policy. Many of the projects submitted
in the grant applications are primarily within the competence of
local governments and local water management agencies. Because
these local institutions have various levels of resources to manage
these project, the State of California allocate grants to help commu-
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nities with fewer resources.
1.4 Disadvantaged communities in California
In this paper, I examine the definition of Disadvantaged Communities
(DACs) used by the State of California to allocate grants for projects
related to water supply and quality. This grant program is included
in two ballot measures from 2006 (Proposition 84) and 2014 (Propo-
sition 1). Direct democracy instruments are used extensively in
California, where popular initiatives, referendums and recalls are
implemented at state and local levels.24 Proposition 84, the Safe 24 Von Arx 2002; Favre-Bulle 2009;
Favre-Bulle 2015.Drinking Water, Water Quality and Supply, Flood Control, River and
Coastal Protection Bond Act was a multi-purpose state bond measure
approved by 53.8% of California voters in 2006. Among $5.388B
of approved spendings, Proposition 84 initiated a grant program
specifically directed at Disadvantaged Communities. The DAC grant
program has been continued by the Water Quality, Supply, and Infras-
tructure Improvement Act, supported by a bond measure (Proposition
1), approved by 67.1% of California voters in 2014, with a renewed
focus on community involvement. From the $838M awarded in
planning and implementation grants in Proposition 84, 14% have
been awarded through DACs targeting.25 Proposition 1 dedicates 25 California Department of Water
Resources 2016c.10% of its $510M grant funding to DACs, amounting to $51M. Cal-
ifornia Department of Water Resources has put out a Request For
Proposal (RFP) to allocate these grants in July 2016.26 Proposition 26 California Department of Water
Resources 2016b.84 inserts a definition of DACs in the California Public Resources
Code.
California Public Resources Code, Section 75005(g):
“Disadvantaged community” means a community with a median household income less than 80% of
the statewide average. “Severely disadvantaged community” means a community with a median house-
hold income less than 60% of the statewide average.
The DACs targeting program stems from the concern that
“many [DACs] lack the staff or financial resources to develop water
projects and process grant applications and contracts”.27 In other 27 Pitzer 2013, p.8.
words, because DACs are economically struggling, they lack orga-
nizational resources to navigate and successfully access the state’s
grant system for projects. DAC targeting, by providing organiza-
tional resources to these communities, provides an opportunity to
“prioritize failing infrastructure in economically disadvantaged
communities”.28 28 Pitzer 2013, p.8.
In practice, grants are submitted by Integrated Regional Water
Management (IRWM) agencies, established by the Regional Water
Management Planning Act of 2002. California counts 48 IRWMs.
The IRWM role is most often taken by a pre-existing agency. In the
San Francisco Bay Area, for instance, IRWM is conducted by the
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), a regional associa-
tion of local governments around the Bay. They can also be cities,
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counties, water districts. . . California DWR provides a mapping
tool identifying California DACs following this definition. 29 This 29 See http://www.water.ca.gov/irwm/
grants/resources_dac.cfmmapping tool is only indicative and not legally binding. The onus is
on each applying IRWM group to provide a rationale for which of
their communities are disadvantaged.30 30 California Department of Water
Resources 2012, p.85.California Public Resources Code’s DAC definition is terse and
accessible. The definition is based on a single metric: the median
household income (MHI). California DWR uses the U.S. Census’
measure of MHI from the American Community Survey (ACS). The
law does not mandate a source for income measurement. The ACS,
contrary to the decennial census, is a more complete but sampled
survey of the American population. Only a fraction of residents
is surveyed every year, and statistic for given geographic units
are estimated from their answers. Because statistics are estimated,
they exhibit a degree of uncertainty. For very small communities,
statistics can sometimes simply not be estimated at all due to the
low number of ACS respondents. It is for instance the case for
small, rural places. For that reason, California DWR “will consider
use of other data that show the community is a DAC”,31 like “a 31 California Department of Water
Resources 2012, p.85.third party survey data that supports the population served by
the project has an MHI of less than $48 706”32 (80% of California 32 California Department of Water
Resources 2012, p.85.median MHI according the 2006-2010 ACS). In any case, DWR only
accepts measures of MHI as sole criteria for identifying a DAC as
eligible for targeted grants.
Prop. 84 grant program has ended in 2015 with a request for
proposal for implementation grants. Therefore, we have informa-
tion about grants submitted by local IRWMs, their reasoning for
DAC inclusion and the decision California DWR made to allocate
grants. When relevant, an IRWM application for planning and,
later, implementation grants, includes an attachment identifying
DACs. 33 33 For an archive of all implemen-
tation grant applications, see:
http://www.water.ca.gov/irwm/
grants/docs/Archives/Prop84/
Submitted_Applications/P84_2015_
Implementation/
Proposition 1 extends the definition of DACs in its Disadvantaged
Community Involvement Program, distinguishing between Disadvan-
taged Communities (DACs), Economically Distressed Areas (EDAs) and
Underrepresented Communities.34 EDAs are areas with MHI between 34 California Department of Water
Resources 2016a.80% and 85% of the state MHI, and includes in addition to house-
hold income criteria of financial hardship, unemployment and pop-
ulation density. Beside, California DWR provides a needs assessment
template including measures of water safety and quality 35. 35 See: http://www.water.ca.gov/
irwm/grants/docs/p1DACinvolvement/
Attachment%201%20-%20DACI%20Needs%
20Assessment%20Template_FINAL_
07152016.XLSX
However, because the grant application process has just begun
in 2016, while all grants have been awarded in the Proposition 84, I
focus on Proposition 84 in this paper.
1.5 Spatial policy mismatches
Such a definition of a spatial targets is subject to different types
of spatial bias or mismatches. These specifically spatial source of
bias come in addition to the potential construct validation prob-
lem described in 1.2. First, spatial targeting can run into spatial
robust spatial targeting for public policies 94
autocorrelation, a common property of geographic objects whereby
proximate realities are more similar to each other than distant real-
ities. Second, the way of aggregating discrete units of interest, such
as struggling individuals or households, into an geographic area to
delineate disadvantaged community can fall for an aggregation bias
termed modifiable areal unit problem.
Distance bias: the Spatial Autocorrelation Problem.
Spatial autocorrelation36 is “the correlation among values of a sin- 36 Cliff and Ord 1973.
gle variable strictly attributable to the proximity of those values in
geographic space, introducing a deviation from the independent
observations assumption of classical statistics”.37 Waldo Tobler 37 Griffith 2003, p.3.
states that the first law of geography is that “everything is related
to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things”.38 The metric chosen to measure this distance is pivotal 38 Tobler1970.
to understand proximity between social uses of space. Two places
can be close by euclidean measure, but hardly connected, therefore
distant, for social purpose.
The implications of spatial autocorrelation for spatial policy tar-
geting are twofold. First, given a single metric of targeting, targets
are likely to be geographically clustered. Indeed, low-income com-
munities and high-income communities are relatively segregated
from each other.39 Second, the context in which targets are placed 39 S. J. Rey and Montouri 1999; Taylor
and Fry 2012.differs with geography. Two communities distant from each other
are likely to experience a different context. Consequently, two com-
munities with the same Median Household Income (MHI) might
experience very different levels of hardship depending on this con-
text. Having a low income in a place where the cost of living is low
is a different experience than having the same income in a place
where the cost of living is high.
This is the reasoning between the calculation of a Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) between different countries, stating that “when
measured in the same unit, the monies of different countries should
have the same purchasing power and command the same basket of
goods”.40 The same reasoning stands at more local scales, especially 40 Cassel 1918; Cheung 2009.
for policy targeting goals, replacing monies by another relevant met-
ric of measurement, in this case economic disadvantage. In other
words, the same measurement should measure the same economic
disadvantage, controlling for the difference in local context.
Aggregation bias: the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem.
A second source of spatial bias stems from the necessary aggrega-
tion of the measured objects. The policy calls for a delineation of
disadvantaged communities. These communities are themselves an
aggregation of individuals and households. The prescribed metric,
the Median Household Income is an aggregate statistics of the income
of each individual household. Therefore, the chosen area of aggre-
gation for this metric has a decisive influence on its actual measure.
This is a case of modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). This prob-
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lem occurs when spatial point data, such as census respondents,
are aggregated in areas, such as census tracts.41 In this case, “the 41 Gehlke and Biehl 1934; Openshaw
1984.definition of these geographical objects is arbitrary and (in theory)
modifiable at choice”.42 Changing the definition of the area changes 42 Openshaw 1984, p.3.
the statistics of the area. Gerrymandering offers a salient illustra-
tion of MAUP. By changing district boundaries, one can change the
results of elections by creating a different distribution of votes.43 43 Erikson 1972; Cain 1985.
As the California Public Resources Code defines a DAC as a
“community with a median household income less than 80% of
the statewide average”, changing the boundaries of a community
changes this aggregate statistic and can push it below or above this
threshold. Let us imagine an area of low-income residents imme-
diately abutting another area with high-income households. The
selected area of reference to estimate the median household income
has a critical influence on the value this statistics will take. If both
types of household are taken together, the MHI might be neither
high nor low, giving the impression of a middle-income commu-
nity, and leaving the low-income households out of a delineated
DAC, non eligible for a grant. By contrast, if both are considered
in separate areas, one of them will have a high MHI, and the other
will have a low MHI, and be thus eligible to DAC outreach pro-
grams.
Proposition 84’s measure of DACs attempts to control for these
effects by multiplying possible scales of measurements: Census
Block Groups, Census Tracts, and Census Places. Block groups
and tracts are statistical units redrawn by the US Census Bureau
after each decennial census. Each block group and tract is drawn
to have a comparable population size. They allow the collect and
tabulation of significant aggregated statistics while preserving the
anonymity of census’s respondents. Block groups are composed
of a number of Census Blocks, and are themselves subdivisions
of Census Tracts,44. Both Block Groups and Tracts usually cover 44 U.S. Census Bureau 1994, Ch.11.
a contiguous area. Census Tracts are mainly delineated by local
participants (state and local governments, tribes...) through the
Census Bureau’s Participant Statistical Areas Program and as such
aim at reflecting community boundaries.45 45 U.S. Census Bureau 1994, Ch.10.
Census Places are concentrations of populations that “have a
name, are locally recognized, and are not part of any other place”.46 46 U.S. Census Bureau 1994, Ch.9.
Places come in two types. A place can be incorporated, usually in the
form of a local municipal government, following incorporation laws
of each state. But in the United States, counties, and not munici-
palities, are the default level of local government. Municipal gov-
ernments do not cover the whole territory. Sometimes large urban
settlements are under direct administration of counties. Therefore,
the U.S. Census Bureau recognizes unincorporated places as census
designated places (CDP). East Los Angeles, for instance, is such an
unincorporated place. Although East L.A. lies in the heart of the
Greater Los Angeles and has a population of more than 120 000
inhabitants, it is under direct government of Los Angeles County
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and is recognized as a CDP. For the purpose of this research, an
important character of places is their diversity. Large cities covering
an important territory, as well as small rural communities can be
places. Contrary to tracts and block groups, places are not compa-
rable in size or population.
2 Research question
The goal of this research is to evaluate the definition of Disadvan-
taged Communities (DACs) by the California Department of Water
Resources (DWR). Specialists and laymen alike have a sense of what
a disadvantaged community is, but charting a consistent definition
based on observable metrics is challenging. DACs are currently
identified using a mono-dimensional metric, the median household
income, applied to entities at various scale.
For a definition of disadvantaged communities to be both effec-
tive and efficient in the context of this policy, I argue that it should
fulfill 4 criteria:
Truthfulness The definition should delineate the intended spatial
reality. Here, the definition should effectively tell disadvantaged
communities apart from not disadvantaged communities. It
should not make wealthy, resourceful communities eligible for
grants, for this would be a blatant case of policy deadweight, in-
efficiently spending resources on communities that are not in
need and, at times, subsidizing projects that would have been
undertaken without the grant. The definition should also not
leave out truly disadvantaged communities, preventing them
from participating in a program explicitly intended for them.
Robustness Small changes in the definition criteria should result
in small, predictable changes in the delineated spaces. Given a
set of measures of disadvantage, the effect of adding or remov-
ing a specific measure should have a limited and predictable
effect. Robustness of the definition relies on a valid underlying
reality (i.e. disadvantaged communities are actually a thing that
exist, see 1.2) and effective metrics (i.e. metrics used to delineate
disadvantaged communities actually identify disadvantaged
communities in some way).
Legibility The definition should be easy to understand by policy
providers as well as by individuals and communities targeted
by the policy. This is the main advantage of the California’s Pub-
lic Resources Code’s definition of disadvantaged communities.
Because the code uses a simple, mono-dimensional metric of Me-
dian Household Income, the definition is easy to understand. If
half of the households of a given place have an income below the
threshold, this is a disadvantaged community. In the same way
that “justice must not only be done, but must be [. . . ] seen to be
done”,47 a welfare policy must be demonstrably and verifiably 47 R v Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy
1924.
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fair. An alternative definition to the current one should preserve
simplicity and legibility.
Fitness The definition should capture the relevant spatial reality
for the policy. Even if the definition perfectly captures disad-
vantaged communities in a legible and robust way, the efficacy
of the policy would be undermined if disadvantaged communi-
ties are bad fit for water policy purposes. The stated goal of the
policy is to compensate for these communities’ lack of resources
to address water related issues. [TALK ABOUT DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN PROP 84 AND PROP 1]
A good definition should achieve a balance between these 4
criteria, without sacrificing one to optimize the others.
California’s Public Resources Code’s DAC definition is simple
and legible. But is it truthful, robust and fit to the policy? If not,
can we create a better definition maintaining a high degree of legi-
bility?
3 Methods
I evaluate California’s Public Resources Code’s DAC definition’s
truthfulness, robustness and fitness to the policy. I evaluate truth-
fulness and robustness jointly, by controlling for sources of poten-
tial spatial aggregation and distance biases, as well as for construct
validity. First (3.1), I examine how the multiple scales of measure-
ments create a potential for modifiable areal unit problem. Second
(3.2), I evaluate how the lack of geographic context in the definition
produces a DAC delineation bias. Third(3.3), I analyze the effects
of the mono-dimensionality of the definition, attempting to cap-
ture disadvantage with the sole median household income. These
three stages generate a gradually complexifying alternative DAC
definition.
3.1 Multiple scale of definition and neighboring effects
First, I address potential sources of biases resulting from aggre-
gation effects. Aggregation is susceptible to the Modifiable Areal
Unit Problem (MAUP, see 1.5), whereby the area chosen to perform
the aggregation of the variable of interest (household income) has
an irrefutable impact on the aggregated statistics (median house-
hold income). Proposition 84 addresses this problem by multiplying
the scales of measurements. But this superimposition creates in
turn a new possible source of bias. Each IRWM group presents
an argument for why each community counts as a DAC, and uses
overlapping measurement units to do so. For instance, a place can
be counted as a DAC if it comprises one or more tracts below the
median household income threshold. A source of bias exists when
affluent communities abut low income communities. In this case,
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the affluent neighbor can take advantage of its low-income neigh-
bor to be recognized, together, as a DAC, and benefit from the grant
program.
The classic case of MAUP, operating on a single, uniform scale
of measurement, is more likely to occur in medium scales of mea-
surements, where there is extensive leeway to change delineation
areas. Census Tracts, for instance, encompass between 2 500 and
8 000 people, enough room to include multiple communities of
varying income. Block Groups, in turn, are the smallest scale of
measurement and relatively small areas. They are likely to leave
out communities that would meet the criterion, alleviating the risk
of classic MAUP to occur. In the context of Census measurements,
MAUP occurrences have been overwhelmingly recognized in tracts
rather than block groups. The bigger the scale of the modifiable
area, the higher the risk for classic, mono-scalar, MAUP to occur.
This risk is further diminished by the high degree of spatial auto-
correlation in household income.48 Because of their wide variations 48 S. Rey 2004; Garrett, Wagner, and
Wheelock 2007.in size, places offer the highest potential for classic MAUP. A large
place—incorporated municipality or Census Designated Place—can
comprise households that are very diverse in income. The relatively
arbitrary nature of place delineations significantly influences its
summary statistics such as median household income and whether
the place qualifies as a DAC.
MAUP risk is further aggravated by multiple scales of measure-
ment for DACs: census block groups, census tracts, and census
places. A community can be deemed a DAC if, on one of these
scales, its MHI falls below the threshold. Affluent tracts or block
groups can be erroneously marked as DAC simply because they are
in the same municipality as economically struggling communities,
therefore becoming eligible to DAC grants. This effect is at its max-
imum potential when places are large, offering more opportunities
to group together communities of contrasting economic situation.
MAUP creates potential for false positives, by identifying as DAC
communities that are too affluent to benefit from earmarked grant,
in line with the policy goal. I evaluate the extent of these false pos-
itives using a multi-scalar DAC definition. Census Block Groups,
because of their small size, have little potential for MAUP to occur
at their scale. Therefore, I use CBGs as the unit of reference to eval-
uate MAUP occurrences. The DAC status of a CBG measured at
CBG scale is always truthful, because its size is so small. They are
too small, however, to fully capture what are generally understood
as communities. By definition, all CBGs having an MHI under the
threshold are DACs. However, CBGs with a MHI over the threshold
can be DACs if they are located inside a DAC tract or place.
I summarize, for every CBG in California, their DAC status on
the three scales of Census Block Group, Census Tract, and Cen-
sus Place. I uncover DAC false positives by highlighting Census
Block Groups that are only DAC because they are located in a
DAC Census Tract of Place. Census Block Groups are hierarchi-
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cally nested into Census Tracts. Their geographic relationship is
simple. However, Census Places have no rigorous relation to Tracts
or Block Groups. Therefore, I compute spatial overlay between
Census Places and Census Block Groups, ascribing a Census Block
Group to the Census Place that it overlaps the most. 49 49 Using R package sp (https://cran.
r-project.org/web/packages/sp/)More than the simple count of false positive, their distribution
along MHI reveals the dimension of MAUP biases introduced.
If false positives are close to the threshold, their identification as
DAC does not markedly deviate from policy goals. However, if
really wealthy neighborhoods are included as DACs and rendered
eligible to DAC grants, it introduces biases directly against policy
goals of compensating disadvantaged communities for their lack of
resources.
3.2 Using rent prices to account for local purchasing power
A second geographic source of bias in the current DAC definition
is the absence of context factored in. The median household in-
come threshold is defined for the whole state of California, fixed as
49 191,2 $ following the 2010 census, regardless of the situation of
the community in the state. However, the same household income
offers more purchasing power in places where the cost of living is
low than in places where it is higher.
In order to assess if the DAC definition accounts for the geo-
graphically contextual nature of being disadvantaged as a commu-
nity, I compute a relative purchasing power index (PPI) for every
block group. I compare their DAC status with the PPI, to gage if
the DAC definition correctly captures the level of economic hard-
ship that communities experience given their geographic context.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases local measures
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). CPI is a measure of everyday
items prices, measuring a “representative basket of goods and ser-
vices”, such as gasoline, food and clothing. Overtime, CPI measure-
ments have been adapted to reflect cost-of-living more closely, but
still fails to account entirely for substitution effects. Local CPI mea-
sures are limited to metropolitan areas, and do not cover the whole
state of California.50 Even more importantly for this study, CPI 50 Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016.
measures cannot be compared from one area to another, because
the composition of each basket is determined locally. CPI measures
can only be compared in the same area over time. Because of this
limitations, CPI is not a good measure of local purchasing power to
compare communities across the state of California.
To achieve this comparison, I build an relative purchasing power
index based on rent prices, assuming that high rents signal a high
cost of living in the area. I use the Zillow Rent Index (ZRI), pro-
vided by the real estate data company Zillow, tracking “monthly
median rent” over multiple areas.51 Among several measures of 51 Bun 2012.
real estate prices provided by Zillow, I focus on rental prices be-
cause lower income population are more likely to rent than other
robust spatial targeting for public policies 100
segments of the US population.52 Therefore, rental prices are more 52 Schwartz 2014.
likely to reflect the economic conditions of disadvantaged com-
munities than home prices. The ZRI overcomes the three major
drawbacks of CPI’s measurement: the ZRI is available with a large
geographic coverage, at a grain as fine as the neighborhood and
ZIP code, and is designed to be comparable between multiple geo-
graphic areas. However, the ZRI only incorporates real estate data,
to the exclusion of every other relevant aspect of the cost of living
in an area, such as food, healthcare, energy or water.
I take ZRI measures at the zip-code level and map them to indi-
vidual census tracts, through US Census ZIP Code Tabulation Areas
(ZCTAs). Zip-codes do not map to Census Tracts perfectly, but ZC-
TAs are provided by the Census Bureau as the optimal mapping
between the two. All tracts in the same ZIP code are thus attributed
the same ZRI measure. For each tract, I compute a PPI simply by
diving the MHI by the ZRI.53 This HPPI gives a measure of how 53 For each census tract, and given the
Median Household Income MHI and
Zillow Rent Index ZRI, the Household
Purchase Power Index HPPI is:
HPPI =
MHI
ZRI
far a dollar goes in a certain geographic context. In places where
prices are low, the same income allows a household to live more
comfortably than in paces where prices are high.
3.3 Controlling for household structure to understand individual pur-
chasing power
The third geographic source of bias in the current DAC definition
lies in its lack of dimensionality. The definition uses a single mea-
sure, the median household income, to assess the economic strug-
gles of a community. The income dimension of this measurement
is relatively straightforward. However, the structure of a household
varies considerably between places. The US Census’ definition of
a household is large and includes “all the persons who occupy a
housing unit as their usual place of residence”, regardless of the
relations they have with each other.
Household size tend to be larger in suburban homes than in
city apartments, for the formers tend to roof larger families. Ad-
ditionally, the “continuing separation of family and household”54 54 Cherlin 2010.
has undermined the relevance of the household as the social unit
for reference in contemporary America. The rise of cohabitation
over lifelong stable, nuclear families complexifies relations between
household income and the economic situation of individuals. In
the traditional nuclear family with a single or primary breadwinner,
the household income could be considered as a single account used
fluidly for all household members’ expenses. By contrast, in a co-
habiting household with several adults in the workforce, it is more
likely that each adult will dispose of their own income. In this case,
the household income is an abstraction with limited relevance to how
much each cohabiting adult can enjoy.
To account for differences in household structure, I control for
the average household size in the census block group, to create an
Individual Purchasing Power Index (IPPI).55 55 For each census block group, and
given the Median Household Income
MHI, Zillow Rent Index ZRI and
Average Household Size AHS, the
Individual Purchase Power Index IPPI
is:
IPPI =
MHI
ZRI ⇥ AHS
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Finally, I measure how much the simple official DAC definition
based on MHI alone captures the variability of the more complex
measure of relative, contextual disadvantage recorded by the IPPI.
Ideally, a simple measure would capture as much of the variabil-
ity contained in the more complex measurement as possible, while
providing a more approachable and legible account. To measure
the official DAC definition efficiency at capturing IPPI variabil-
ity, I first run a simple linear regression and measure how much
of the variability in IPPI can be explained by the DAC categoriza-
tion (R-squared). The more variability in IPPI explained by DAC
categories, the better this definition performs.
Second, I compare the distribution of the two populations of
census block groups, DACs and non-DACs, along the IPPI. The
more apart are these two distributions, the better the official DAC
definition performs. I compare their summary statistics (minimum,
maximum, mean, median, standard deviation). I then compute
their Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, a measure of how apart these
two distributions are. Ideally, the two distributions of DACs and
non-DACs along a measure of IPPI should be as far apart as possi-
ble for the official definition to capture the information conveyed by
the IPPI.
4 Results
4.1 Measurement on multiple scales identifies resourceful communi-
ties as disadvantged
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Census Block Group (CBGs), the
smallest scale of DAC measurement, by DAC scale and overlap.
Over the 23 212 block groups in California, 12 934 (55.7%) are not
in a DAC at any scale. Their Median Household Income (MHI) is
over the DAC threshold. They are located in census tracts whose
MHI is over the DAC threshold, and they do not overlap with a
place whose MHI is below the DAC threshold. This leaves 10 278
block groups, 44.3% of the total, that can be counted as DAC on
at least one scale of measurement. Since CBGs are designed to be of
comparable population, the population of California population in
DAC CBGs is approximatively the same, 43.4% (16 524 981 people
over 38 066 920 total population). This high proportion of DAC
block groups is a first indication that the current definition does not
offer significant sorting power to identify struggling communities
in the state.
Figure 2 reveals the distribution of DAC CBGs by overlap level.
A block group that is not a DAC has a level of 0, where a CBG
that is a DAC at all levels (block group, tract and place) has a level
of 3. Over the 10 278 DAC CBGs, 2 464 are counted DAC on all 3
levels, while 4 520 CBGs see one overlap between 2 DAC scales, and
3 294 can be counted as DACs on only 1 scale. DAC levels 1 & 2
have potential to exhibit Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP).
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Figure 1: Distribution of CBGs by DAC
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Figure 2: Distribution of CBGs by DAC
overlapping level.
Indeed, level 0 CBGs are not identified as DAC at all, and level
3 CBGs are, by definition, under the DAC threshold at the CBG
level too. However, level 1 & 2 CBGs can be DAC at the Census
Tract (CTr) and/or Census Place (CPl) while having themselves a
relatively high MHI. Indeed, figure 1 shows that 2 292 CBGs are in
this situation.
Figure 3 shows that block groups that can be counted as DAC
on a higher number of scales tend to have a lower MHI. They are
lower income block groups situated in lower income tracts and
places. Not only are they low-income, their vicinity also tends
to be low-income. However, this observation also indicates that
DAC CBGs with only one DAC scale tend to have a higher MHI
than DAC CBGs on all three scales of measurement, including a
number of high-income CBGs, categorized as DACs nonetheless.
Figure 4 goes more into details and shows the distribution of MHI
divided by specific DAC overlapping type (as in figure 2). The three
categories where non-DACs CBGs are identified as DAC because of
other scales are when they are in a DAC Census Tract (CTr), a DAC
robust spatial targeting for public policies 103
MHI by DAC overlap level for Census Block Groups (CBG)
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
0 1 2 3
Census Block Group (CBG) DAC level
M
ed
ia
n 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 In
co
m
e 
(M
H
I)
FALSE
TRUE
Figure 3: MHI by DAC overlap level
for Census Block Groups (CBG)
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Figure 4: MHI by DAC overlap type
for Census Block Groups (CBG)
Census Place (CPl), or both. Of these three possible cases, CBGs
in DAC CPls have the highest MHI. This is expected considering
that Modifiable Areal Units Problems (MAUP) tend to occur in
larger entities, as I explained in 1.5. Places are, on average, larger
geographic units, containing sometimes a large number of CBGs,
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thus offering more opportunities to lump high-income areas with
lower-income communities creating geographic entities appearing
as lower-income on aggregate statistics.
By contrast, CBGs in DAC Census Tracts (with or without a DAC
Census Place) tend to have a MHI very close to the DAC threshold
of $49 191. Figure 5 confirms this by showing that the MHI distri-
bution for these CBGs is concentrated on the lower bound, closer to
the DAC threshold. Thus, by extending the DAC definition beyond
CBGs only to Tracts and Places, Prop. 84 provides a mechanism to
include low-income communities that are not meeting the thresh-
old. However, Prop. 84 does so by exploiting the Modifiable Areal
Unit Problem in a way that was unpredictable to policy proponents.
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Figure 5: Distribution of CBGs by
MHI.
I will now explain several examples of situations where MAUP
becomes apparent and creates a potential bias for DAC identifica-
tion following Prop.84 definition. They can occur either because of
direct neighboring conditions (in Windsor Square) or because of
large scales of measurements provides opportunity for grouping
together a large diversity of communities, in regards to their MHI
(in Arden-Arcade).
Windsor Square: Direct Neighboring Conditions. Census
tract 2 115 in Los Angeles epitomizes this measurement effect. Block
group 3 on the West of this tract is part of the wealthy neighbor-
hood of Windsor Square, comprising multi-million dollar homes,
and the official residence of the Mayor of Los Angeles. This Block
Group had in 2010 a MHI of 233 281 $. Immediately to the east of
Windsor Square, making block groups 1 and 2 of the tract, is the
north-west corner of Koreatown, a highly diverse and lower in-
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come neighborhood. The 2 block groups had a MHI of 41 953 $ and
41 538 $, respectively. The satellite view of this tract on figure 6 ex-
poses the sharp contrast between home types on the eastern and
western sides of the tract. Nonetheless, they are immediately abut-
ting each other.
Figure 6: Census tract 2115 in Los
Angeles.
Windsor Square exemplifies the importance of direct neigh-
boring conditions in Prop. 84’s DAC definition, applied to the
segregated and contrasted human geography of California cities.
Windsor Square, a wealthy community, is directly adjacent to low-
income neighborhoods, and lumped in the same census tract. Al-
though census tracts should be delineated to reflect community
boundaries,56 it is dubious that Windsor Square and the north-west 56 U.S. Census Bureau 1994, Ch.10.
corner of Koreatown would be perceived as the same community
by their inhabitants. Nonetheless, it allows Windsor Square to be
eligible to a grant program directed at struggling communities.
A good measure of this neighboring condition is the standard
deviation of the MHI of CBGs in the tract, whose distribution is
displayed by figure 7. A high standard deviation indicates an im-
portant contrast between CBGs relative wealth in the tract, creating
potential for a DAC Tract to include high-income areas. This is a
by-product of the necessary trade-off operated by the US Census
between delineating tracts as close as possible to communities to
be meaningful, and balancing population between tracts to permit
statistical comparison between them. In the case of Windsor Square,
the community delineating dimension of tracts has clearly been a
second-order consideration.
Figure 7 demonstrates that Windsor Square is far from an ex-
ception and that diversity of income inside a single census tract is
widespread. The distribution stays concentrated on the lower end,
with more tracts being homogeneous, thus exhibiting an expected
pattern of spatial autocorrelation for household income. There is
however a long tail of heterogeneous tracts, as illustrated by the
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Figure 7: Distribution of standard
deviation of MHI for CBGs in CTrs
median standard deviation of CBG MHI of 15 025 $. DAC tracts
themselves exhibit the same distribution of income diversity. This
income heterogeneity undermines the relevance of tracts as a mea-
sure of community for targeting economic disadvantage.
Arden-Arcade: Large scale of measurement. Arden-
Arcade, immediately east of the city of Sacramento, offers another
example of MAUP, this time due the large number of CBGs that a
place can comprise. Arden-Arcade is a Census Designated Place
(CDP), devoid of an incorporated municipal government and under
direct administration of Sacramento county. The CDP had a MHI
of 45 750 $ in 2010, and can be therefore counted as a disadvan-
taged community. However, the place is also home to some of the
most affluent neighborhoods of the county, particularly along the
American River on the south. Block group 1 of census tract 56.06, a
wealthy enclave of mansions built on big lots along sinuous drives,
had a MHI of 207 361 $ in 2010. Block group 3 of census tract 58.03,
overlooking the American River on the south-est of Arden-Arcade,
had a MHI of 175 216 $ in 2010.
Arden-Arcade illustrates the scale problems of the current defi-
nition. A DAC can be defined at multiple scales. If census block
groups and tracts are designed to be comparable in population,
places offer a wide diversity of population and size. Arden-Arcade
is a large place, counting 92 186 inhabitants in 2010. Because of
its sheer size, a modest median household income can obfuscate
important income differences.
robust spatial targeting for public policies 107
MHI by CBG in Arden-Arcade, CA
0km 1km 2km
38.575
38.600
38.625
-121.42 -121.40 -121.38 -121.36 -121.34
long
la
t
CBG MHI
[ 12383, 26176)
[ 26176, 41246)
[ 41246, 65563)
[ 65563,113102)
[113102,207361]
Figure 8: MHI by CBG in Arden-
Arcade, California.
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Figure 9: Distributions of CBGs, along
Median Household Income (MHI)
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4.2 Household income is relative to relative local purchasing power
Proposition 84 uses a uniform threshold of Median Household In-
come to define DACs all over the State of California. California is
a large and diverse state, and prices of some types of goods vary
widely in the state. Housing is one of them, and influences signif-
icantly local purchasing power of individuals. The same income
leads to a higher purchasing power where rents are low than where
rents are high.
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Figure 10: Distribution of CBGs, along
Household Purchasing Power Index
(HPPI)
Figure 10 shows the distribution of Census Block Groups by
Household Purchasing Power Index (HPPI), between DAC and
non-DAC block groups. Taking local purchasing power into ac-
count accentuates the number of false positives detected: block
groups that are relatively wealthy in context, but still identified as
DACs by the official measure. False positives are in the right tail of
the distrivution of DAC block groups in figure 10. The majority of
DACs have a low HPPI, in line with policy goals. But a number of
DACs have a very high HPPI, indicating a high puchasing power
in context. False negatives are non-DACs that really are struggling
in context. They are block groups with a MHI over the threshold
but situated in an area where cost of living, as measure by ZRI, is
high. In figure 10, false negatives are situated on the left side of the
non-DACs distribution, having a low HPPI. They are relatively rare
compared to potential false positives.
Norma Triangle: above the threshold but struggling
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Figure 11: Map of Norma Triangle,
Census Tract 7005.01, Los Angeles
County, Californiain context. Norma Triangle, in West Hollywood, exemplifies
this bias. The southern part of the triangle, along Santa Monica
Boulevard, block group 3 of the census tract 7005.01, had a MHI
of just 52 467 $ in 2010. The Triangle, however, is nestled in an ex-
ceptionally wealthy area of Los Angeles county, as its 90210 ZIP
code testifies. The area has a ZRI of 11 671, resulting in a PPI of 4,5.
Norma Triangle forms the western border of West Hollywood, ad-
jacent to Beverly Hills. The area is therefore just shy of qualifying
as a DAC following the official definition, but situated in one of the
most expensive areas of the state, where houses are regularly listed
for more than a million dollars. Figure 11’s map shows Norma Tri-
angle, largely composed of small houses and apartment buildings,
nestled between Beverly Hills on the West, the luxury houses with
stunning views of the Bird Streets on the North, urban upper-class
West Hollywood on the East, and design retail around the Pacific
Design Center on the South.
Tower District: lower income in an affordable environ-
ment. Tower District in Fresno, just right north-west of Downtown
Fresno, illustrates the bias in the inverse direction. Block group 4 of
census tract 22 had a MHI of just 44 679 $ in 2010. Yet, it’s ZRI was
just 747, resulting on a PPI of 59,8. The district is urban, historic
and young, lying between an active Olive Avenue on the South,
counting bars, restaurants and theaters, and Fresno’s City College
on the North.
Residents of Fresno’s Tower District earn significantly less than
their WeHo’s South Norma Triangle counter-parts, 7 788 $ a year
less per household, but every dollar they earn goes more than 10
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times as far on housing.
4.3 Household structure provides a more detailed picture of purchas-
ing power
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Figure 12: Distributions of DAC and
non-DAC CBGs, along Individual
Purchasing Power Index (IPPI)
Figure 12 shows side by side the two distributions of DAC and
non-DAC census block groups along the IPPI index. The figure
hints at two very similar distributions, that would indicate a poor
performance of the official DAC definition at capturing disadvan-
taged communities.
Figure 13 compares the two distributions of DAC and non-DAC
census block group along the IPPI with a quantile-quantile plot.
A quantile-quantile plot compares two distributions quantile by
quantile, each on one axis of the plot. If the two distributions are
identical, the plot will show a straight 45 degrees line. Figure 13
shows that the distribution of DAC and non-DAC census block
groups along the IPPI are very similar, with an expected right skew
for non-DAC block groups. This skew is expected because a right
skew along the IPPI index is a skew towards more purchasing
power, but the two distributions are still very close.
The similarity of the two distributions confirms that the DAC
definition set California’s Public Resources Code is ineffective at de-
lineating disadvantaged communities using a simple, but context-
less and mono-dimensional metric.
DACs with relatively high purchasing power. Midtown
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Figure 13: Quantile-Quantile plot
of the 2 distributions of DAC and
non-DAC blocks along Individual
Purchasing Power Index (IPPI)
Sacramento illustrates how the household structure and contextual
conditions nuances the picture offered by a simple MHI measure.
The area around J street in the vicinity of Marshall Park (Block
Group 1 of Census Tract 14) had a MHI of just 49 107 $ in 2010, be-
low the DAC threshold. However, the area has a relatively low ZRI
of 1 187 and one of the lowest average household size in the state
at 1,12. Figure 16’map shows median household sizes for Census
block groups in Sacramento, and exposes the relatively unique sit-
uation of this neighborhood in the region for its small households.
Marshall Park is a relatively young, affordable and urban neighbor-
hood. The MHI of 49 107 $ reflects the individual income of adults,
not an income supporting a large family, explaining the high IPPI of
36,9.
Wofford Heights, Kern County, a census designated place of
2 200 inhabitants on the shores of Lake Isabella in the High Sierra
(figure 17), offers another, more nuanced example of relatively high
IPPI for a low income. The northern part of Wofford Heights (Block
Group 4 of Census Tract 52.01), north of Route 155, had a very low
MHI of 28 667 $ in 2010. The southern part of Wofford Heights
(Block Group 3 of Census Tract 52.01) had a MHI of 43 500 $ in
2010, well below the DAC threshold. Because Wofford Height is ru-
ral and rental prices low, and households in south Wofford Heights
are relatively small (1,52 median), its IPPI is high at 27,6.
Context and age nuance these two examples, similar if one looks
at IPPI alone. Wofford Heights is a rural, aging community. South-
ern Wofford Heights residents have a median age of 60. There is
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Figure 14: Density of CBGs by MHI
and IPPI
very little economic opportunity in the vicinity, with the small ski
resort and cabin rentals of Alta Sierra. By contrast, Midtown Sacra-
mento residents are younger with a median age of 42 in the census
tract. They have access to a larger pool of potential employment, at
the center of the 4th largest metropolitan area of California. Wof-
ford Heights is an unincorporated Census Designated Place, under
direct administration of KernCoutny, as are many rural communi-
ties in California. Midtown Sacramento is part of a large city with
extensive infrastructures. If Wofford Heights and Midtown Sacra-
mento’s situation look similar regarding income and household
structure, their relative accessible resources tell a contrasting story.
One of these communities has access to much fewer resources than
the other.
Communities with low purchasing power non-identified
as DACs. The area North-West of the rail station in San Juan
Capistrano (Block Group 3, Census Tract 423.12), in Orange County,
illustrates how household structure influences relative affluence.
The area is not a DAC by the official definition, with a MHI of
51 028 $ in 2010, and the city of San Juan Capistrano itself had a
MHI of 76 686 $, below the state median. Orange County is a rela-
tively expensive part of the state, along the coast of Souther Cali-
fornia between Los Angeles and San Diego. As a result, real estate
prices can be high. What distinguishes this part of San Juan Capis-
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Figure 15: Density of CBGs by MHI
and IPPI, by DAC status
trano, however, is the large average household size of 6.91. This
area is visible on figure 18, showing that, in regards to household
size, it is an outlier in the municipality. As a result, the area has a
low IPPI of 2.96. The station area of San Juan Capistrano illustrates
that even when two areas are very comparable in term of house-
hold income and rent prices, the actual affluence of an household
can vary widely depending on the number of household members
that this income supports.
The IPPI offers a simple alternative to MHI, that is still legible.
However, one should still be cautious of the block group level real
estate conditions that are not captured by a contextual indicator
such as the Zillow Rent Index. The Naval Amphibious Base on
Coronado Island in the port of San Diego illustrates this caveat.
Coronado Island is a fairly wealthy and expensive neighborhood in
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Figure 16: Map of median household
size by Census block group, 2010,
Sacramento, CA. Highlight on Mid-
town Sacramento, Block Group 1 of
Census Tract 14.
San Diego county. Therefore, the ZRI index is relatively high (4 851).
Figure 19’s map shows that the base is in the immediate vicinity of
oceanfront condominiums and wealthy individual houses abutting
a golf. Military personnel tend to have larger household size than
the rest of the population (the average household size is 3.52 on the
base). They have more children. They also tend to have a stay-at-
home spouse more often. Although military personnel often have
a modest income (the MHI is 49 943 $ on base), their accommoda-
tion is provided on base. As a result, Naval Amphibious Base on
Coronado has a very low IPPI of 2.9, reflecting its status as a lower-
income community in a generally well-off environment. But the
IPPI score does not reflect benefits that military personnel enjoy, es-
pecially regarding housing, and that makes it not a disadvantaged
community.
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Figure 17: Map of Wofford Height,
Census Tract 52.01, Kern County,
California
Median Household Size by CBG
2010 Census, San Juan Capistrano, Orange County, CA
2 3 4 5 6
Median Household Size
Figure 18: Map of median household
size by Census block group, 2010, San
Juan Capistrano, Orange County, CA.
Highlight on Midtown Sacramento,
Block Group 3, Census Tract 423.12.
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Figure 19: Map of Coronado Island
Naval Amphibious Base, Census Tract
216, San Diego County, California
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Multiple scales of measurement provide opportunities for exploit
Measuring a spatial aggregate on multiple scales increases chances
of false positives, and multiplies opportunities of policy exploit
in consequence, as I have demonstrated in section 4.1. These false
positives are due to the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP).
Larger entities present risks to lump together wealthy neighbor-
hood with struggling communities, in a aggregate appearing as
the latter excusively. In regards to policy goals, this is a potential
exploit because it could direct funds earmarked for disadvantaged
communities to serve affluent neighborhoods.
To avoid this problem, I recommend measurement on one scale
only, the scale presenting the lowest risk of MAUP, the Census
Block Group. Census Block Groups are small enough to be rela-
tively homogeneous, but large enough to enwrap neighborhoods or
large portions thereof.
5.2 Geographic realities need to be measured in their geographic con-
text
Absence of context in the current DAC measurement is a major
hindrance to the policy efficacy. Spatial statistics such as the cen-
sus aggregates used as a criterion to delineate DACs in Prop. 84’s
definition are meaningful in their geographic context. Spatial au-
tocorrelation, the fact that realities close to each other look more
alike than realities more distant from each other, must be accounted
for in any use of spatial statistics, especially for policy purposes.
Prop. 84 fails to do so on two different grounds, and this dou-
ble geographic shortcoming undermines policy efficacy. Spatial
autocorrelation—geographic context—must be taken into account
both outside units of statistical aggregation—i.e. regional geo-
graphic context—and inside of them—i.e. local geographic context.
First, on a macro-scale, spatial units of statistical aggregation
(Census Bloc Groups, Census Tracts & Census Places) are located
in very different context all over the state of California. As a result,
the same aggregate statistic conveys a potentially different infor-
mation depending on the overall context. In regards to the metric
set by Prop. 84, income is only indicative to economic hardship
when compared to cost of living, and cost of living varies with
geographic context. For a household, an annual income of 50 000 $
could mean living relatively comfortably in a rural part of the state
where cost of living is low, but be effectively in poverty in an ex-
pensive metropolitan area. In this research, I used rent index as a
proxy for cost of living, and shown in section 4.2 that bringing rel-
ative cost of living into the picture already undermines Prop. 84’s
DAC metric.
Second, on a micro-scale, spatial units of aggregation (CBG, Ctr
& CPl) are different from each other in ways that are not captured
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by the simple Median Household Income (MHI) metric. Because
of spatial autocorrelation, the same MHI captures a different in-
formation between two places with different household types, as
I have demonstrated in section 4.3. An annual household income
of 50 000 $ can be insufficient for a family of five and put them
through severe economic hardship. The same income would be a
healthy income for a single, young professional tarting her career
without any dependent to support. Neighborhoods, and therefore
spatial units of statistical aggregation for MHI, tend to concentrate
one type of household structure.
Taking into account both regional and local geographic context
exposes the failure to Prop. 84’s DAC definition to truthfully delin-
eate communities experiencing a real economic disadvantage from
the others. Further, it fails to do so in both direction, producing
false positives and false negatives. On the one hand, Prop. 84 fails
to identify struggling communities because their MHI is above the
threshold, where in context their income is insufficient to live out of
struggle. On the other hand, Prop. 84 labels as DACs communities
that in context are not experiencing serious economic hardship.
5.3 A continuous metric effective in regards to policy goals
Measurements of disadvantage metrics made at all stages of this
analysis, from the original MHI to the final IPPI taking geographic
context and household structure into account, are continuous met-
rics. Communities do no fall naturally from one side or the other
of an obvious separation between struggle and ease. In effect, all
distributions of these metrics approach a log-normal distribution,
where the logarithm of measurement is normally distributed. There
is no intrinsic way of dividing such a distribution into different cat-
egories, and the challenge becomes all the more difficult with the
fewer categories we want to use. Rather, ad-hoc, contextual con-
siderations can be used to decide on a threshold. However, in the
case of disadvantage communities, such an obvious threshold is
lacking. The 80% of statewide MHI has no particular meaning, not
more than 75% or 85%, nor would have any arbitrary cutoff along
the IPPI scale.
Furthermore, because the distribution is log-normal, measure-
ments are concentrated on the lower-end, and form a long-tail on
the higher-end. This right skew helps distinguishing wealthy com-
munities from the others more than it helps telling struggling com-
munities apart, consequently countering the policy-driven purpose
of effectively delineating disadvantaged communities.
Therefore, there is no good way of separating disadvantaged
from not disadvantaged communities in a binary fashion using
these metrics. Nonetheless, this measure of disadvantage can still
be used effectively to achieve the policy purpose of providing re-
sources to disadvantaged communities in priority. California DWR
uses a point-based system to allocate Prop. 84 and Prop. 1 grants,
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judging applications and allocating point along a diversity of di-
mensions, one of these dimensions being involvement of disadvan-
taged communities. I propose that points be allocated in inverse
proportion to the Individual Purchasing Power Index (IPPI), or
the log thereof, of Census Block Groups (CBG) served by the
project. This would ensure that projects benefiting to a higher num-
ber of actually economically struggling households are moved up in
the ranking for projects for grant allocation.
I propose to use the CBG scale exclusively because CBGs are
small enough to not cross community borders and be relatively
homogeneous, not subject to the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
(MAUP) as much as Census Tracts, and, even more so, Census
Places. The number of points allocated to this IPPI should be cali-
brated with other dimensions to ensure impact on disadvantaged
communities has the desired weight compared to other dimensions.
This would have the additional effect of making the policy trade-
off between social justice and environmental goals transparent.
Moreover, I recommend that the point scale take into account the
number of CBGs served, favoring projects that serve large disad-
vantaged communities.
In addition, Prop. 84 sets a minimum goal to be met by all
IRWM submitting grant applications, for 25% of projects to serve
disadvantaged communities. This minimal threshold can be han-
dled in different ways, using the IPPI metric. The simplest way is to
use the same point allocation system as for general project evalua-
tion, setting a minimum average of DAC points by allocated grant.
This average by allocated grant allows trade-offs between projects
serving large disadvantaged communities and projects serving
none. This trade-off can be exploited by IRWMs by including mod-
est, high-DAC projects compensating for expensive, low-DAC ones.
If this trade-off is not desired by policy proponents, the program
can mandate that a proportion of projects be above a certain num-
ber of DAC points. Because DAC points are a finer metric, it would
pose less discretization problems than the current binary thresh-
old, but would still create arbitrary threshold effects. To eliminate
threshold effects and mitigate trade-off exploits potential, I propose
to weigh the contribution of each project to the average by the grant
amount requested. Large projects not serving any DAC would
have a greater negative effect on the weighted average compared to
smaller project serving DACs, coherent with the policy goal.
5.4 A better metric to delineate disadvantaged communities
In regards to the four criteria I have defined in the research ques-
tion (section 2)—truthfulness, robustness, legibility & fitness—,
Proposition 84’s measure of disadvantage communities based on a
unique threshold on median household income has a single strong
point: its legibility. Because the measure is so simple, it is easy to
understand and to use in a grant application. Applicants, however,
robust spatial targeting for public policies 121
sometimes feel the need to justify the DAC focus of their projects
with other measures.
I have shown that MHI is neither truthful nor robust to delin-
eate disadvantaged communities. When taking geographic con-
text into account, MHI fails to distinguish economic disadvantage.
The information conveyed by MHI is highly dependent on geo-
graphic context—how far a dollar goes in this place—and house-
hold structure—how many individuals does this income support.
For these reasons, it appears that Proposition 84’s measure sacri-
fices truthfulness for simplicity. A MHI threshold is also not robust,
because of the degree of freedom introduced by multiple scales
of measurement, especially by allowing definition at the scale of
Census Places. And because it is binary, it creates arbitrary false
positives and false negatives around the threshold value.
A definition based on IPPI is, in practice, less legible, because
it requires more operations. In principle, however, it captures a
simple concept of purchasing power: how far a dollar goes in a spe-
cific place. Geographic differences of purchasing power is common
enough in everyday conversations that the concept is accessible to
lay persons. Differences in rental prices is a well known, and much
discussed, phenomenon.
IPPI measured at the scale of the Census Block Group allows is a
more truthful and robust metric than a multi-scale MHI threshold.
IPPI captures economic struggle, in context. The metric is closer to
actual experienced disadvantage. It is more robust because it does
not introduce MAUP biases. Implementing IPPI in a point based
system, closer to a continuous measurement, also eliminates the
majority of false positives and false negatives, therefore rendering
it both more truthful and more robust. It is more truthful because
it better identifies disadvantaged communities, and it is more ro-
bust because it does not create arbitrary false positives and false
negatives when the threshold is moved.
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Abbreviations
ABAG Association of Bay Area
Governments
ACS American Community Survey
BG (Census) Block Group
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics
CDP Census Designated Place
CPI Consumer Price Index
DAC Disadvantaged Community
DWR (California) Department of
Water Resources
HPPI Household Purchasing Power
Index
HUD U.S. Department of Housing &
Urban Development
IPPI Individual Purchasing Power
Index
IRWM Integrated Regional Water
Management
MAUP Modifiable Areal Unit Prob-
lem
MHI Median Household Income
MTO Moving to Opportunity for Fair
Housing
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC (California) Public Resources
Code
ZCTA ZIP Code Tabulation Areas
ZRI Zillow Rent Index
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THE PLACE AND SCALE OF 
CONSENT
INDIV IDUAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION IN 
CALIFORNIA METROPOLITAN AREAS
Chapter III

The Place and Scale of Consent: Individual Support
for Local Government Collaboration in California
Metropolitan Areas
Policy take-aways
• People are not averse to metropoli-
tan collaboration.
• One size does not fit all. Prefer-
ences of respondents vary geo-
graphically.
• Focus on solving the policy prob-
lem, not the institutional setup.
People are swayed by a spe-
cific policy mix relevant to their
metropolitan area.
• Arguments on cost savings brought
by metropolitan collaboration are
ineffective. However, respondents
are deterred by cost increases.
Metropolitan areas are the space of urban life, the space of hous-
ing, job and transit markets: they are functionally integrated. Many
local governments (cities, towns, counties) coexist in this integrated
space: metropolitan areas are institutionally fragmented. In con-
sequence, policies conducted in metropolitan areas have strong
externality effects, beyond the boundaries of a single municipality
or county. Scholars have proposed ways to address this discrepancy
between functional integration and institutional fragmentation, from
competing jurisdictions to metropolitan consolidation. Yet, popular
support for these proposals is not abundantly researched.
In this paper I study individual support for collaboration between
local governments on policies presenting strong metropolitan exter-
nalities: land-use, transportation and transit, water supply.
I conduct a fully randomized survey experiment and ask re-
spondents to express support or opposition to collaboration plans.
Institutional features of these plans are randomly drawn from a set
of possible values, derived from existing collaboration arrangements.
Features include scale of collaboration, coordination with other
policies, cost, or the type of power the new board will hold. This ex-
periment is designed to measure the average marginal effect of each
institutional feature, understanding how the shape of a collaboration
plan causes popular support.
I find that coordination between policies is one of the few factors
driving popular support towards more collaboration. Moreover, indi-
viduals favor small to medium-scale collaboration inside a metropoli-
tan area rather than an all-encompassing proposal. In addition,
features prompting support for collaboration varies geographically
between different metropolitan areas in California.
I recommend that policies aiming at fostering metropolitan col-
laboration adopt a cross-policy approach, flexible enough to adapt to
the policy mix driving more support in different metropolitan areas,
and focus on fostering mid-scale collaboration between neighboring
municipalities.
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1 Literature review
Figure 1: California Core-Based Statis-
tical Areas, 2010 Census.
Figure 2: California Primary Statistical
Areas, 2010 Census.
Figure 3:
1.1 Metropolitan areas are functionally integrated
The White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) uses
two criteria to identify metropolitan areas: one or several urban
centers, and a high degree of commuting integration between coun-
ties.1 Metropolitan areas’ definition and delineations are revised ev-
1 Office of Management and Budget
2010.
ery decennial census since 1950,2 grounded in the same concept of
2 Klove 1952.
a socially integrated space measured by the daily movement of peo-
ple. Because they are based on commuting, American metropolitan
areas are job markets by definition.3 Two counties with a high level
3 Adams, VanDrasek, and Phillips 2013;
Duranton 2013; Morrill, Cromartie,
and Hart 1999.
of commuting integration—i.e. many commuters living in one
county and traveling on a regular basis to their workplace in the
other county—are identified as part of the same metropolitan area.
On a first level, the OMB mandates the US Census to identify sta-
tistical areas around a single urban core, delineating Core-Based
Statistical Areas (CBSA). On a second level, if several CBSAs have
themselves a high level of commuting integration, they form Com-
bined Statistical Areas (CSA), in effect clusters of CBSAs. CSAs
allow multi-polar metropolitan areas to be properly recognized.
Lastly, CSAs and lone CBSAs that have not been combined in a
CSA form together the group of Primary Statistical Areas (PSA).
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the difference between these definitions
in California. The San Francisco Bay Area, as well as the Greater
Los Angeles, are multi-core metropolitan areas. In these two areas,
single-core CBSAs are grouped together in CSAs because of a high
degree of commuting integration.
Metropolitan areas are the product of a growing daily mobility
of Americans from the beginning of the 20th century onward. The
United States have evolved from a clear separation between small
rural places and large cities to a realm of poly-centric metropoli-
tan areas.4 Until the first half of the 20th century, Americans were
4 Oliver 2001, p.35.
mostly living either in small rural places or mono-centric industrial
cities.5 Since then, the bulk of urban growth has happened in small
5 Wallis 1994a.
municipalities or unincorporated communities within multi-core
large urban environments.6 This suburban growth, at first fueled by
6 Wallis 1994b; Jackson 1985.
the creation and extension of rail transit, driving the growth of the
streetcar suburbs,7 was later encouraged further by the development
7 S. Warner 1962.
of the highway system.8
8 Baum-Snow 2007; Walker and
Schafran 2015.
The measurement of metropolitan areas by commuting is a
proxy for general socio-spatial integration between places. If in-
dividuals commute between their residence and workplace, there is
a good chance they will conduct their other social activities chiefly
in the same space. Metro areas are also integrated housing markets,
transportation sheds, water provision areas. . . Although using coun-
ties as units of measurement, the definition of metropolitan areas
set by the OMB is a statistical definition, not administrative or polit-
ical. This definition delineates an existing spatial reality, the most
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approachable functional unit of urban organization in the United
States.
Figure 4: Fragmentation of local
governments in the San Francisco Bay
Area.
1.2 Metropolitan areas are institutionally fragmented
Despite their deep socio-economic integration, American Metropoli-
tan Areas are not governed by overarching integrated institutions.
The advent and extension of metropolitan areas has not left the
pre-metropolitan institutional landscape unscathed. New mu-
nicipalities9 and special districts10 have multiplied within their
9 Burns 1994.
10 Foster 1997.
boundaries. On the contrary, the map of counties, rapidly evolving
through the colonization and the expansion of western settlements,
has been largely unchanged since the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. Urbanization and metropolitanization, therefore, have had
very little impact on the number and shape of American counties.
County governments are, in metropolitan areas, a legacy form of
government engulfed in urban regions they precede.11 This static
11 William M. Scholl Center for Amer-
ican History and Culture at The
Newberry Library 2016.
map, superimposed but not corresponding with urban settlements,
creates measurement problems, as metropolitan areas are largely
defined on a county basis. The San Francisco Bay Area, for instance,
comprises 9 to 11 counties, some entirely urban and some sparsely
populated. The Greater Los Angeles, in turn, encompasses rela-
tively large counties. Some of these counties, like San Bernardino
and Riverside, comprise both populous cities and large areas of
desert. Counties are the default form of local government in the
United States, and especially in Western states, among them Cal-
ifornia. Given their importance, their spatial structure inherited
from the 19th century causes palpable metropolitan governance
effects today. For instance, the relatively large number of counties
in the San Francisco Bay Area, and the small size of San Francisco
itself, a consolidated city and county, creates coordination prob-
lems in metropolitan policies typically managed by counties, like
public transit. By contrast, the centrality and large size of Los An-
geles county facilitates the integration of the core of the Greater Los
Angeles served by a common integrated transit service.
Although county boundaries have been stable over the 20th cen-
tury during the extent of metropolitan areas, numerous new mu-
nicipal and special purposes governments have been created in that
period. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Nancy Burns shows,
new municipalities were mainly created at the fringes of extending
metropolitan areas to provide services for newly developed areas.12 12 Burns 1994.
The success of the civil rights movement, however, put an end to
the most obvious segregation strategies and land-use became a
key component for community and community leaders to restrict
who could in effect own property in that community. Municipal
incorporation became the vehicle to control land-use, and access to
land-use powers explains the bulk of incorporations after 1968.13 13 Burns 1994.
Dis-incorporation, the dissolution of a municipal government and
return of the municipal land under direct county administration, is
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possible, but rarely happens.14 These rare dis-incorporation events 14 Anderson 2011.
are motivated by economic and fiscal hardship.
Special districts, by contrast with municipal general purpose
governments, are created to conduct one or a limited set of policies.
Often, they are directed at service provision. While special districts
add the institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas, they are
often designed as a mean to address this very fragmentation, by
creating a policy instrument shared by several general purpose
governments.15 The public has typically very little knowledge of 15 Nunn and Schoedel 1997.
special districts and, when their board is directly elected by voters,
special districts’ elections prompt very low turnout.16 Special dis- 16 Burns 1994.
tricts are often a financing instrument for capital intensive services
and infrastructure.17 17 Stephens et al. 1998.
This multiplicity of governments in a single functional space
results in institutional fragmentation. This fragmentation, how-
ever, varies in the United States. The difference between the func-
tional dimension captured by commutes and the political struc-
tures of metropolitan areas can be measured by an index of in-
stitutional fragmentation. This index is a generalization of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), developed independently
by Albert Hirschman18 and Oris Herfindahl19 to measure industrial 18 Hirschman 1945.
19 Herfindahl 1950.concentration. The Federal Reserve has been using this index for
market concentration of firms20. Daniel Kubler applied the HHI 20 Rhoades 1993.
to metropolitan fragmentation in the Swiss context, taking only
municipalities into account.21 In figures 1 and 2, I present a gener- 21 Kubler 2005.
alized measurement of fragmentation accounting for counties and
municipalities in California metropolitan areas. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
For every metropolitan area M, with
a number N of institutions i, every
institution with a population of Popi ,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of
Concentration HHIM is:
HHIM =
N
Â
i=1
 
Popi
ÂNi=1 Popi
!2
In contrast with Europe, where many countries have imple-
mented a new government layer to govern metro areas,22 attempts
22 Sellers 2013; Heinelt and Kübler
2005.
to create such metropolitan governments have largely failed in the
United States.23 Metropolitan denizens today spend more and more
23 Phares 2004.
of their time outside of their jurisdiction of residence. Yet, they con-
tinue to vote, and potentially have a voice to influence policy, in a
single town or city. This discrepancy matters because policies con-
ducted by a local government in a metropolitan area has potential
effects in the whole area.
1.3 Metropolitan policies have strong externalities
In metropolitan areas, policies and services have externalities out-
side of the boundaries of a specific jurisdiction. Carl Dahlman
identifies externalities as a “divergence between private and social
cost”24. In the context of metropolitan policies, the private cost is 24 Dahlman 1979.
the cost borne by the jurisdiction setting the policy, and the social
cost is the cost supported by other jurisdictions in the area. These
jurisdictions endure an involuntary cost even though they had no
say in setting the policy at the origin of the cost. For these services
and goods, it is difficult to exclude potential beneficiaries or con-
strain negative effects, whether they are common-pool or public
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goods.25 Building new road infrastructure or new traffic generators 25 V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1999.
will influence traffic in other cities.26 Likewise, restraining devel- 26 Duranton and Turner 2011.
opment in a city will affect the housing market in other cities.27 27 Cervero and Wu 1997.
Running water doesn’t know about local government boundaries.
For transportation, jobs, housing or water, the market is the size
of the metropolitan area, not a single local jurisdiction. There is
a spatial spillover and feedback effect of these policies, because
metropolitan denizens move around every day to access goods and
services.
1.4 Addressing the discrepancy between social space and political space
Debate is extensive on the theoretical merits and demerits of
metropolitan institutional arrangements, from consolidation of
metropolitan governments28 to small competing jurisdictions29 and 28 Briffault 1996; Jones 1942.
29 C.M. M Tiebout 1956; V. Ostrom,
Charles M. Tiebout, and Warren 1961;
Frey and Eichenberger 2004.
complex networks of collaborating actors30.
30 E. Ostrom 1972.
The apparent discrepancy between the scale of local governments
and the scale of the policy effects of these governments has first led
to calls to resolve the discrepancy by creating a level of government
large enough to enwrap these policy effects entirely, resulting in the
area’s consolidation. From the 1940s to the beginning of the 1960s,
metropolitan consolidation was the major effort to deal with the
growing fragmentation. New local governments were continually
incorporated at the edge of metropolitan areas, predominantly to
provide services to newly developed areas,31 rendering the frag- 31 Burns 1994.
mentation of public service provision more salient. In this context,
the “metropolitan problem”32 was to be solved by creating a new 32 Reed 1941.
layer of local government that would either replace or complement
existing local governments. Often touted as merits of replacing
the existing governments altogether are the simplicity of the new
structure, and its possible seamless integration into the current lo-
cal government legal architecture. A unique government for the
metropolitan area is easier to understand, therefore easier for voters
to hold accountable. Moreover, this consolidated government can
simply be created by merging existing jurisdictions together, avoid
the need for crafting, and negotiating, a new legal structure. As in
the United States, local government levels are created and regulated
by state laws,33 a merger keeps the solution local and shuffles off 33 Novak 2000; Zimmerman 1981.
the necessity of escalating the issue to the State legislature. This is
the reasoning behind municipal mergers and county-city consolida-
tions.34 However, never have two counties merged together in this 34 SM Leland and Thurmaier 2010; SM
Leland and Thurmaier 2004.setting and mergers have been constrained to the core of metropoli-
tan areas. Wyandotte county, Kansas, created a unified government
approved by referendum in 1997, to consolidate county and munic-
ipal governments around Kansas City.35 Kansas City’s metropolitan 35 S Leland and Thurmaier 2000.
area, however, straddles the border between Kansas and Missouri,
and a merger does not address this bi-state dimension of the area.
Mergers are still advocated today. They are rare events and often
fail in the ballot.36 Notwithstanding, a large merger of cities and 36 Linebaugh 2011.
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counties of the San Francisco Bay Area is regularly proposed.37 37 Mendoza 2013.
Beyond merging existing governments, the second form of
metropolitan consolidation is the creation of a whole new level
of government, not replacing but supplementing the existing local
governments, municipalities and counties. Metropolitan govern-
ments offer the potential to be more largely encompassing than
mergers, engulfing the metropolitan area in its entirety, where
mergers happen at the core. Often touted in the 1950s to the 1970s,
attempts to create metropolitan governments have largely failed
in the ballot in the United States.38 They are, however, common in 38 Phares 2004; Savitch and Vogel 1996.
European countries.39 Portland, Oregon, is one of the rare case of 39 Jouve and Christian Lefèvre 2004;
C. Lefèvre 1998.a successful implementation of a metropolitan government in the
United States.40 Started as a specialized district for managing solid 40 Aoki 2005.
waste, Portland Metro grew into a multi-purpose metropolitan gov-
ernment with a directly elected council.41 Portland Metro’s history 41 Briffault 1996.
is reminiscent of the European Union, started as a vehicle to man-
age a common resource, coal, and progressively built into a tight
political integration.42 Metropolitan governments usually require 42 Dinan 2014.
voters’ approval and a provision from the State legislature, making
them particularly difficult to conjure into existence. Consolidation
never stopped being advocated as the solution to metropolitan frag-
mentation. For David Lowery, metropolitan areas are the lowest
level at which policies might be provided.43 43 Lowery 2000, p.65.
Early on, the growing fragmentation of local governments in
metropolitan areas appeared to some scholars not as a problem
but as a solution, an opportunity to manage public resources more
efficiently. The public choice theory understands competition be-
tween local governments for fiscal resources as an incentive to
be responsive and to align policies with their constituents’ pref-
erences. In a metropolitan area with multiple and diverse local
governments, people have always the choice to vote with their feet
and move to the municipality fitting their preferences the most.44 44 C.M. M Tiebout 1956.
Public choice approaches were influential from the 1970s to the
1990s,45 offering an alternative to failed consolidation attempts, and 45 Lowery 2000.
more largely inscribed in a growing interest for market mechanisms
and more direct accountability in public administration. Today,
Bruno Frey advocates for Functional Overlapping Competing Ju-
risdictions, smaller autonomous jurisdictions competing for fiscal
resources.46 Residential mobility, however, is limited for metropoli- 46 Frey and Eichenberger 2004.
tan residents,47 who realize this choice in a constrained space.48 47 Ferreira 2010.
48 Nall and Mummolo 2016.Small municipalities’ social homogeneity renders them more prone
to civic participation, and more democratic, for Eric Oliver.49 49 Oliver 2001; Oliver 2000.
In 1972, Elinor Ostrom proposed to go beyond proposals of hefty
institutional overhaul of metropolitan local governments and focus
on metropolitan governance conducted by networks of interacting
actors.50 She conducted an attempt to be on the one hand more de- 50 E. Ostrom 1972.
scriptive of the actions of actors on the field, and on the other hand
to work within the existing institutional landscape of metropolitan
areas. Her proposal avoids the political cost of re-architecturing
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institutions, preferring instead a progressive change of their mode
of operation. Consolidation, Ostrom argues, might not be the way
to efficiency.51 Since then, metropolitan governance has indeed 51 E. Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker
1973.focused on how existing institutions interact to manage common
problems. More recently, scholars have integrated actors beyond
governments in their assessment of metropolitan governance, in-
cluding actors from civil society to describe collaborative modes of
governance.52 52 Ansell and Gash 2007.
There is no consensus on which arrangement would be the most
efficient and democratic, in part because there is no consensus
of what constitutes a measure of efficiency and democracy and
how these measures could be optimized.53 Cost reduction and 53 Allers and Geertsema 2016; E.
Ostrom 1973.increases in efficiency is not a given in any form of metropolitan
governance and depends on contextual factors.54 This study is 54 G Bel and ME Warner 2015.
indifferent to the actual efficiency of institutional arrangements and
does not advocate for one or the other as a premise. I do not make
an assumption that one mode of governance of the discrepancy
between social and political spaces, be it consolidation, competition
or collaboration, is more efficient or more democratic than the
others.
1.5 Understand metropolitan residents’ preferences towards governance
Whether scholars conclude that governance should be divided be-
tween many small competing local governments or concentrated
into a consolidated metropolitan government, prescriptive works
seldom describe a path to actual implementation of their propo-
sitions, instead focusing on what ought to be the institutional
end-goal. Empirical research on popular support for institutional
arrangements is scarce. Researchers have focused on perceptions
and preferences of governments officials, both elected and staff
members.55 A multiplicity of fiscal, spatial, and organizational fac- 55 G Bel and ME Warner 2015.
tor seem to influence willingness to cooperate.56 Studies are often 56 Germà Bel and M. E. Warner 2015.
conducted through survey of local government officials.57 Yet, un- 57 M. Warner and Hefetz 2002.
derstanding individual support is especially relevant since every
major metropolitan collaboration plan since 1950 had to go to the
ballot for approval and often failed to convince a majority of vot-
ers.58 Moreover, local elected officials are more trusted and more 58 Hamilton 2014; Linebaugh 2011,
p.122.responsive to their constituents’ preferences than federal congress
members. Rather, growing distrust government at the federal level
in the United States has not translated in a corresponding distrust
of state and local government.59 59 Jennings 2003.
There is extensive research, however, on preferences for gov-
ernance institutions in general and individual perceptions of
democratic legitimacy.60 An important distinction in democratic 60 Norris 1999.
legitimacy is between what the governance instrument produce—
output—and what how it operates—input & throughput. On the
one hand, people can support governance institutions because
they are efficient and produce good results. On the other, they can
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value public input and responsiveness as democratic. Normative
has theory has emphasized one or the other,61 noting that the two 61 Cohen 1997.
are sometimes incompatible. Public input can hinder as it can fos-
ter efficiency. Another dimension of legitimacy in the context of
metropolitan governance is the question of scale. The question of
governance scale is orthogonal to input and output legitimacy and
can interact with both. If there is indication that the upscaling of
functional integration in metropolitan areas reshapes local identi-
fication towards metropolitan areas,62 there is no clear evidence of 62 Kübler 2016.
it in the United States yet. Local governments are generally more
autonomous than in Europe and in many cases created to enforce
homogeneity in communities through land-use policy.63 63 Burns 1994.
The open question is therefore whether individuals value metropoli-
tan governance plans on the merits of their efficiency or of their
public process, and if they value smaller or larger scale cooperation.
1.6 Metropolitan California, a diverse and fragmented field
The State of California offers seminal ground to study metropolitan
governance in America, for a series of reasons. First, California is
the most populous state of the Union, with more than 39M resi-
dents in 2015, and the third largest with 155,000 sq mi. Second, Cal-
ifornia comprises multiple and diverse metropolitan areas. In this
research I use the US Census’ definition of Primary Statistical Areas
as metropolitan areas, because this is the definition that reflect the
most closely social use of space, allowing for metropolitan areas
to contain one or multiple urban cores. The four main metropoli-
tan areas of California who will be the focus of this study are the
Greater Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, San Diego and
the Greater Sacramento. These metropolitan areas are diverse in
structure and governance. Especially, they offer an balanced sample
of institutional fragmentation. The San Francisco Bay Area, with its
9 counties and more than 100 municipalities, is one the most frag-
mented metropolitan areas in the United States. San Diego, with a
single county and a large central city is one of the least fragmented
for its size. Texas is the other large state comprising multiple large
metropolitan areas. But Texan metro areas are much more similar
in having a relatively low institutional fragmentation with very
large central cities and few incorporated suburbs. Third, local gov-
ernments are relatively autonomous in California. Cities and coun-
ties can design their own organization rules by adopting a charter,
although the State provides a default structure for local govern-
ments who do not do so.64 California ranks 18th over 50 on Zim- 64 Richardson et al. 2003; Albuquerque
1997.merman’s local autonomy ranking.65 Local governments are gov-
65 Zimmerman 1981.erned by state laws in the United States. Combined with the large
extent of the state, California presents a diversity of metropoli-
tan areas governed by the same legal regime. Lastly, California’s
metropolitan areas are confined inside state borders. This is an
exception rather than the rule in the United States, where many
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large cities border state boundaries. Their metropolitan areas, as
defined by people’s commuting patterns, straddle multiple states.
This multi-state extent of metropolitan areas is particularly salient
in the North-East, but also present in the West. The metropolitan
area of Portland, Oregon, for instance, extends over the Columbia
River in Washington state. This adds a level of complexity that I
avoid by focusing on California.
The Greater Los Angeles, in Southern California, is the second
largest metropolitan area in the United States, with more than
18M inhabitants. It is also the densest. For its size, the Greater Los
Angeles is relatively less fragmented than other metropolitan areas.
the City of Los Angeles is large, with more than 4M residents. Los
Angeles County is central, populous, with more than half of the
Greater Los Angeles population, and powerful.
The San Francisco Bay Area, in Northern California, offers a
stark contrast with the Greater Los Angeles. The Bay Area is a
rapidly growing 8.4M residents metropolitan area. But the area is
very fragmented, with 9 counties and more than 100 municipalities.
San Francisco, the only consolidated city and county in California,
accounts for only 10% of the Bay’s population. San Jose, at the
south end of the Bay, is the largest and only millionaire city in the
Bay. As a result, the Bay Area is multi-polar, and policy decisions
are scattered between multiple local governments with diverging if
not competing interests.
San Diego, immediately south of the Greater Los Angeles
and bordering the California-Mexico border, is a very integrated
metropolitan area of 3M inhabitants. Constrained by topographi-
cal and political obstacles on all sides, it is the largest metropolitan
area in the United States made of only one county. As a result, pol-
icy decisions are often clearly distributed between county and mu-
nicipalities, and there is little need for another level of specifically
metropolitan governance. The city of San Diego itself is large and
populous relative to the size of the metropolitan area. The main
caveat regarding the insitutional landscape of San Diego is its situ-
ation at the Mexico border. There is an urban continuum between
San Diego and Tijuana, the city located immediatly south of the
border, in the Mexican state of Baja California. The two cities are
integrated and complement each otehr functionnaly with intense
daily exhanges of people and goods.66 66 Bae 2005.
The greater Sacramento is the capital region of California, lo-
cated in the northern tip of the Central Valley. The Sacremento-
Roseville PSA counts 2.5M inhabitants and extends over 7 counties.
Its influence spans over Douglas County in the state of Nevada.
As illustrated by figure 2, the Greater Sacramento has an average
level of fragmentation. The city of Sacramento itself houses only
20% (500 000) of the region’s inhabitants. Suburbs and semi-rural
communities span over 6 other counties. However, many commu-
nities are unincorporated (only 26 incorporated municipalities) and
therefore the counties themselves conserve large responsibilities.
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2 Research question
In section 1 I showed that metropolitan areas are functionally inte-
grated even though they are institutionally fragmented. They form
integrated social spaces where residents commute and live most
of their social life. However, citizens only vote, and thus influence
policy directly, in a single municipality of this area, although they
are affected by policy decisions of other local governments. This
discrepancy between social and political space has fostered three
main strains of research pointing to the relative benefits of local
government consolidation, competition, and collaboration. Recently,
research on local government collaboration has focused on elected
officials and staff preferences. However, public preferences, and
especially voters’ approval of collaboration, is an important yet
unexplored support if not a driver of this collaboration. Proposals
for integration, collaboration and incorporation of new municipal
governments often have to be approved on the ballot, particularly
in Western states and in California where direct democracy is more
prevalent, and often fail there.
In this study I shift the focus from elected officials and govern-
ment staff to the general public and voters to understand their
preferences for collaboration between local governments in their
metropolitan area. Collaboration between local governments takes
multiple institutional forms and happens at different scales within
metropolitan areas. Which features of inter-governmental collabo-
ration influence citizens’ support or opposition? The experimental
setup I describe below is designed to answer this question for resi-
dents of California metropolitan areas.
3 Methods
3.1 Focusing on land-use policy
I select land-use policy as a main focus to test individual prefer-
ences for collaborations between local governments. The first reason
is that land-use is a policy to be defined, not a service to be pro-
vided. In consequence, there is no obvious optimum, nor is there a
clear metric of the efficiency of the service provided. Defining and
implementing a land-use policy incur costs. Costs and their distri-
bution is one of the several dimensions of a collaboration plan I test
in the experiment.
Numerous previous studies on inter-governmental local collabo-
ration has focused on the provision of services. Their focus on ser-
vice provision can be explained on the one hand by the relative ease
demonstrated by local government in contracting out these services,
providing a larger field of observations. On the other hand, service
provision is more easily quantified than is a policy. A garbage col-
lection optimum, for instance, is clearly recognized as maximizing
coverage while minimizing cost. What a land-use policy optimum
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would look like, if it existed at all, is not so immediately apparent.
These two dimensions, a larger sample and an obvious metric, are
related. An evident benchmark facilitates transactions between local
governments and begets more collaboration.
Land-use policy is also relatively contentious, which makes the
policy issues more salient to the general public, therefore more
graspable. The institutional setup of land-use policies is simpler
to understand than with many other policies. Municipalities are
usually in charge of land-use in the United States, and in Cali-
fornia they have extensive powers to define their land-use policy.
Land-use has tangible externalities, that anyone who has looked for
housing in a metropolitan has experienced at least once. Because a
metropolitan area is an integrated housing market, housing built in
a municipalities affects availability and prices of housing on other
places of the area. Metropolitan residents are more familiar with
land-use policy than with other policies.
Compared to other policies, land-use planning is a relatively
straight-forward policy process in California today. Land-use plan-
ning involves multiple local officials: the legislative body of the
local government (city council, board of supervisor), an advisory
board (typically a planning commission), administrative staff, and
legal counsel. The whole process is usually under the jurisdiction
of a single local governments: a city, or a county for unincorpo-
rated areas.67 By contrast, water or transit policies often involve a 67 The Institute for Local Government
and Sanders 2010, p.7-12.complex web of interacting institutions. However, environmental
concerns have pushed land-use policy towards more complexity.
Since 1970, both federal and, in California, state law, mandate the
conduct of a thorough environmental impact assessment when a
significant environment impact is likely (EIS/EIR).68 68 The White House 2014.
Since the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, all urbanized area
of more than 50 000 people are mandated to have a Metropolitan
Planning Organization (MPO), channeling federal fundings for lo-
cal transportation projects. More recently, the state of California
has pushed local governments towards more cooperation to re-
duce the environmental impact of development, and, specifically,
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Sustainable Communities
and Climate Protection Act of 2008 (SB375) mandates that each
MPO develop a strategy integrating land-use and transportation
to reduce greenhouse gases.69 MPOs set a shared vision for the 69 Senate Bill No. 375 n.d.
metropolitan area’s future development as well as specific goals
for every local government in their jurisdiction. However, MPOs
lack enforcement power. Therefore, very little effective land-use and
housing development coordination actually occurs.70 70 Sciara 2014.
While the main focus of the experiment is land-use and plan-
ning, I test the support for coordination of this policy with other
policies exhibiting metropolitan externalities and strong interac-
tions with land-use. First, I choose water supply policy, where the
externality lies in the sharing of a rival resource: water. When a
municipality or a water district draws from a source of water, this
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water is not available for other uses in the area. The experiment
takes place in California, a state that was at the time of survey com-
pletion plagued by a severe drought,71 drawing public attention 71 Diffenbaugh, Swain, and Touma
2015.to the rival nature of water. The interaction between water supply
and development is also clear to the public. More development in
an area means that more water should be provided to this area. In
California, however, no coordination between development and wa-
ter supply is currently required. Land-use and water are typically
managed by different institutions, namely municipal governments
and water districts.
Second, I choose transportation and transit policy as a poten-
tial coordination with land-use policy. Transportation capacity,
either by roads or public transit networks, are goods that are not
restricted to the denizens of the jurisdiction laying them out. Many
commuters use the roads of cities they do not live and vote in, or
use a transit service from another city or county to commute. This
is particularly true in metropolitan areas with a high degree of in-
stitutional fragmentation, where many different cities create and
maintain roads used by people from all over the metropolitan area,
and where commuters have to transfer from one transit system to
another to reach their destination. The San Francisco Bay Area, for
instance, comprises no less than 110 cities and 9 counties having
their say in how the road network develops, and at least 26 pub-
licly funded transit operators.72 In more institutionally integrated 72 Amin and Barz 2014.
metropolitan areas, a small number of institutions plan and manage
roads and transit systems. San Diego, the least fragmented of the
big four metropolitan areas in California, is composed of a single
county and is served by only two urban public transit operators
and two commuter rail line operators. The existence of an interac-
tion between land-use and transportation and transit is also clear
to the public, in principle if not in details. The abundance of com-
ments on traffic and parking issues in public planning hearings and
meetings demonstrates this public awareness.
The scenario tested in the experiment is therefore the creation of
a new land-use board, shared between the respondents’ munici-
palities and its neighbors, and mandated with the definition and
operation of the land-use and planning.
3.2 Randomized conjoint experiment
Real-life individual support or opposition to policy arrangements
is a multidimensional choice. In California, voters are familiar
with being presented policy options in the ballot. The option that
they have to decide on is composed of many dimensions.73 Many 73 Hopkins, Yamamoto, and Hain-
mueller 2013.studies rely on a declaration of preferences,74 but to act on a de-
74 Kübler 2005; Sellers 2013.clared preference in a decision context, individuals have to make a
trade-off between several competing and sometimes contradictory
preferences.75 Individuals consider the opportunity cost,76 the cost 75 Nall and Mummolo 2016.
76 Palmer and Raftery 1999.of alternatives foregone by making a choice, or resort to heuristics
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to identify their preferred alternative. In order to untangle the dy-
namics of support or opposition to multi-government collaboration
in metropolitan areas, I design a fully randomized, full factorial,
coinjoint experiment.
The experiment is designed to uncover causal effects.
The experimental setup observes responses of participants when
they are presented with a controlled experimental treatment. The
purposeful change of the treatment presented to respondents al-
lows, under the right conditions, to ascribe the corresponding
changes in the observed response to the treatment variation,77 and 77 Montgomery 2012, p.1.
statistically establish a causal link.
The survey takes places in two phases. In order to avoid prim-
ing,78 experimental questions are placed at the very beginning of 78 Fowler2013.
the survey, while socio-demographic questions follow the experi-
ment. Placing experimental questions first ensures that respondents
are not influenced by their answers to previous questions in their
choice of collaboration plans. Before the experiment, however, re-
spondents are asked for their residence and work location. Their lo-
cation is used to adapt question to their specific metropolitan area.
For instance, a resident of San Francisco can be asked about collab-
oration in the “Greater San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland Area” while
a resident of San Diego can be asked the same question about the
“Greater San Diego-Carlsbad Area”. After experimental questions,
respondents are presented with extensive socio-demographic ques-
tions. These questions largely reproduce questions of the American
Community Survey (ACS). The ACS is a long-form, continuous
sampled survey of the United States population, complementing
the short-formed decennial, un-sampled and exhaustive census.
The experimental setup itself is twofold. First, respondents ex-
press a choice between two collaboration plans in a conjoint ex-
periment. Respondents are asked which plan they prefer between
two alternatives. Figure 7, in appendix, shows an example of the
conjoint question. Then, respondents are asked to express an in-
dependent preference for each of the two plans, expressing a No,
I don’t know, or Yes vote. Figure 8, in appendix, shows an example
of the independent preference question. The two plans presented
to respondents are the same for conjoint and independent prefer-
ence questions. Plans are vignettes, constructed descriptions of a
proposal for a collaboration plan between local governments on
land-use policies, representing a “systematic combination of charac-
teristics”,79 the vignettes’ dimensions. 79 Atzmüller and Steiner 2010, p.128.
Each of the seven dimensions tested takes between 2 and 5 possi-
ble values. Each vignette comprises one value for every dimension.
I extract dimensions and possible values from features of institu-
tional arrangements in Californian metropolitan areas today. These
dimensions, listed in table 2 are (A) scale of the collaboration, (B)
evolution of the service cost, (C) distribution of these costs between
municipalities, (D) type of power of the new board, (E) coordina-
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tion with other policies beyond land-use, (F) mode of designating
board members, and (G) sanctions for municipalities who would
not comply with the board’s decisions. The whole space of possible
combinations for these values amounts to 2 160 vignettes.
The population of vignette is too large to be judged by a sin-
gle respondent. Therefore, I design a method of selecting a sub-
population of vignettes, and a method of partitioning this pop-
ulation to present a limited number of vignettes (2) to each re-
spondent. I use full randomization to generate vignettes for each
respondent. Every time a respondent takes the survey, a script gen-
erates a new set of vignettes by randomly assembling institutional
features. The experiment is fully factorial because the vignette sub-
population presented to respondents is randomly selected.80 The 80 Jasso 2006; Rossi and Nock 1982.
experiment is also fully randomized because the partitioning of vi-
gnettes and their allocation to respondents are both random. There
is, in effect, as many vignette sets as respondents.
Confounded main effects are negligible The total popula-
tion of vignettes is larger than the number of observations, leaving
a number of them unobserved, and most of the observed vignettes
are observed only once. This design typically creates a potentially
complex set of confounding effects.81 Because of the sheer size of 81 Atzmüller and Steiner 2010, p.131.
the vignette population, however, it is unlikely that by random
chance a dimension only varies with another dimension. For in-
stance, it is unlikely that, by random chance only, the feature (F1)
appointed board members would always be selected alongside the fea-
ture (D1) strong board whereas the feature (F2) elected board members
would always be selected along the feature (D2) weak board. There
would be no combination (F1)(D2) or (F2)(D1) presented to re-
spondents. If it were the case, and if respondents were for instance
expressing a systematic preference for the latter combination, it
would be impossible to ascribe that preference to the feature elected
board members or the feature weak board. The double randomiza-
tion, of vignette sub-population selection and partitioning along
with the target number of respondents (N = 600) ensures that the
probability of confounding main effects is small. Table 3 displays
the results of Pearson’s Chi-squared independence tests for pairs
of vignette dimensions,82 and shows that they are independent. I 82 Agresti 2013.
can safely assume that confounded main effects are negligible with
the design. However, confounded effects might still be present for
interactions. For this reason I will focus on main effects to analyze
experimental results.
Estimating the average marginal effect of each institu-
tional feature. A large proportion of the vignette population is
unobserved, and each respondent expresses a preference on a small
number of vignettes. This design does not allow to estimate the ef-
fect of each institutional feature for each individual respondent. Re-
spondents express a preference for each potential collaboration plan
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presented, but there is no way to know which features are more
instrumental than others in the formation of this individual prefer-
ence. The experiment is designed to estimate the average marginal
effect of each institutional feature over the whole population
of respondents or groups of respondents. Given a collaboration
plan composed of several dimensions, it is impossible to estimate
if the scale of the proposed collaboration, for instance a small scale
collaboration between the respondent’s municipality and its imme-
diate neighbor, is the feature that sways the respondent in favor of
supporting the plan and not other features of the plan. Over the
whole population of respondents, this specific feature is randomly
presented jointly with all the other features. If respondents consis-
tently prefer plans with the features over plans without the feature,
it is possible to conclude that the feature has indeed, on average, a
positive effect on individual preference for a plan.
As proposed by Hainmueller et al,83 I estimate Average Marginal 83 Hainmueller2014a.
Component Effect (AMCE) of institutional features using linear
regression. I use the R package cjoint in order to do so. 84 84 https://CRAN.R-project.org/
package=cjoint
Putting respondents’ preferences in context. Beside the
experiment itself, the survey asks questions on socio-economic
status and geographic behavior, to put respondents’ preferences
in a broader context. Socio-economic questions largely reproduce
questions from the American Community Survey,85 the detailed 85 Mather, Rivers, and Jacobsen 2005.
survey conducted every year by the US Census on a sample of
the American population. 86 These questions offer two main uses. 86 By contrast with the decennial
census, conducted every ten years
on the whole US population, but
gathering less data on each participant
with a form shorter than the American
Community Survey.
First, they serve to compare the respondents’ sample with the char-
acteristics of California’s general adult population, assessing the
sample’s representativeness. I report on the sample quality in sub-
section 3.4. Second, these questions allow me to control in what
proportion respondents’ preference for collaboration between their
municipality and others on land-use policy are attributable to insti-
tutional features and what proportion is attributable to their basic
socio-economic characteristics. For instance, we could expect that
younger people are, in general, more prone to collaboration than
older metropolitan denizens.
The second set of declarative, non-experimental questions asks
respondents about their geographic behavior. I ask for the zip-
codes of their place of residence, as well as workplace and place
of study. I also inquire of their commute habits. These answers are
used to tailor experimental questions to the geographic context
of the respondent. Metropolitan areas can be an abstract concept,
and I anchor respondents’ task by providing question mentioning
their municipality and metropolitan areas by name, as table ?? il-
lustrates. For instance, a respondent from Oakland, California, can
be asked about a collaboration plan encompassing Oakland and 3
neighboring cities or all cities and counties in the greater San Jose-San
Francisco-Oakland area (CA). Although not included in this analy-
sis, answers to these questions can also be exploited to study their
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main effect on collaboration preferences, or their interaction with
the effects of institutional features. For instance, respondents who
have a more extensive commute in the metropolitan areas could
be more disposed to support collaboration than respondents living
and working in the same municipality. In that case, commute extent
would have an effect of its own. Similarly, respondents with an ex-
tensive commute could be more prone to support coordination of
land-use with transportation, since they are more affected than oth-
ers by traffic conditions and transit infrastructure. In this case, the
interaction between commute extent and the institutional feature of
policy coordination would be significant.
I test for differences between sub-groups of respondents. Most
important sub-groups are residents of different metropolitan ar-
eas in the State of California. I thus divide respondents into five
groups, based on their declared place of residence: Greater Los
Angeles, Greater San Francisco, Greater San Diego, Greater Sacra-
mento, and Others. Respondents’ location is determined by their
declared zip-code of residence. For boundaries of Metropolitan ar-
eas, I take OMB’s 2010 Primary Statistical Areas (PSA). In addition
to location, I also test for differences by gender, household income,
party affiliation, age and race. All these characteristics are declared
by respondents in the socio-demographic part of the survey, after
the experimental part where respondents express preferences be-
tween and for plans. Age and income are discretized into ordered
categories of age and income, each category comprising on third
of respondents. For instance, respondents are divided between the
third youngest, third oldest, and in between.
Differences between sub-groups are estimated by calculating
Average Marginal Component Effects conditional on respondent’s
membership to each sub-group, as proposed by Hainmueller et al.87 87 Hainmueller2014a.
3.3 Institutional features
Institutional features are listed in table 2. They are extracted and
generalized from features of institutional arrangements existing to-
day in metropolitan areas of California. They are randomly drawn
and assembled for each plan presented to a respondent. These fea-
tures can be present individually in plans. The specific combination
of features produced by random draw can, and often is, unseen on
the ground, as there is 2 160 possible arrangements. Additionally,
these features are drawn from inter-governmental collaboration
devices beyond land-use. Land-use is a prerogative of cities and
counties in California.
Scale of participation. The first feature is how many munici-
palities participate in the collaboration plan. I divided the dimen-
sions in three scales. The small scale is the respondent’s city and 3
neighboring municipalities. The medium scale is the respondent’s
city and 15 neighboring municipalities. Lastly, the large scale is the
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entire metropolitan area of the respondent. Features are adapted
to the respondent’s declared location. For instance, a respondent
from Oakland, California, is presented all municipalities in the Greater
San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, California as the large scale feature.
For the sake of consistency, metropolitan areas are identified by
their census designation, and not a vernacular name like the Bay
Area. Census names make clearer which urban cores does the area
revolve around. In California today, metropolitan associations of
governments are mandated by state law to coordinate planning, for
climate regulation purposes, but often lack enforcement powers.88 88 Barbour and Deakin 2012.
Type of power. This dimensions expresses the powers held by the
new board, with two possible values. First the board can be a weak
board, simply coordinating participating municipalities’ planning
policies together, without doing the planning itself. Depending on
other features drawn for other dimensions, especially sanctions,
decisions of a coordinating board can still be more enforceable than
the typical inter-governmental coordination in place in California
today. Second, the board can be a strong board, replacing participat-
ing municipalities’ planning departments altogether. In this case,
cities simply transfer their planning power under the law to the
new board. Considering a large number of municipalities were cre-
ated to capture land-use planning in the first place,89 I expect the 89 Burns 1994.
strong board feature to negatively affect respondents’ support for
collaboration.
Policy coordination. This dimensions tests coordination of
land-use with either water supply, transit and transportation, nei-
ther, or both. Inter-governmental collaboration has focused on
single policy arrangements, often around service provision. How-
ever, rising concerns on the environments consequences of growth,
as well as on spillover effects like insufficient housing development
to support a growing economic base, have brought the focus on co-
ordination between policies as well. Political contentions in the San
Francisco Bay Area around the merger of MTC and ABAG, coordi-
nation boards for transit and land-use, respectively, exemplify this
growing attention.
Board members. Board members can be elected or appointed
by other elected officials, such as a mayor, or a city council. Both
configurations exist in California today. Appointed members are
more common, for most often the collaboration instrument is a
creation of local governements, and there is no intent to make them
independent. However, independent, directly elected boards, are
sometimes created to take over all or part of a policy area, or to
fund, build and manage an infrastructure. In the San Francisco Bay
Area, the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) is operated by a
special purpose transit district, the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District. BART Board members are directly elected by the
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population of San Francisco, Alameda and Contra Costa Counties.
The district can raise taxes of its own, but is also depending on
other local governments to provide operating funds and capital
for maintenance and expansion. Californians are therefore familiar
with an elected board.
Cost of planning and infrastructures. This feature is sim-
ply the evolution of the cost of running both the planning depart-
ment and the infrastructural costs of development. I expect the
effect of this dimension to be linear, in the sense of cost reduction
fostering support and cost increase to deter it. This dimension and
the following other two dimensions related to cost partly reproduce
institutional dimensions tested by Michael Bechtel and Kenneth
Scheve on popular support for global climate agreements.90 90 Bechtel and Scheve 2013.
Distribution of costs. A new collaboration device between mu-
nicipalities on land-use creates a cost sharing problem. How will
these costs be divided between participants? Bechtel and Scheve
tested this dimension for global climate agreements and found it
significant.91 I present three different possible features to respon- 91 Bechtel and Scheve 2013.
dents. First, costs can be divided proportionally by population, more
populous cities paying more for the service in proportion to their
population, regardless of the socio-demographics characteristics
of this population. Second, costs can be divided proportionally
by the current tax base. Wealthier municipalities, and also munic-
ipalities with more economic activity, will pay more in this case.
Lastly, costs can be divided proportionally to the new development.
In this case, growing cities will pay more, while cities with no new
development will contribute very little financially. This last option
represents a proportionality with expected growth in tax base.
Sanctions for non-complying cities. At last, this feature rep-
resents how participating municipalities are financially incented to
comply with decisions of the collaborative planning board. Bechtel
and Scheve found that a moderate level of sanctions drives popular
support for global climate agreements.92 I test three levels of sanc- 92 Bechtel and Scheve 2013.
tions: no sanctions, moderate and high. Sanctions are expressed in
dollars per household per month for non-complying cities.
3.4 A large sample
I recruited survey participants from California on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk) during the summer of 2015. With a goal of 600
responses, respondents were compensated $0.5 for their partici-
pation. Designed as a marketplace to outsource menial computer
tasks better performed by a human than by a computer program,
Amazon MTurk has emerged in the last decade as a viable and
cheaper alternative to survey vendors. Notably, thanks to its low
cost, Amazon MTurk permits an important increase in the num-
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ber of respondents within a given budget. The data obtained in
Amazon MTurk is as reliable as with traditional providers,93 espe- 93 Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling
2011.cially for experimental purposes.94 Respondents do not appear to
94 Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis
2010.be primarily motivated by financial gains.95 Although respondents
95 Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling
2011; Ross et al. 2010.
can be less representative than national probability samples, their
experimental response is consistent with respondents from more
traditional recruitment methods96 and population-based samples.97 96 Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012.
97 Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan
2014.
Out of 730 respondents, 620 were indeed from California and
gave complete responses. Figures 5 and 9 reveal that respondents
are relatively well sampled in regard to their geographic origin. The
two largest metropolitan areas of Los Angeles and San Francisco
are slightly under-sampled. The largest sampling bias occurs with
Sacramento, whose weight in the survey is almost 50% higher than
its share of the State’s population.
Map of respondents
Complete responses by zip-code
# Respondents 
 by zip-code
1
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Figure 5: Map of respondents, com-
plete responses by zip-code, California.
Figures 10 to 13 compare the socio-demographic composition of
the sample relative to the State of California. They expose a rela-
tively representative sample in regards to gender, with a slight over-
representation of men, and income, with an under-representation
of the highest income categories. However, survey respondents’
distribution is skewed towards a younger (figure 11) and whiter,
non-Latino (figure 12) sample compared to the State of California.
The bias exhibited by the respondent sample is consistent with
usual biases documented for the collection method, Amazon Me-
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chanical Turk.98 To address this bias, I weight survey respondents 98 Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan
2014.to correct for race and ethnicity and age, following weighting spec-
ifications of the American National Election Studies.99 I compare 99 Pasek 2010; Pasek 2011.
the results of AMCE models with unweighted and weighted sam-
ples, displayed in figures 20 and 21 respectively. Weighting causes
very little change to the estimated effect size, bringing confidence
that the sample can be relied upon despite biases. The weighted
model conserves the direction of the effects and their general scale.
However, the weighted model tends to display a larger uncertainty.
For the analysis of the survey, I rely on the weighted sample to es-
timate the effects of each institutional feature in different groups of
respondents.
4 Results
4.1 Respondents are in general favorable to a collaboration plan
For all groups considered—all respondents, likely voters, and
groups of respondents in the four largest metropolitan areas in
California—respondents express in aggregate a slight preference
for approving the collaboration plan, as figures 14 to 19 show. The
support score for every group of respondents is above 0.5, indicat-
ing a slight preference for supporting a collaboration plan on the
ballot.100 100 Support score is the average of
expressed preferences for a plan in
the respondents’ group scored as 1
for Yes, 0.5 for I don’t know and 0 for
No. Therefore, an average support
score below 0.5 for a respondents
group indicates a tendency to reject
collaboration plans, and a score above
0.5 indicates a tendency to support
collaboration plans.
Support score across all respondents is 0.53. Support score is the
highest among respondents from the San Francisco Bay Area (fig-
ure 17), and the lowest among San Diego respondents (figure 18).
The relative proportion of respondents having formed a prefer-
ence for the plan increases among likely voters, shows figure 15, as
expected considering these respondents are more motivated by a
ballot. Only a third of respondents state that they are likely to some
degree to cast a vote if such a plan was on the ballot in their town
or city.
The likely vote question is articulated to emphasize the cost of
voting for the respondent. The question asks if they would cancel
or rearrange their plans to vote in an off-cycle ballot two weeks
from when they answered the survey. For that reason, the question
leans on the side of a more conservative estimate of the proportion
of likely voters in the respondents’ sample, underestimating rather
than overestimating their number.
Support for inter-governmental collaboration is surprising, given
the low level of general identification with metropolitan areas.
General support for collaboration, however, includes respondents
who have been presented with large scale as well as small scale
collaboration. Support could indicate, therefore, that metropolitan
residents favor inter-governmental collaboration, but not necessarily
at a large scale, and with carefully chosen parters.
Support for collaboration is confirmed by results of an additional
question, asked after the choice of collaboration plan. This question
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tests respondent’s perception of interdependence between munici-
palities in their area, 101 prompting them to choose between three 101 “Thinking about what other towns
and cities in your area are doing, how
do you feel about how their policies
affect your own community?”
statements: 1. “We are all in this together.” 2. “They do what they
want, it does not concern my community.” and 3. “We compete
with them, and they compete with us.” These three answers re-
spectively capture a perception of interdependence and solidarity,
independence, and competition.
Figure 6 reveals that respondents overwhelmingly (56%) perceive
their municipality as being interdependent with others in the area,
in a way that favors collaboration. Only 13% of respondents have
a competitive view and 23% perceive their municipality as being
independent.
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Figure 6: Distribution of respondents
by perception of local interdepen-
dence.
Widespread perceptions of interdependence and solidarity com-
bined with support for inter-governmental collaboration could ap-
pear as paradoxical with low levels of identification with metropoli-
tan areas. The paradox is resolved, however, if we understand
that supporting collaboration does not necessarily mean identi-
fying with a larger scale in which this collaboration takes place.
Metropolitan externalities, perceived in their everyday life, are rec-
ognized by metropolitan residents and suffice to motivate them to
support collaboration. Resolving this paradox depends on examin-
ing the scale of collaboration favored by metropolitan residents.
4.2 Respondents favor non-committal, economical collaboration around
policy coordination
Respondents demonstrate a sensitivity to the collaboration features
that are being presented to them. In other words, respondents ex-
press a choice that is informed by the details of the plan, and they
do not reject or approve metropolitan collaboration on the whole
regardless of what is proposed to them. As figure 21 shows, re-
spondents display a general aversion towards costs increase and
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sanctions, while cost decrease does not conversely causes more sup-
port. Stronger collaboration drive respondents’ opposition. They
generally want their municipality to retain the bulk of land-use
policy power, and limit collaboration to policy coordination. Re-
spondents are swayed by coordination between land-use and water
policies. While other coordination scenarios, with transport and
with both transport and water, fail to be significant, their general
direction is also positive. Respondents also favor a board composed
of directly elected members over appointed experts.
Likely voters exhibit the same preferences, shows figure 22 , with
a higher uncertainty due to the smaller size of the sample.
4.3 Respondents are more sensitive to cost increase than to cost de-
crease
Respondents react negatively to cost increase, but do not answer
positively to cost decrease. Three types of effects could cause this
asymmetry. First, respondents could be confused by the survey
language. Indeed, this dimension is formulated rather neutrally,
as table 2 shows, and could be more confusing than if the question
wording was closer to everyday language. For instance, cheaper
service would convey the right information to the respondents more
efficiently than 20$ less than today per household per month.
The second possible cause for the asymmetry of cost preferences
could be loss aversion. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman102 102 Tversky and Kahneman 1991.
show that people prefer avoiding losses over obtaining gains. That
is, people feel a loss more strongly than they feel an equivalent
gain. Following this explanation, respondents are more prone to
avoid losses than to seek gains. In the case of a collaboration plan,
the losses that respondents are trying to avoid are increases in
the cost of running the planning service. Their preferences for
avoiding losses drives them to reject plans that would result in a
cost increase that does not conversely translate in a support for
plans that would reduce costs.
Lastly, the cost preferences asymmetry could be caused by an
asymmetry of expectations. In this situation, respondents expect
a cost increase to materialize, while they do not expect a cost de-
crease to do so. They expect government project to cost more than
advertised. This asymmetry of expectations can reflect a broad dis-
trust in the ability of local governments to run cost efficient policies.
It can also reflect a disbelief in the cost efficiency of policy upscal-
ing in metropolitan areas. In that case, respondents do not believe
that a reduction of cost is among the merits of inter-governmental
collaboration, even if they are swayed in favor of this collaboration
by other features of the arrangement. It is indeed unclear that local
government consolidation or collaboration generally results in cost
efficiencies, and cost reductions seem to be the exception rather
than the rule.103 103 Bish 2001; Fox and Gurley-Calvez
2006; G Bel and ME Warner 2015.
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4.4 Respondents’ preferences vary between metropolitan areas
If institutional features of a collaboration plans have robust effects
on individual preferences for the plan, figures 25 to 28 reveal a
number of variations between the four biggest metropolitan areas
in California: the Greater Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area,
San Diego County, and the Greater Sacramento. I summarize these
differences in table 1.
In line with respondents of the whole State of California, Los
Angeles respondents (figure 25) are more likely to favor a weak
collaboration shifting costs to a proportion of the tax base, with
a board composed of directly elected members. Los Angeles re-
spondents, however, do not particularly care about multiple policy
coordination, with effect sizes being not only insignificant, but close
to 1, revealing their indifference. Cost features fail to sway them in
favor of disfavor of a plan, with the exception of cost structure.
San Diego respondents (figure 27), just south of Los Angeles,
also care about cost, in that they strongly disfavor potential sanc-
tions for municipalities that would not comply with the collabora-
tion board decisions, as well as potential cost increase. San Diego
respondents do not display a preference for a specific type of cost
structure. In accordance with their Angelino neighbors, however,
they do not seem to care about policy coordination either.
San Francisco respondents, however, do care about policy coordi-
nation (figure 26), both land-use water and land-use and transport,
but fail to be swayed by an all-encompassing coordination instru-
ment comprising all three policies of land-use, water and transport.
The effect is positive, but not significant. All other institutional fea-
tures fail to drive their preference for a plan over another, including
cost features that are important for their Southern California coun-
terparts in Los Angeles and San Diego.
Sacramento respondents are similar to San Francisco respon-
dents is being swayed by policy coordination at the exclusion of
other plan features. They exhibit a specificity, however, in favoring
coordination of three policies, land-use, water and transport, over
coordination between land-use and transport, over coordination
between land-use and water and a focus on land-use exclusively.
Sacramento respondents are almost perfectly indifferent to the
composition of the board, cost, or strength of the collaboration in-
strument. Although not significant, a collaboration encompassing
the whole Greater Sacramento seems to have a positive effect.
As table 1 illustrates, there is a divide between respondents from
Northern and Southern California. Northern California respon-
dents exhibit a preference for policy coordination that Southern
California respondents do not express. Moreover, Northern Cali-
fornia residents are not averse to stronger forms of collaboration,
whereby a new shared land-use planning board would completely
take over their cities’ planning boards. By contrast, Southern Cali-
fornia participants do reject strong collaboration. To the extent that
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they support collaboration, they favor mere coordination between
existing municipal planning boards that would retain all their pow-
ers.
Large metro Medium metro
NorCal San Francisco Bay Area Greater Sacramento
+ Policy coordination + Policy coordination + Policy coordination
= Weak / strong collaboration = Weak / strong collaboration = Weak / strong collaboration
= Cost changes & sanctions - Cost changes & sanctions
SoCal Greater Los Angeles San Diego County
= Policy coordination = Policy coordination = Policy coordination
- Strong collaboration - Strong collaboration - Strong collaboration
= Cost changes & sanctions - Cost changes & sanctions
Table 1: Summary of significant effect
by California Metropolitan Area.
Is geographic variation anecdotal or systemic? The
source of respondents geographic variation of preferences remains
unknown in this study. On the one hand, geographic variation of
preferences could be purely anecdotal. In this case, residents of
a given metropolitan area express preferences that are dependent
to the historical path of the area. Even if we measure perfectly
comparable conditions in two different metropolitan areas today,
preferences for collaboration would be different if the history of
these two areas was different. On the other hand, preferences can
be systemic, explained by the conditions currently witnessed by
metropolitan residents. Two metropolitan areas exhibiting the same
conditions today would cause the same type of preferences in their
residents.
The source of this systemic variation can lie in the institutional
setup of the metropolitan area, the broader metropolitan context,
or regional conditions beyond the scope of the metropolitan area
per se. The institutional fragmentation of the area could explain
an appetite for coordination in very fragmented areas where mul-
tiple local governments conduct mutually contradictory policies.
Residents of the San Francisco Bay Area could be swayed in favor
of policy coordination at a larger scale by witnessing local gov-
ernments competing to build new economic development without
providing enough housing to support it, therefore driving housing
prices up around the Bay. By contrast, San Diego respondents re-
side in a metropolitan area comprising only one county, San Diego
County, and where population is distributed in a relatively low
number of cities. Political power in the metropolitan area is concen-
trated. San Diego County does not experience a housing shortage
as acute as the San Francisco Bay Area. These factors could explain
the low appetite of San Diego respondents for policy coordination
and strong collaboration forms on land-use. The problems to solve,
pertaining to both institutional and policy dimensions, are simply
more stringent in the Bay Area.
the place and scale of consent 154
Both causal mechanism, anecdotal and systemic, are likely to
explain each a portion of the respondents’ preferences geographic
variation. The experiment I conduct here does not offer enough
variance between metropolitan areas to decide between the two ex-
planations. Another experiment should be performed with a larger
sample, expanded to the contiguous United States. This experiment
would provide enough metropolitan contextual variance to test
these two hypothesizes.
4.5 Respondents’ preferences depend on their political affiliation and
socio-economic profile
Partisanship. As would be expected, partisan affiliation influ-
ences individual preferences for plan features (figures 32 to 34). To
evaluate these effects, I have grouped together respondents declar-
ing being registered as Democrat or Republican with respondents
simply leaning towards a party. Pure independents, declaring no
leaning towards either one party, form another group. Cost effects
are stronger for Republicans than for Democrats and Independents.
If all groups care about a strong increase in policy cost, Republi-
cans are the only ones that are swayed favorably by a cost decrease.
Considering Republican combine a general higher distrust in gov-
ernment with a preference for small government,104 a possible 104 PewResearchCenter2015.
explanation is that respondents view cost as a proxy for the size
and importance of the service provided, and not necessarily as a
pure question of efficiency. Following that hypothesis, Republican
would prefer to decrease cost to decrease the level of service pro-
vided, as much or more as they want more efficiency in the service
provision. Moreover, Democrats display a strong preference for an
elected board, and a cost structure proportional to tax base, there-
fore shifting the burden of cost to wealthier areas. Democrats also
tend to car about policy coordination, where Republicans do not.
Gender. Respondents’ preferences vary along gender (figures 30
& 31). Female respondents care more about policy coordination, an
elected board and are averse to strong forms of collaboration. Their
male counterparts are more sensitive to cost, being strongly averse
to cost increase and sanctions for non-complying municipalities.
In line with the influence of cost features, male respondents are
also convinced by a cost structure proportional to tax base, making
wealthier areas pay more for the policy.
Race and ethnicity. There are significant race and ethnicity
effects (figures 35 to 39), although they are harder to ascribe to
a specific cause. White, non-Latino respondents tend to prefer a
cost structure proportional to tax base or new development, while
disliking sanctions and strong collaboration. They are also taken
aback by any change in cost, even to reduce policy costs. Asian
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respondents care about coordinating land-use with transport, and
dislike sanctions. Black respondents care about lowering policy
costs and dislike sanctions, while favoring strong collaboration
over mere coordination between municipalities. Latino respondents
are swayed by a decrease in policy cost. These effects are hard to
interpret because race and ethnicity often correlate with other socio-
economic factors. Moreover, spatial segregation is still strong in
the United States. Consequently, race and ethnicity also conveys
geographic information. For these reasons, I will not hypothesize
here about race and ethnicity causes for specific preferences, as
further studies should be undertaken to specifically untangle these
different dimensions.
Income. Dividing respondents in three annual income groups—
less than $33,000, between $33,000 and $72,000 and over $72,000—
offers a contrasting picture of preferences (figures 40 to 42). Poorer
respondents do not express significant preferences, as an income
group. Middle-income respondents seem to primarily dislike strong
collaboration, preferring mere coordination between local govern-
ments. Higher income respondents are the ones expressing clearer
preferences, with a strong dislike of cost increases, and a signifi-
cant preference for coordination between policies, in all possible
combinations.
Age. Lastly, age is also a discriminant of respondents’ preferences
(figures 43 to 45). When divided into three groups—from 18 to 31,
31 to 47 , and more than 47—younger respondents dislike strong
collaboration and cost increase. Middle-age respondents are the
ones primarily swayed by policy coordination, although cost effects
also get stronger for them, disliking both cost increase and potential
sanctions. Lastly, older respondents do not express many significant
preferences, apart from cost increase.
5 Conclusion
People are not averse to metropolitan collaboration.
Metropolitan residents of California do favor collaboration between
their local governments on land-use policy, by a slight but con-
sistent margin. People are swayed in favor of collaboration by a
coordination between different policies, namely water and trans-
portation and transit, in a way that is related to the specific issues
pertaining to their area of residence and the existing institutional
structure addressing these issues.
Institutional features of collaboration matter. This
study shows that people are not indifferent to the shape taken by a
collaboration plan when they decide to support or oppose it. They
tend to prefer small to middle-scale collaboration, coordinating
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multiple policies. Respondents are averse to cost increase. They
generally prefer a weaker coordination device, focused on coordi-
nating multiple local governments, to a stronger institution taking
power away from their municipality. Young, democratic voters are
also more prone to support a collaboration.
The policy problem is what matters. By contrast with cost, a
specific policy mix addressed by the reform plan is one of the only
drivers for popular support of collaboration in metropolitan areas.
By comparison, the effect of institutional design elements, such as
the composition of the board (elected or appointed members), is
weak. Solving the way development impacts traffic or water con-
sumption, when perceived as a problem by respondents, seems
to be what people actually care about, more than the specifics of
the institutional arrangement. The focus of the research in public
policy has been for a long time on institutions, and their impact on
the efficiency of policy making and service provision. This exper-
iment suggests however that researchers and policy-makers alike
should direct their attention to the specific of the policy issues fac-
ing metropolitan areas. These issues differ from region to region
and inform the preferences of people living in these areas. The fo-
cus on policy, however, offers more leeway to reform proponents to
find an arrangement that works inside the current constraints of the
metropolitan area.
Cost arguments are inoperative. Respondents are sensitive to
cost increase arguments but by and large indifferent, or even hos-
tile, to cost reduction arguments. In section 4.3 I outlined several
possible explanations for these preferences. However, this prefer-
ence has policy implications. Arguments for metropolitan reforms
often focus on efficiency and legitimacy. Cost preferences uncov-
ered in this study point to the inefficiency of these arguments to
sway voters. Hopeful reformers should therefore not make cost ar-
guments a central point of their argument, but rather focus on how
their proposal solves actual policy problems perceived by residents.
Respondents’ aversion for cost arguments reflects the uncertainty of
actual efficiency effects in metropolitan reform.
Preferences vary geographically. In every metropolitan area
of California, respondents express a slight preference in favor of
collaboration, but the features driving this support vary greatly
between metropolitan areas. There is no single collaboration for-
mula that would be the right one and unmistakably sway people in
favor of the plan. Rather, the features of collaboration favored by
residents of the San Francisco Bay Area, a medium scale collab-
oration with multiple policies, with no aversion to strong power
transfers or cost changes, are very different than the ones exhibited
by Greater Los Angeles residents, namely a small scale coordina-
tion restricted to land-use, and a shift to cost distribution to all
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economic actors.
The institutional solution to the policy problem is lo-
cal. This study shows that there is no global institutional optimum
that would drive popular support for metropolitan collaboration
regardless of the specifics of the local context. Although I do not
address neither efficiency nor legitimacy in this research, previous
research suggests there is no global optimum along these dimen-
sions either (see section 1.4). Copious resources are dedicated to
solve the social space / political space discrepancy in each of these
metropolitan areas, but very rarely is popular support for potential
solutions gauged. This absence of research makes political capital
difficult to build for these solutions, relying on efficiency claims
difficult to support empirically, and heuristics reinforcing local po-
litical fault lines. This study has been conducted with a research
grant of $2,000, offering a glimpse on how local aspirant reformers
could build an experimentally driven reform proposal in tune with
metropolitan residents preferences and perceptions of the actual
policy problem to solve at an affordable cost.
Metropolitan policies are rival in context. The geographic
variation demonstrated by survey respondents hints at the local
functional and institutional context of diverse metropolitan areas
interacting with the typology of goods produced and managed by
policies. In particular, how local conditions makes a good more
or less rival matters in how respondents are driven to support
institutional reform to alleviate the competition. In particular, in-
stitutional fragmentation in the growth oriented environment of
the San Francisco Bay Area could accentuate the rival dimension
of economic development and population growth. Cities compete
for economic growth, providing an expansion of tax base without
consuming much more public services. By contrast, cities are leery
of population growth, much less lucrative and requiring costly
public services. Thus, local governments try to offset their housing
needs to other local governments in the area, welcoming the jobs,
but not the new population. In a fragmented environment where
local governments can effectively compete for land-use, the rival
dimension of this mis-alignment is markedly salient to residents
and could make them sensitive to policy reform to alleviate this
rivalry. Understanding the specific conditions of rivalry in different
metropolitan contexts is therefore promising to reveal the potential
levers of metropolitan reform.
How to understand geographic variation. The realization
that one size does not fit all in terms of metropolitan governance
reform and that local context and preferences have a potential to
influence and support diverse reform plans in different metropoli-
tan areas in the United States begets the question of the nature of
this geographic variation. Are comparable local conditions foster-
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ing comparable popular preferences across multiple metropolitan
areas in the country? Or is every metropolitan area a single case
too specific for researchers to uncover common causal mechanisms
at work? Focused on California, with four large metropolitan ar-
eas, this study does not offer the sample size and representativity
to answer this question. A larger, comparable study should be
conducted, this time sampling respondents from all metropolitan
areas in the United States, to address the question of geographic
variation. This sampling would provide enough of a variation of
geographic context to answer it. Providers such as Amazon MTurk
offer the possibility of conducting such a study at a reasonable
cost, compared to traditional survey recruitment methods. Broadly,
two types of questions should be engaged with. First, how does
the metropolitan context influence people preferences? Housing
prices, traffic conditions, among others, could influence willingness
of residents to collaborate on multiple policies across municipal
boundaries if they perceive it would solve their problems. Second,
how does the existing institutional architecture of metropolitan gov-
ernance influence people’s preferences for collaboration? Residents
of very fragmented metropolitan areas, experiencing first-hand the
effect of fragmentation, for instance, could be driven to support
collaboration. By contrast, residents of metropolitan areas where
power is more concentrated could not see the need for collabora-
tion.
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Abbreviations
ABAG Association of Bay Area
Governments (Regional planning
agency for the San Francisco Bay
Area)
ACS American Community Survey
AMCE Average Marginal Component
Effect
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Appendix: Survey questions
Figure 7: Example of experimental
question. Conjoint experiment.
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Figure 8: Example of experimental
question. Vignette experiment.
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dimension values
Participation* - [My city] and 3 neighboring cities
- [My city] and 15 neighboring cities
- All cities and counties in the greater
[metropolitan area]Cost
of
plan-
ning
and
infrastructures
- Same as today
- 20$ less than today per household per month
- 50$ less than today per household per month
- 20$ more than today per household per
month
- 50$ more than today per household per
month
Distribution of costs - Proportional to the population: places with
more population pay more.
- Proportional to the current tax base: places
with more population and economic activity
today pay more.
- Proportional to the new development: places
with more new development pay more.
Type of power - [Your city] keeps much of the land-use plan-
ning power: the new multi-city planning board
only does coordination, giving objectives and
guidelines for participating cities.
- Replaces [your city] planning department
completely: all planning powers are transfered
to the new multi-city planning board, including
detailed zoning and building permits.
Policy coordination - Only regulates land-use.
- Regulates land-use and coordinates with wa-
ter management: makes sure there is enough
water for development.
- Regulates land-use and coordinates with
transportation and public transit: makes sure
that transportation infrastructure is adequate
for development.
- Regulates land-use and coordinates with wa-
ter management, transportation and and public
transit: makes sure there is enough water and
transportation infrastructure is adequate for
development.
Board members - Directy elected by the population.
- Non-partisan, independent, appointed ex-
perts.
Sanctions for
non-complying
cities
- No sanctions
- 20$ per household per month
- 50$ per household per month
* Content in brackets is adapted to the location of the respondent,
based on the zipcode provided.
Table 2: Institutional arrangement
dimensions and values
Each individual plan presented to respon-
dents is made of one value randomly chosen
for every institutional dimension.
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Participation Cost Distribution Power Coordination Board Members Sanctions
Participation 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.36 0.73 0.98 0.36
Cost 0.36 0.00 0.24 0.60 0.70 0.22 0.40
Distribution 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.78 0.69 0.57
Power 0.36 0.60 0.62 0.00 0.52 1.00 0.28
Coordination 0.73 0.70 0.78 0.52 0.00 0.45 0.49
Board Members 0.98 0.22 0.69 1.00 0.45 0.00 0.54
Sanctions 0.36 0.40 0.57 0.28 0.49 0.54 0.00
Table 3: Pearson’s Chi-squared inde-
pendence tests for pairs of vignette
dimensions
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Appendix: Distribution of Respondents
How to read the figures. Figures 9 to 13 display the relative
distribution of survey respondents compared to the overall adult
population of the State of California, as measured by the American
Community Survey from the US Census, dated from 2013 and av-
eraged over a period of 5 years, along several socio-demographic
characteristics: primary statistical area of residence, gender, age,
race and ethnicity, and annual household income. In each figure,
the teal-colored bar shows the distribution of survey respondents
along the dimension of interest, while the red bar shows the distri-
bution in the State of California. Both quantities have been graph-
ically normalized to be comparable, and the axis shows the actual
number of individuals for each population.
Distribution of complete responses by Primary Statistical Area
Compared to 2013 PSA population
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Figure 9: Distribution of responses by
Primary Statistical Area (PSA).
Bar size is equally proportional to each
PSA share in the survey sample and in
California’s population. Two bars of equal
size for a PSA reflect that the proportion
of respondents from the area is exactly the
same as the area’s weight in the State’s total
population.
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Distribution of complete responses by gender
Compared to 2013 California population
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Figure 10: Distribution of complete
responses by gender, compared to 2013
California population.
Distribution of complete responses by age group
Compared to 2013 California population
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Figure 11: Distribution of complete
responses by age group, compared to
2013 California population.
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Distribution of complete responses by race & ethnicity
Compared to 2013 California population
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Figure 12: Distribution of complete
responses by race and ethnicity, com-
pared to 2013 California population.
Distribution of complete responses by household income group
Compared to 2013 California population
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Figure 13: Distribution of complete
responses by annual household in-
come, compared to 2013 California
population.
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Appendix: Statistical Model Figures and Tables
No
Not sure
Yes
0 100 200 300 400 500
# Responses
Avg support: 0.53 / 1
Figure 14: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a collabora-
tion plan, all respondents.
N = 620, 2 measures/respondent
No
Not sure
Yes
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# Responses
Avg support: 0.53 / 1
Figure 15: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a collabora-
tion plan, likely voters.
N Likely Voters = 258, 2 mea-
sures/respondent
No
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Avg support: 0.53 / 1
Figure 16: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a collab-
oration plan, Greater Los Angeles
respondents.
N = 620, 2 measures/respondent
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Figure 17: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a collabo-
ration plan, San Francisco Bay Area
respondents.
N = 620, 2 measures/respondent
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Avg support: 0.51 / 1
Figure 18: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a col-
laboration plan, Greater San Diego
respondents.
N = 620, 2 measures/respondent
No
Not sure
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# Responses
Avg support: 0.52 / 1
Figure 19: Distribution of expressed
individual preferences for a collab-
oration plan, Greater Sacramento
respondents.
N = 620, 2 measures/respondent
How to read the figures. Figures 20 to 45 are visualizations
of estimates of Average Marginal Component Effects for the con-
joint experiment, the effect of each institutional feature, on the
relative preference for a plan over an alternative. For convenience
of interpretability, the figures display the effect of a feature on the
respondent’s odds of supporting the plan over its alternative. For
instance, an effect of 2 means that the feature makes respondents
twice as likely to support the plan on average. Conversely, an effect
of 0.5 means that the feature makes the respondents half as likely
to support the plan on average. Moreover, the figures show the 95%
confidence interval for each effect. A smaller confidence interval
means a larger certainty about the true effect. A confidence interval
that does not include 0 indicates that the effect is significant with a
p-value < 0.05.
Figure 20 and 21 compare AMCE estimates for the whole popu-
lation of respondents, without and with sampling weights to correct
for sampling biases
the place and scale of consent 171
Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) of plan features
Unweighted, all respondents (unconditional)
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Figure 20: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Unweighted, all respondents (uncondi-
tional).
the place and scale of consent 172
Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) of plan features
All respondents (unconditional)
0
0.92
0
1.12
1.09
1.08
0
1.01
0.91
0.81
0.82
0
1.11
1.05
0
0.95
0.95
0
0.92
0
0.92
0.89    50
    20
   (Baseline =  No )
Sanctions
    Strong
   (Baseline =  Weak )
Power
    Metro
    15
   (Baseline =  3 )
Participation
    New development
    Tax base
   (Baseline =  Population )
Distribution
    Plus 50
    Plus 20
    Minus 20
    Minus 50
   (Baseline =  Same )
Cost
    Transport
    Water+Transport
    Water
   (Baseline =  No )
Coordination
    Appointed
   (Baseline =  Elected )
BoardMembers
0.5 0.7 1 1.4 2
Average Marginal Component Effect on odds of choosing the plan
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
pl
an
 fe
at
ur
es
p < 0.05
p > 0.05
NA
Figure 21: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, all respondents (uncondi-
tional).
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Figure 22: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Participation
= Very likely or somewhat likely.
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Figure 23: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Participation
= Neither likely nor unlikely.
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Figure 24: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Participation
= Very unlikely or somewhat unlikely.
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Figure 25: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Metropolitan
Area = Los Angeles.
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Figure 26: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Metropolitan
Area = San Francisco.
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Figure 27: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Metropolitan
Area = San Diego.
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Figure 28: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Metropolitan
Area = Sacramento.
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Figure 29: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Metropolitan
Area = other.
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Figure 30: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Gender =
Female.
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Figure 31: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Gender =
Male.
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Figure 32: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Party =
Independent.
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Figure 33: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Party =
Democrat (Leaning or registered).
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Figure 34: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Party =
Republican (Leaning or registered).
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Figure 35: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Race and
ethnicity = White.
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Figure 36: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Race and
ethnicity = Asian.
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Figure 37: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Race and
ethnicity = Black.
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Figure 38: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Race and
ethnicity = Latino.
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Figure 39: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Race and
ethnicity = Other.
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Figure 40: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Annual
Household Income < $33,000
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Figure 41: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on $33,000 <=
Annual Household Income < $72,000
the place and scale of consent 193
Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) of plan features
Conditional on Annual Household Income >= $72,000
0
1.04
0.9
0
0.87
0.85
0.78
0.73
0
1.12
0.94
0
0.93
0
1.34
1.21
1.21
0
0.91
0
0.93
0.9    50
    20
   (Baseline =  No )
Sanctions
    Appointed
   (Baseline =  Elected )
BoardMembers
    Transport
    Water+Transport
    Water
   (Baseline =  No )
Coordination
    Strong
   (Baseline =  Weak )
Power
    New development
    Tax base
   (Baseline =  Population )
Distribution
    Plus 50
    Plus 20
    Minus 20
    Minus 50
   (Baseline =  Same )
Cost
    Metro
    15
   (Baseline =  3 )
Participation
0.5 0.7 1 1.4 2
Average Marginal Component Effect on odds of choosing the plan
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
pl
an
 fe
at
ur
es
p < 0.05
p > 0.05
NA
Figure 42: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Annual
Household Income >= $72,000
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Figure 43: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on 18 <= Age <
31.
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Figure 44: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on 31 <= Age <
47.
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Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) of plan features
Conditional on Age >= 47
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Figure 45: Average Marginal Compo-
nent Effects (AMCE) of plan features.
Weighted, conditional on Age >= 47.
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In this research project I have investigated the discrepancy be-
tween social and institutional space by examining two spatial real-
ities: metropolitan areas and disadvataged communities. For both,
I have evaluated official definitions and proposed alternatives. For
metropolitan areas, I have conducted a survey experiment to un-
derstand people’s preferences for inter-governmental collaboration
in land-use, transit and transportation, and water policies. While
different in scope and methods, these three specific projects offer
common insights to better conduct policies with substantial spatial
dimensions. These insights are precious to conduct policies that, as
it is the case for both spaces examined here, target spaces do not
have a coextensive institution or government.
In this conclusive chapter, I start by summarizing empirical re-
sults from the three studies, describing how they constribute to
general hypotheses of the research laid out in the introduction (1).
Second, I expound how, in a context of networked urban spaces, a
local approach is unavoidable. This local approach, however, can
be undertaken with a comparative mindset and take advantage of
a common toolbox (2). A comparative approach combined with
experimental methods to explore potential policies opens the door
to a rapid-prototyping approach to policy. Involving public par-
ticipation in a scientifically rigorous setting contributes to expand
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the domain of possible policies and defuse political caveats of pol-
icy implementation (3). This rapid-prototyping approach can be
applied to planning, dissolving the border between project and
policy (4). If significant, further research should be undertaken to
precise the contours of an experimental approach to policy, both in
scientific research, and in concrete applications (5).
1 Summary of empirical results
General conclusion can be drawn from the three specific studies
I conducted on the delineation of metropolitan areas, definition
of disadvantaged communities, and individual support for inter-
government collaboration on land-use. They support general hy-
potheses enunciated in the introductory chapter. First, local context
is important in these three cases, and a general solution applying
across the board is not possible (1.1). Second, the idea of determin-
ing a strict boundary between an inside and an outside of these
spatial realities is undermined by geographic continuity, context,
and the necessity of taking into account multiple dimensions (1.2).
Last, an experimental approach to public policy is validated. This
experimental approach allows to understand local preferences for
policy features (1.3).
1.1 One size does not fit all: local context matters
In the three studies that I have conducted, local geographic context
takes precedence over a global, one size fits all solution. I conclude
that delineations of metropolitan areas and disadvantaged commu-
nities, as well as scale and features and inter-government collabo-
ration on land-use policies should emerge from local conditions. If
methods can be defined globally, their application should be local.
The White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
uses a definition of metropolitan areas based on commuting pat-
terns between counties. I validate that there is indeed a lot of in-
formation about metropolitan areas’ functioning in commuting
patterns, and that they reveal different types of relationships be-
tween places. However, no one delineation can capture all this in-
formation and the relevant delineation should be adapted for each
policy. Moreover, the data itself does not display an obvious, inter-
nally valid threshold of commuting to identify metropolitan areas.
Such a threshold would be a range of stability in the data, around
which delineations do not vary significantly. Furthermore, I showed
that commuting patterns vary between large regions of the United
States (East, South & West), further undermining the possibility of a
uniform definition.
In the four largest metropolitan areas of California (Los Angeles,
San Francisco, San Diego & Sacramento), I have shown that res-
idents have different preferences for collaboration between their
municipalities and other municipalities in the areas on land-use,
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transportation, and water. If residents do not seem to attach much
importance to specific institutional features of the collaboration—
board type, sanctions. . .—, their preferences vary regarding their
preferred scale of collaboration and the specific policy mix that the
collaboration should address. However, people are not adverse to
metropolitan collaboration, provided that it solves a problem they
think is important and does it at the right scale. Therefore, it is
likely that collaboration instruments on metropolitan issues would
have a greater chance of gathering support if it stemmed from an
understanding of local preferences for scale and policy-mix.
Lastly, I have shown that a uniform definition of disadvantaged
communities in California fails to identify communities that are,
in context really struggling economically. Local context provides
additional information necessary to make sense the metric used
to measure economic disadvantage. The State of California uses
median household income to identify disadvantaged communities,
but is insensible to the fact that a given income means different pur-
chasing powers in different context. I have shown that, for failing to
take this context into account, median household income by itself
fails to delineate disadvantaged communities.
1.2 Spatial realities are continuous and multi-dimensional
In the three studies composing this dissertation, I have concluded
that there is no single, mono-dimensional metric able to capture
entirely the relevant information to conduct a policy in a specific
space. Rather, policy-makers should build a series of complemen-
tary point of views to gain a better understanding and mutually
validate their instruments. Social behaviors in space are continuous
and the process of simplifying and aggregating them for statisti-
cal purposes is one of approximation. A binary measure trying to
strictly distinguish what is in and what is out might be blurring
the picture more than it sheds light on the reality that the policy in-
tends to target. There is no evidence, for instance, that Metropolitan
Planning Organizations (MPOs) have an impact on planning in line
with the policy goal of reducing urban sprawl.1 On the contrary, 1 Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002.
studies I have produced in this dissertation support that binary def-
initions undermine policy efficacy by diverting resources away from
intended targets.
Taking into account the continuous nature of social space means
that policy definitions should not produce mutually exclusive delin-
eations. I have shown in my study of commuting patterns between
counties to delineate metropolitan areas that there is significant
continuity in regions that are abundantly urbanized. A county sit-
ting between two important metropolitan centers, for instance, is
influenced by both and does not need to be in one metropolitan
area of the other. Rather, it should participate as a relevant actor
in addressing issues of both. By creating a fixed tessellation of
metropolitan areas, the OMB undermines local capacity of adapta-
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tion where it should be incentivizing it.
Additionally, different issues have different relevant scales of
action. Solving local traffic does not need to be addressed at the
same scale at solving a regional housing shortage. With hierarchical
clustering of counties along the strength of their commuting ties,
I have shown that parts of large urban regions can retain a strong
local specificity, while metropolitan areas themselves aggregate
in larger urban regions. The right scale is the one that solves the
problem. I have shown that residents are relatively indifferent to
the details of institutional architecture, and care more about the
problem that the policy intends to address.
With disadvantaged communities in California, I have pointed
to the pitfalls of relying on a single dimension of measurement—
median household income—to approach a spatial reality when the
meaning of this measurement varies considerably with geographic
context. The problem is less stringent with metropolitan areas be-
cause the use of commuting as a proxy for routine mobility has
been validated. However, the county is a relatively coarse scale of
measurement. This is especially the case in the West where counties
tend to be larger. Therefore, smaller-scale commuting data would
be useful for a better understanding of local contexts.
1.3 An experimental approach to policy is viable
Lastly, I have demonstrated with the last of the three studies in this
dissertation that an experimental approach to public feedback for
policy design is possible. I have used fully randomized vignette
experiments to uncover causal links between policy features and
individual support for the policy. This type of experiments need to
be externally validated, to ensure it fits the policy and can integrate
in a policy design process to produce a measurably better outcome
than the current practice of voluntary public feedback.
However, fully randomized policy vignettes and conjoint exper-
iment have already demonstrated great potential for bringing solid
public feedback into policy making. They depart from opinion sur-
vey in that respondents are not asked to express an opinion but, to
the highest possible extent, to take a decision. The role of the re-
searcher, in that case, is to create an experimental setting in which
a cost is attached to this decision for the respondent. The decision
must feel real for the respondent to reveal their preferences.
The comparative experiment between the four largest metropoli-
tan areas of California reveals the relative unimportance of demo-
graphic factors in support for a collaboration policy. Significant
demographic factors—age—and party identification effects are con-
sistent across metropolitan areas. Policy features swaying respon-
dents’ support, however, varies markedly between metropolitan
areas. Scale and policy-mix especially have an effect, by contrast
with institutional architecture features such a board composition.
It is probable that differences between metropolitan areas could be
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explained by differences in issues experiences by residents of dif-
ferent metropolitan areas. Respondents would then favor the policy
instrument that they think addresses the problem they identify.
External validation would be needed to further explain individ-
ual preferences, but randomized vignette experiments are a good
tool to measure variations between places and understand local
concerns.
2 Local solutions, common toolbox
Evidence of the importance of local context in identifying target
spaces and shape policies in line with residents’ preferences should
not obfuscate the potential of a shared platform to understand this
local context. Indeed, if policies should be local, tools should be
shared, so that cities and their policy makers can learn from each
other.
2.1 Policies should be local
Local context is prime in understanding spatial realities. This is a
common conclusion of the three studies I have conducted on the
delineation of metropolitan area, the identification of disadvan-
taged communities as policy targets, and individual preferences for
inter-governmental collaboration. Local context prevalence implies
that policies, too, should be defined locally, at least in their spatial
dimensions.
Different functionings of metropolitan areas have different con-
sequences for planning policies, for instance. A metropolitan area
composed of a single core around which suburban developments
progressively aggregate faces different challenges than a multi-core
area where each part keeps significant specificity. Metropolitan ar-
eas are also multidimensional, and they way these dimensions ply
together is specific to each. Consequently, the right scale to address
transportation or housing challenges is different for each metropo-
lis, and can be for each policy.
Conversely, it is impossible to assess a community’s economic
struggle without consideration for local context. Beyond a univer-
sal metric like household income, what does this income mean in
context? It is easier to live with a lower income in places with a cor-
responding low cost of living. The same income in a neighborhood
with low rental prices, inhabited by young, single adults captures
a different reality than in a place with high rental prices and large
families. Access to resources matters, too. Places where economic
activity is low and job opportunities rare are harder to live in than
places with abundant employment at hand.
Lastly, local context matters because it matters to people. Resi-
dents of Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, have
a different view on the challenges that their metropolitan area is
facing. This perception influences in turn their preferences for col-
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laboration beyond the borders of their municipality.
Policies should be local because local realities are different, and
because these differences shape the path of political legitimacy
towards public support and implementation.
2.2 Tools should be shared
Policies should be local but tools to conduct these policies, and in-
struments to measure their efficacy and efficiency can be shared. In
the three papers composing this dissertation, I have used common
tools to identify local specificities and common trends. Indeed, it
is precisely because instruments to look at them are the same that
local situations become commensurable and comparable.
Accounting for local specificity in public policies does not en-
tail a complete withdrawal from states and federal administrations
in how spatial realities should be defined and delineated. On the
contrary, they can provide the means to do so in an efficient and
comparable way, while leveling the field so that local authorities
have access to quality data and instruments. In metropolitan areas,
large cities and existing associations of local governments possess
human and technical resources to manipulate complex sets of data,
but smaller governments in the area do not enjoy these capabilities.
Often, the debate over precises delineations that a policy should
take are not rooted in data because of this imbalance in access to
good resources. By providing accessible tools, central administra-
tions can contribute to improve the quality of local debate, ease the
path to consensus, and enhance the quality of policies altogether.
Strict, mono-dimensional out-of-the-box delineations of metropoli-
tan areas provided by the OMB today do not achieve these goals.
For instance, debates over housing in the San Francisco Bay Area
often trigger accusations that some local communities are not “do-
ing their fair share” by allowing construction of enough housing,
or that others seek to attract too many wealthy households without
providing housing for lower income populations. Municipalities
in the South Bay, benefiting from important economic growth in
the technology sector, are often suspected of attracting jobs but re-
fusing to house new residents. Much of the debate is focused on
the relations between San Francisco on the one hand, and the Sil-
icon Valley on the other. This debate cannot be addressed, and a
solution cannot successfully emerge, without recognizing the ef-
fects of job growth on the housing market through commuting. A
more precise look at theses dynamics show that the relationship
between San Francisco and Silicon might not be as strong as usually
portrayed, and points at the role of the Central Valley as San Fran-
cisco’s Inland Empire, usually ignored. This information, however,
is not captured in the official definition of metropolitan areas. By
providing more detailed but accessible analysis about functionings
of metropolitan areas, both the OMB and the US Census Bureau
could contribute to a higher quality of local debate and better pol-
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icy outcomes.
Compensating for diversity of local access to resources, spatial
justice, is another reason to provide a common toolbox. Resource-
ful communities and local administrations can go beyond official
definitions in order to build a case. California DWR’s disadvan-
taged communities grant program, for instance, explicitly allows
for arguments beyond the official Proposition 84 definition. How-
ever, gathering and treating data is expensive, time-consuming and
requires technical capability that can be well beyond the means
of struggling communities. By providing tools to access the data
necessary to make a case for the identification of a community as
a disadvantaged one, and by lowering the barrier to put this data
to use, the State of California could be more in line with the policy
goal.
State and federal administrations should take a step back in
regards to delineations of spatial realities for policy purposes and,
instead of providing borders, provide the tools to draw them. This
is the best way to ensure both spatial justice, by providing resources
to communities who lack them, and improve policy outcomes, by
allowing delineations to follow local specificities more closely.
3 A rapid prototyping approach to policy
Policy solutions and relevant institutional architectures are local.
There is therefore no big solution of universal panacea to problems
common to many different places. Public administration research
should therefore shift its focus towards shared tools to measure
local context and build local solutions, allowing a comparative
approach between differing local conditions. But this creates a chal-
lenge in designing policies that are locally efficient and politically
acceptable. This challenge is even reinforced in a federal country
like the United States where local governments collaborating on a
given problem enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Policies are of-
ten designed in a linear way in regards to contacts with the public.
Many policies fail to pass or be implemented because political pit-
falls are not defused early enough in their design. Policy-makers
go forward in the definition of the policy, only for the policy to fail
on the ballot or be buried by elected officials worried about their
constituency.
Simultaneously, access to polls and survey has become cheaper
and easier. Polls are now widely conducted for local elections in
large cities. However, these polls are confined to elections, and stay
overwhelmingly declarative, gaging declared support for candi-
dates. Public support for policies is largely conducted through pub-
lic meetings. There is three problems with the way public opinions
is integrated in policy-making today. First, it is confined to a spe-
cific phase of the policy definition process. Public opinion is often
gathered towards the end, when the policy has been largely defined
and several options are still under consideration. Second, public
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comments are based on voluntary participation, through public
meetings or workshops. This creates an significant participation
bias, where only specific individuals with high stakes in the project
will participate. Lastly, public opinion is collected in a declarative
way. Participants are asked to provide their opinion on the project,
without being put in the situation of making a decision between
different trade-off architectures. Declarative survey, because they do
not associate a cost to the opinion being expressed, do not necessar-
ily translate the preferred trade-off of the respondents.
Easy and inexpensive access to surveying methods creates a
substantive opportunity to renew the process of gathering and inte-
grating public opinion in policy-making. In the third paper of this
dissertation, The Place and Scale of Consent, I have placed respon-
dents of different metropolitan areas in California in the situation
of making a trade-off between different dimensions of a policy.
This method can be generalized and applied to a high number of
policies, and mitigates the three aforementioned caveats of current
public participation models. Participation bias is reduced because
respondents are chosen at random amongst a pool of participants
from the survey recruitment provider. With a higher budget than
allocated for this specific research project, a better quality of recruit-
ment, closer to random selection among residents of the metropoli-
tan area, is possible. Contrary to public meetings and workshops,
potential recruitment bias is not correlated with the policy. Re-
cruited participants are not likely to be recruited because they have
a particular stake in the policy. Vignette and conjoint experiments
allows a randomization of treatment, the particular policy trade-
off, amongst respondents, therefore allowing causal relationships
between policy dimensions and support for a policy. Lastly, policy
makers can afford to run several rounds of experiments along the
policy design process. Public participation conducted through sur-
vey experiments can be more iterative, keeping the policy in check
with people’s preferences all along.
Regular causal experiments from a randomly selected group
of residents allows policy making to become more akin to rapid-
prototyping. Rapid prototyping is the process of integrating the
production of models of the final product in the design process.
Rather than design in abstracto and then producing the object, the
production of iterative models of the object is integrated in the
design process itself. A core idea of rapid prototyping is that this
production of models brings valuable information to the designer.
Similarly, rapid, frequent experiments on policy trade-offs can in-
form policy makers in a valuable way. Rather than designing a
policy as a big, indivisible and linear process, this suggest a pos-
sibility to conduct policy design in a more nimble, iterative and
interactive way. Rapid policy prototyping does not replace public
workshops and meetings, rather it complements them, and allows a
more informed discussion with participants of these meetings.
This idea of causal experiments informing iterative design has
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been in use in marketing. It is important for firms to design prod-
ucts that people actually want to buy. It is equally if not more
important to design policies that people actually support. In rep-
resentative democracies, this task is delegated to elected repre-
sentatives. Diminishing trust in elected representatives over the
past decades, however, has put a dent in this idea. In countries
with direct democracy, such as the United States and Switzerland,
important, divisive legislations make their way to the ballot. But
the ballot suffers from selection bias, with direct democracy be-
ing usually associated with low turnout ascribed to voter fatigue.
Moreover, direct democracy is hardly iterative. If the same issue can
come back to the ballot several times until it is adopted or until its
proponents abandon it, cycles are measured in years. With rapid
causal experiments, cycles of feedback can be as fast as weeks.
Strikingly, the idea of random selection has been a regular
stream of democratic theory. In ancient Athens, late medieval
Northern Italy, and 18th century Switzerland, some official positions
were alloted by random draw, or sortition. The idea, mirrored in
judicial juries, is that random draw better represent the population
as a whole, increases fairness of the selection process, and defeats
corruption by eliminating career politicians. Numerous democratic
theorists have proposed some form of random draw for policy mak-
ing, either to complement or to replace elected bodies. A drawback
of these proposals however, is the time participants would be asked
to dedicate to it. Rapid causal experiments alleviate this concern, by
reducing participation time to minutes.
Developments of experimental methods in social sciences cre-
ates an opportunity to expand random draws and uncover causal
mechanisms of people’s support for public policies.
Beyond producing better policies, rapid prototyping likely pro-
duces policies that are more likely to be accepted by the public, and
pass political hurdles. In addition to reveal what people car about,
survey experiments also reveal what arguments people respond
positively and negatively. For instance, many policies are touted to
be more efficient or cost saving. In the context of the specific exper-
iment I conducted on multi-government collaboration for land-use
policy, respondents are not swayed by this argument. It seems that,
if they trust that a policy can increase spendings, they hardly be-
lieve it can decrease them. This insight suggests that arguments
about what problems the policy solves and what it accomplishes
are more potent than arguments about costs.
4 Implications for planning
The two main dimensions of the work I conducted in this research
project, regarding the delineation of spatial realities, and the use
of experimental methods to understand local preferences, have
relevance to planning. In this section I examine how the results of
this work informs the fabric of the city and urban infrastructures.
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4.1 Planning is a policy
The distinction between planning and policy is flimsy. Large scale
planning projects do not have a clear beginning or end and can
easily span over decades. Infrastructure projects are often phased
and amended, containing several overlapping dimensions. In turn,
these projects shape the spatial environment of societies around
them. The development of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) sys-
tem, around the San Francisco Bay, has accompanied ans shaped
urban development around the Bay for seven decades. The Second
Avenue Subway, in New-York, has been in planning, then construc-
tion, for more than a century. The Second Avenue Subway will
continue to slowly expand in the next decades, exerting potent ef-
fects on the city around its stations and beyond. In these conditions,
planning looks less like a project and more like an ongoing policy.
At the same time, development of policy evaluation and time
limits imposed of policy funding has transformed policies into
projects, with a clearer beginning and end. Many policies do not
enjoy funding unlimited in time, but are tied to a specific funding
instrument, like a bond. This is the case for California’s Safe Drink-
ing Water, Water Quality and Supply, Flood Control, River and
Coastal Protection Bond Act of 2006 that I examine in the second
paper of this dissertation. Many policies directed to metropolitan
areas follow the same pattern. They have a stated goal, a time limit
and a funding cap. The way these policies are conducted is closer to
projects, making them easier to evaluate, but separating them from
their potential externalities.
This double trends creates a convergence between the way plan-
ning projects and policies are conducted. In turn, this convergence
opens opportunities to share practices and tools.
4.2 Planning is embedded is socio-spatial realities
Planning is embedded is the spatial functioning of societies. There
is a feedback loop between planned projects and infrastructures
and the way people use space. This feedback goes in both direc-
tions. New projects changes social use of space. The attachment
of the Central Valley to the Bay Area beyond mountain ranges is
permitted by the construction of transport infrastructure. If moun-
tain ranges had stayed impervious to daily commutes, California
Central Valley wouldn’t develop to absorb part of the Bay Area’s
growing population. This emerging condition, in turn, creates
orientations for planning projects: further development of roads,
growth of communities in the Central Valley. . .
Conversely, planning projects become possible or out of reach
because of the social and political context, beyond engineering and
technical feasibility. For instance, San Francisco’s BART system
finds more political support for extensions at the periphery of the
system than for reinforcing the core of the system. This context
should be an integral part of how to frame the planning problem.
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Feedback on these dimensions should be incorporated as early as
possible in the planning process, lest it be sidetracked or deemed
politically infeasible later on.
4.3 Lean planning
For these reasons, a more careful understanding of the spatial re-
alities surrounding planing projects and a nimbler, more iterative
public feedback would improve quality and political acceptability
of planning projects. Many large scale planning or infrastructure
projects are embedded in metropolitan areas. A better understand-
ing of how this metropolitan area functions would allow more
precise arguments on how the project addresses local problems. As
I have shown in the third paper of this dissertation, The Place and
Scale of Consent, these are the most potent arguments. Metropoli-
tan residents care about what problems are addressed and at what
scale, much less about the precise institutional arrangement to do
so. Moreover, residents tend not to trust cost-saving arguments.
Public feedback on planning projects is often dominated by close
stakeholders pushing for a specific agenda not necessarily aligned
with overall preferences of residents. These stakeholders are mo-
tivated by the concentrated costs or benefits that they would incur
with the project. The general population enjoys distributed ben-
efits or suffers distributed costs, individually not high enough to
motivate engagement in the public participation process.2 Cycles 2 Olson 1965.
of rapid feedback based on experimental methods able to uncover
causal effects between the project’s features and general public
support would counterbalance this effect and complement existing
voluntary public participation with a wider view of public support.
Technical tools for recruitment of respondents, construction of sur-
vey experiments and analysis of their answers have become much
more accessible in the pas decade. The cost of recruiting a suffi-
ciently large representative panel has also decreased in the recent
past, at least in large American metropolitan areas. Compared to
the overall cost of the design process and public participation, the
cost of running several rounds of experiments is bearable.
5 Follow-up research program
The research program permitted by this work is twofold. First, it
is possible to build on the analysis of metropolitan areas and dis-
advantaged communities to build a better understanding of these
spatial realities. In particular, I pointed to several directions for bet-
ter metrics, taking multiple dimensions into account and producing
a more nuanced, non-binary understanding of these realities. I have
concentrated efforts on internal validity of measurement, and work
must be extended to external validation: how to make sure that
these measurement actually correspond to the spatial reality that
is intended. External validation creates an opportunity to bridge
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observational with experimental methods. This is the more theo-
retical dimension of a follow-up research program. There is also
an important operational dimension, concerned with how to apply
tools and methods defined in this dissertation to policy problems
and integrate them in policy making.
5.1 A deeper understanding of spatial realities combining observations
and experiments
I have produced an analysis of the official definitions of metropoli-
tan areas and disadvantaged communities, as instance of spatial
realities used for policy purposes. I have shown that both these def-
initions fail at delineations these spatial realities, with implications
for public policies based upon them. Especially, I have underlined
the importance of understanding these spatial realities in context.
This context needs to be researched further, pursuing the analysis
in depth. In particular, I ave shown that metropolitan areas have
different structures, revealed by their commuting patterns, and ev-
idenced by hierarchical clustering of counties based on clustering.
The structural properties of metropolitan areas can be characterized
further. Similarities and differences between metropolitan areas
should be mapped. Some metropolitan areas are composed of sev-
eral relatively independent parts, while others aggregate linearly
around a single, large core. Theses differences have potentially
strong repercussions for policy purposes and must be further un-
derstood.
There is a strong potential to bring experimental methods in to
understand these spatial realities from the point of view of their
users. Further work on the delineation of metropolitan areas dis-
advantaged communities can be accompanied with experiments
putting residents in the position of taking a decision that will reveal
their view on this delineation. The survey experiment that I con-
ducted to reveal preferences on inter-governmental collaboration in
metropolitan areas is already revealing views about respondents’
perceived scale of the metropolitan space of externalities. These two
dimensions, observational and experimental, can be further tied to-
gether. Using an experimental method, asking respondents to take
a decision on a policy question, and varying the features of the pol-
icy question at random, yields a causal understanding of the link
between policy features and popular support. This link, in turn, can
help build an understanding of spatial realities as understood by
the people who build them.
The survey experiment I conducted shed light on people’s in-
volvement in metropolitan areas. Beyond the question of their
identification to the area, the experiment uncovers their willing-
ness to incur costs to share resources in order to solve an issue in
common. The experiment, however, has been conducted in Cali-
fornia only, with respondents from only four large metropolitan
areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento. For this
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reason, it is difficult to infer how characteristics of metropolitan
areas—housing prices, traffic conditions, environmental stress, in-
stitutional fragmentation. . .—weigh on respondents’ preferences.
More metropolitan areas, units of respondents’ aggregation for a
multi-level analysis, are needed to study this relation between local
conditions and individual preferences. A nation-wide survey exper-
iment would provide enough variations in metropolitan conditions.
5.2 A toolbox for public policies
I have shown in this work that spatial realities are to be understood
in their multiple dimensions, and that public policies should veer
away from binary definitions of spatial realities in order to be in
line with their policy goals. Integrating multiple dimensions and
integrating context in policy definitions is challenging and could
potentially generate much obfuscation. Complicated definitions
are not legible, therefore not actionable by agents along the policy
implementation process. Therefore, conveying local geographic
context in a simple and graspable fashion is an important ques-
tion of policy research. Here again, experimental methods could be
employed to test lay persons’ understanding of a delineation, find-
ing the best possible trade-off between a definition that truthfully
portrays the intended spatial reality, and a simple, legible defini-
tion. Local governments and administrations have a diverse degree
of technical capability, and bringing tools to measure local spatial
realities to a level of accessibility that is productive for small gov-
ernments lacking data science skills is a challenge. Allowing them
to build a case for policy delineations and include it grant applica-
tions has potential to enhance the degree to which policies are well
adapted to local contexts. In order to do so, however, and bring
power of delineation down to local level of governments, the field
of data manipulation that is necessary to actually make these delin-
eations must be leveled down to be accessible by local employees
without extensive data training.
Additionally, I have illustrated the power of survey experi-
ments to gather public feedback on policy orientations, and un-
cover causal relationships between policy features and support.
The experiment I conducted to understand individual support for
multi-governments collaboration around land-use issues in Califor-
nia metropolitan areas is an example of how policy makers could
gage public feedback for policy design. For this tool to be usable
in real policy design, two elements need to be advanced further.
First, it needs to be accessible for use by a wider audience with
lower technical skills. Market research tools for conjoint experi-
ments and treatment randomization can serve as a base to build
a platform suitable for policy research. Second, the effect of us-
ing this additional technique of public feedback should be studied
further. Survey are sometimes used for public policy feedback but
more rarely at local levels. Moreover, they are often declarative and
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not based on a randomization of treatment, therefore unsuitable
to causal inference. In particular, the integration of several rounds
of survey experiments as rapid feedback along the steps of policy
design from beginning to implementation has not been researched.
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Abbreviations
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organi-
zation
OMB (White House) Office of Man-
agement and Budget
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